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Introduction
Thl. i. a .tudy of the attitude of the British Labour Party and
of Labour group, generally. in Britain, on questions of foreign policy
during the year.. 1931-19*. It is easier. at this time, to arrive at
b reasonably clear picture of the attitude and motives of Hi, LjMlf*.
opposition ou questions of foreign poUey than it is to interpre! the
policy of the Oovornment, itself. Altho^h the manifest*!**, of the
British Government »• foreign policy are reasonably clear, it is diffi-
cult to discover the reasons and notives behind that policy. Undoubted-
ly there are many documents, still unavailable, which *ould help to
explain the reasons which motivated the Government's foreign oolioy.
The Government may often have had information, unknown to the general
public, which had a direct bearing on Briti«n policy. For example,
er^ct information a. to Germany's military strength in 1938 may have
dictated the wlicy of ao-easement at Munich. On the other hand,
there 1. material available which makes it possible 1-termine with
reasonable assurance the Labour Party attitude on question of foreign
policy, and the re- sons for that attitude. The Labour Party w°s not
handicapped by responsibility, and, therefore, could freely express
its opinion, lor that reason, the material necessary for a study
of the Labour Party*, attitude end the basis for that attitude is
available, while some information nece<*s~ry t- a study of the British
Government's foreign policy is still unavailable,
The central problem of the thesis is this: In what respect and
to whrt extent did the attitude of the Labour v\~rty on question, of
foreign policy differ from the -oolicies oursued by the British Govern-
ment during 1931-1938. Some account?, such as Europe on the "Ve by
Frederick L. Schuman, Interpret British pcltey durin* the
being merely en expression of conservative oplnl©. i a 11^ by Con-
servative Party leaders. In any objective approach we must ask the
question.
-Is this interpretation correct, or did British policy re-
flect poet-war attitudes held by all classes and groups in Great
Britain?" A study of the attitudes of the Labour Party and Labour
groups will help to answer this question.
Following are some of the important problems which will be con-
sidered:
1. Was the attitude of the Labour Party on questions of
disarmament essentially different from that of the
Government?
2. Did the Labour Party ov 0 se the Government* s policy of
appeasement? If the Labour Party did, how soon and to
what extent?
3. Did the Labour Party take a different position than the
Government in regard to international collective security
and the enforcement of existing in t
-motional agree-
ents?
k. Did the Labour Party differ from the Government in its
attitude toward fascism in Italy, Bazisra in Germany, and
the franco regime in Spain? If the Labour Party had
been in power, would its policy have been radically differ-
ent from that followed by the British Government?
The study has been confined to the attitude of the Labour Party
and the groups which supported the Labour Party. The r>nlicies of the
Independent Labour F»rty, the Rational Labour Party, and the Communist
taif have been omitted fro. consideration. Support for the labour
Party came fro, the Trade Unions an, Socialist Societies and. of course,
from individuals outside of these
.roup.. Most of the membership of
the Labour Party came from the Trade Unions. The labour Party had the
support of many British voters. M |, evtd«t from the General Section
of 1935. In this election. Labour candidates polled 8.3?6,l3 l votes,
while the Conservative candidate. poiud lO.U9g.3io votes. As a result
of the election the Conservatives had 378 members to Labour's l-M
members in the House of Commons. 1 As in every other political oarty,
there were members who did not support ail of the program of the Labour
Party. George Lansbury. for example, was a pacifist, so extreme in
belief that he was opposed to any sanctions which might lead to war
during the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. On the other hand. Colonel Wedge-
wood early in the period decided that the only way Britain could handle
such situations we. to rearm. Interesting as their statements may be.
they were not representative of the Labour Party. More representative-
of the Party were auch men as Clement Attlee. Hugh Dalton, and Morgan
Jones. Resolutions of the Trades Union Congress or of the Labour P^rty«s
Annual Conference may usually be considered to represent a considerable
number of the persona attending, and thus Labours attitude. In both
cases, however, it is usually true that the resolutions are introduced
by the executive group * each body and accented by the vhole conference.
This approval does indicate majority support for the policy "f the
executive groups. As both executive groans ere closely associated with
the Labour Party, such support is nlso supr.ort for the Labour Party.
1. Bean 1. McHenry, Bis Majesty's Opposition
. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 19'
-0, p. I90t
By considering the statement, of Labour Party member, in the Common*, the
resolutions of the Trade Union groups, and the opinions in Labour public*,
tione. it has been possible. I believe, to arrive at some fairly tentative
conclusions concerning the alleles supported by British labour.
This has been chiefly a source study. Almost all statements con-
cerning Labour's foreign policy have been drawn directly from source
references. Statements concerning the policy of the British Government
have come from secondary works concerned with the international situation
during the years 1931-193*. Tour main sources have supplied the neces-
sary information on Labour attitudes: (1) Mansard's Parliamentary
Debates. House of Commons, which is in the Converse Library at Amherst
College; (2) The Labour Magazine and its successor. Labour, found in
the Mount Holyoke College Library; (3) The Annual Reports of the Pro-
ceedings o f the Trades Union Congress ; ft) The Resorts of the Annual
Conference of the Labour Party, which are available in the Hew York City
Public Library.
In using The Labour Magazine and Labour, it was necessary to
read £.11 articles pertaining to foreign
-policy, and to find statements
concerning the major topics of this study. This magazine is a Joint pub-
lication of the Trades Union Congress and the Labour party. The editors
preface their publication with a statement that the opinions of the
authors are their own and do not represent the official policy of either
organisation. In spite of this, the magazine did offer illustrations of
the opinions of Labour people. When articles by such persons as Clement
Attlee are included, it is clear that the magazine was used to present
the Labour viewpoint to the British people. The Annual Reports of the
Proceedings of the Trades Union Congress and the Reports of the Annual
Conference of the Lfegg »Hrty were r*to*U because each report showed
clearly the opinions of the respective groups. Their resolutions adopted
at each mating indicated what courses of action met the delegates*
approval. stents made in support of. or in opposition to, the resolu-
tions, showed whether 1 plan had unanimous or divided support.
Hanaardt 8 ^rliamentary Debates. House o1 Commons va. the most
important source. In the course of the debates, the Labour members of
the House of Commons showed how and why they differed or agreed with the
Government's policy. In the debates the Labour members often stated
what they believed the correct policy should be in regard to the problems
which faced Britain. In using the Commons Debates , it was necessary to
secure r list of the Labour members of the House of Commons. A list was
secured from the London Weekly Times following the general elections in
1931 and 1935. With this list it was possible to go to the index for a
year of the Commons Debates and to find in what volume and column a
Labour member's speech on foreign policy was printed. Although they
must be examined critically, the Commons Debates present an excellent
picture, both of Labour Party views which had vide support vithin the
Party, and the views of minority groups.
Chapter I
Disarmament
Throughout most of the period 1931-1938, Labour supported interna-
tional disarmament without taking into consideration the events and poli-
tical philosophies which made the realization of this aim impossible. It
TOS Ub0Ur ' S contention that disarmament brings peace and security, but
the events of the 1930's have not borne out that contention. Rather it
has been proved that armaments are necessary to bring security and to keep
peace. International conditions in the 1930's made disarmament impracti-
cable. Tho attitude and actions of the aggressor nations, Japan, Italy
and Germany, made it imperative for other nations to have military strength
sufficient to prevent undesirable actions. Yet, at that time, many sought
disarmament when the acceptance of disarmament would have r suited in
weakening the nations who sought to maintain international law, - the very
law which those who advocated disarmament wanted to uphold.
1
Disarmament could have been effective only when prefaced by military
force, or a threat to use force, preferably by collective action. Collec-
tive action could have taken two forms: military alliances, providing
for a guarantee of mutual aid in the event that any part to the alliance
were attacked, or an international police force, under a world organization
1, Robert T :. Seton-Watson, Britain and the Dictators. New York:
MacMillan, 1938, p. 107"
~~
John F
.
Kennedy, ^liy England Slept
. York: W. Funk, inc.,
1940, Chap. I -VI I, XIII, passim.
Frederic H. Soward, Twenty Troubled Years 1918-1943
. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1944, Chap. II, passim.
C.G. Haines and R.J.S. Hoffman, Origins and Background of the
Second World V.ar . New York: Oxford University Press, 1943,
Chap. VII, passim.
The introductory section, pp. i-iii is based largely on the works
mentioned above.
7.
such as the United Nations, to pretect the community of nations or any
member of that community from aggression. If either of these two forms
of collective action had been provided, there would have been security for
nations belonging to the system. Under the former each nation would have
had to keep its armament strong enough so that combined with other nations
it could have prevented an attack from succeeding. Under such a plan par-
tial disarmament might have been possible; on the other hand, an increase
in arms might have been necessary so that the coalition could be strong
enough to meet any nation or coalition of aggression. If an international
police force had been formed, it, too, would have needed sufficient strength
to meet any attack. It would have made possible the reduction of any one
nation's arms, but the cost of such a force might have exceeded the usual
appropriations of the member nations. Neither alternative would have led,
necessarily, to disarmament, yet only these two plans could have created
security in a world where some nations were determined to use force to
achieve their aims.
If a world organization had been responsible for the security of its
members, that organization should have been given special powers, designed
to prevent aggression. Assuming that all member states had disarmed, the
system should have included a plan by which any nation could have been
prevented from rearming. This could have been accomplished by creating
an international commission to make sure the disarmament pact was not
violated. This commission should have had the power to search for ille-
gal arms and the means of producing arms. If violations had been found,
then the commission should have had the power to destroy the arms and
the factories which produced them. Such action would have made it im-
possible for one nation to create a force strong enough to defeat collec-
tive action.
o an
The ideal situation would have been for all nations to belong
organization which stood for both disarmament and collective security
and. most important, for each nation to support in practice the^
^
Sanction and its ideals. Unfortunately, during the 1930's there .ere
nations 1th isolationist tendencies outside the League, 11* the United
States, and nations within the League of Nations which desired not collec-
tive strength but collective meekness. Except for the United States,
these countries looked to disarmament with the hope that their relative
strength would be increased arid gave no support to any plan to provide
security. It was security, however, which had to be provided with dis-
armament, or better still, before disarmament took place. Not until ag-
gression is honestly renounced by all nations nor until collective strength
is powerful enough to meet and defeat aggression is disarmament possible.
Neither condition had been fulfilled by the 1930 »s. Disarmament, there-
fore, was a policy of idealism, not realism.
ifter Vorld Wftr I Britain reduced her arms to a very low level. She
entered into naval agreements which limited her naval strength to a very
great degree. Britain agreed to accept naval parity *ith the United States
the first time she had accepted equality with any nation. In 1922 at the
Washington Naval Conference, battleship and aircraft carrier strength was
placed at a ratio of 5-5-3 for Britain, the United States, and Japan res-
pectively, with a ratio of 1.67 for France and Italy. No agreement was
reached at that time for other types of nav-l craft. In 1930 as a result
of the London Naval Conference, it was decided that the capital ship
strength of Gret-t Britain, the United States, and Japan was to bo 15-15-9
respectively in 1936. The United States and Great Britain were to have
approximately the same tonnage in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines,
but Japan's ratio was increased fro* 60* to 7<# in cruisers an, destroy-
er, and Japan wag given equality in submarine*. 1
Many had high hopes that a reduction of other argents would come
from the League of Hatlons Disarmament Conference which first met at
$mm on February 2, 193?, but these hopes were not he realised. H0
compromise was found which would satisfy aermany's demand for equality
and Prance's demand for security. A8 a result Germany withdrew from the
Conference. She returned for a brief period, hut withdrew permanently
from the League in October, 1933. It was not until March of I933 that the
British government presented the Conference with a definite plan for re-
duction of arms. This plan included the French suggestion for short ser-
vice armies, limited war material on ft qualitative baaia.and abolished
military aircraft entirely. It was also proposed that t permanent dis-
armament commission with wide powers of inspection be established. The
British plan fared no better than other plans presented to the Conference
which en fled in failure.
At home Britain reduced hor armaments to a minimum, a policy which
amounted to uni lateral disarmament. This policy has been considered by
many to hare been extremely c>ngerous and partially responsible for the
diplomatic defeat at Munich. Prom 19?6 to I53I appropriations for arms
decreased from X 116,000,000 to i 110,000,000. The total appropriations
for the years 193?- 193^ showed no sharp increase, although ft definite in-
crease was voted in Commons in 19 3^« The appropriations approved in 19 ^5
provided for an increased air force end increased efficiency of the army
and navy, leading to a rearmament program in 19 36. All military services
were to be increased, particularly the air force. The years 19*7 and
1938 saw these amounts increased to strengthen the military ~*>wer of
1. Haines and Hoffman, op. clt., p. 258.
Britain still .ore. The appropriation made in 1938, h M2.664.000.
.as
an increase of h 34.879.000 over the_ voted in 1937. These espies
show the decrease in anient expenditures until the threats of the dic-
tators forced Britain to turn to rearmament. 1
The British Labour groups went through an evolution regarding agents
similar to the policy pursued by the Government, but with a difference in
emphasis. Labour supported disarmament until it was more than apparent
that current international events, end those which seemed imminent neces-
sitated British rearmament. The arguments Labour offered as reasons for
a disarmament program were chiefly three: (l) the effects of War upon
civilization;
( 2 ) the internal effects of an armament program upon the
nation, and ( 3 ) the benefits of peace to Labour.
I ince the Labour Party
*as not in power at this time, it could only urge the Government to folio*
certain plans at home end abroad to achieve disarmament. Because hopes
ran very high that the Geneva Disarmament Conference would decrease world
military forces, some of the plans put before the Disarmament Conference
received Labour support. The Labour groups wanted any disarmament to
apply to all military forces, some forms of which they wanted completely
abolished. Their final objective was to secure the elimination of all
national military forces. In their stead arbitration, sanctions, and the
League of Nations would be used; and, if force were necessary, an inter- "
national police force should settle disputes or prevent them from leading
to war.
The desire to avoid war «*a one of the reasons British Labour favored
a policy of disarmament. Labour believed that war is futile - that even
victory in war would not bring peace. The one person in the Labour Party
1. Kennedy, op. cit
., pp. 18 and 170
*ho put forward this claim most strongly
.as the pacifist, George Lans-
bury. during and after the Ethiopian affair he rePeatodly made this point
in the House of Commons. For instance, in 1935, he said, "I WOuld like
to call your attention to the fact that the piling up of armaments or the
putting y*ur faith in armaments has not saved the world from war, and even
victory in war does not save us."
1
A year later he again stated that war
would only start another war. A permanent peace could not result from war
because war leaves the seeds of future wars.
2
Two or three other nations
would be crushed, but soon they would rearm to start another war. 3 Lans-
bury's solution was complete disarmament.
In support of Lansbury's viev/point, Mr. G. Hall was of the opinion
that it is madness to assume that more armaments are required to
preserve peace, to give security, and doter aggression.... Arms have never
saved a nation from war nor have given s-curity to either weak or strong
4
nations against attack."
Arthur Henderson also believed in the futility of war, but went fur-
ther in insisting that it was not inevitable. He also added that there
could be no progress until the war system had been stamped out. His sub-
5
stitute for armaments was the Pact of Paris.
Clement Attlee summed up Labour's early attitude by saying, "We
do not believe there is such a thing as national defense. He are not
persuaded in the least that the way to safety is by piling up armaments.
We think that you have to go forward to disarmament not to the piling up
1. George Lansbury, House of Commons
, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates,
CCCIV, August 1, 1935, col. 2891.
2. Ibid., CCCXY1I, November 5, 1936, col. 30G.
3. Ibid., COCXXVIII, October 27, 1937, col. 162.
4. G. Hall, Commons
,
CCXCIX, March 14, 1935, col. 614.
5. Arthur Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy . London: Labour Party
Transport House, July 1933, pp. 18-9.
of argents."
1
By 1938, however, most of the Labour groups recognized
the need for armaments, but still aiaintained that arms and war would not
settle anv problem justly or permanently. I n general, the Labour vi ap-
point held that "Just treaties and generous behaviour still rteaia mm
powerful for Peace than all the arsenals." 2
Labour stressed the horrors of war even more than its futilitv.
If war MM, they believed that it would be a conflict mm horrible than
the world had e,or experienced. Labour made the gloomy prediction that
the next war would destroy civilization, particularly western civiliza-
tion. ?Jr. Henderson mm* of the opinion that, unles world peace could
be built upon • firm foundation, sooner or later, !, s cataclysm will come
upon the world which will engulf all we care about western civilization
which N have inherited trm the pasta" At the 1933 annual Conference
of the Labour Party, the Right Honorable r ir Charles Trcvelyan proposed
a resolution, which was accepted, sotting forth a policy to prevent war.
One of his proposals WM to publicize the appalling nature of the modern
4
methods of warfare and their results < Two years later Noel-leaker warned
in Labour thtt if the pre-war arms race was repeated, "our western civi-
ligation would collapse in ruin about our heads." Greenwood presented
the picture vividly by declaring that within sixty minutes of a declara-
!• Clement Attlee, Conroons, CCCV, October 22, 1935, col. 46.
2. J.S. i'iddleton, r Labour's Load for the Victory of Peace", Labour
,
February 1358, V, London: Transport Sou**, p. 132.
3» Arthur Henderson, n'Vork for Peace Turing 1930" \.Text for ktftdMit
to U.S.) Labour ?ia^ar,ine
,
January 1331, IX, London: Transport
louse, p. 387.
4* Sir Charles Trevelyan, Report of the Thlrty-TMrd nnual Conference
of the Labour Party* held at Haati gs # October 2-6, 1933. London:
Transport louse, p. 138.
5. Philip Noel-3akor, "'Rearmament' and Collective Security", Labour
Hovemher, 1935, III, p. S2.
6. Arthur Greenwood, Jr., "The Var .gainst Y.-ar", Labour Magazine ,
July 1933, XII, p. 199.
13.
ticn by a European Po*er, bombing planes could be orer ^nglandf and a
single bomb could poison every living thing in an area of three-quarters
of a square mile.
1
A writer in Labour states that the workers would be
murdered by the tens of thousands, that any survivors would starve, and
that hunger would be followed by disease. The wealthy would ,nove to the
country where they would be safe, but the workers would have to remain
in the crowded cities which offer an easy target.
2
Class feeling was
stressed er well as the danger of war.
Labour looked at the positive side of the picture as well, realising
the selfish as well as the humanitarian values of peace. The economic
and political advantages of peace and a peace policy became a center of
Labour thinking. In 1931 the President of the Trades Union Congress in
his annual address recognized the economic advantages when he stated that
success of the i'isarmament Conference would go far to produce internation-
al conditions leading to the revival of industry and trade.'
While Labour believed that economic advantages would result froa Dis-
armament, the party also used disarmament as a reason for criticizing Gov-
ernment policy. Thus Labour leaders could isarn the country of possible
dar gars resulting from rearmament or place the blame for J;he need of arms
upon the Government, in each casr: seeking to discredit the Government.
In 1935 and thereafter, in advocating disarmament Labour W83 in direct
opposition to the Government. In foreign affairs the Government was
1. Arthur Greenv/ood, Jr., "The .ar /gainst War", Labour Magazine
,
July 1933, XII, p. 199.
2. Alexander !!. Thompson, "Beware of Imitations", Labour
,
November
1935, III
, p. 52.
3. "President's .ddress", Keport of Proceedings at the Sixty-thi rd Annual
Trade s Union Congress held at Bristol, September 7-11, 1031, Walter M.
Citrine, editor; J. Mcintosh, reporter; London: Cooperative Printing
Society Ltd., p. 71.
14.
attached by Labour because. according to Labour, the Government's poli.
oiee could not be trusted to keep Engla„d out of „ar. IB 1M6
, Milner
.aid that increased anns „ero driving Cngland to „ar. He stated that
the Government „as sincere enough in believing that they vould prevent
~r. but such a policy .as one of "absolute despair".
1
Attlee said that
he opposed the increase in arms in 1935. because there „as no guarantee
that the a™, „ould be used in pursuit of a sensible foreign policy.
2
A
statement appeared in a Labour editorial in 1938 to the effect, that if the
"Tories" had honored their obligations in foreign affairs, the wasteful
spending for armaments could have been avoided during the period 1931-
1
1938. 3
In addition to the political advantage gained by placing themselves
in direct opposition to the official government policy, the Labour Party
felt that a peace policy was popular with the voters. It was hoped that
this policy would bring the Labour Party into power. Also, peace was a
necessary basis for the type of government they wished to provide. As
Cro pton said in 1933: "Socialism is impossible without settled peace.."
4
Henderson also was of this opinion.
5
Attlee believed that socialism and
peace must come together. He said, "We shall go into this fight with our
1. J. Milner, Commons
.
CCXCIX, March 13, 1935, col. 883.
2. Attlee, Commons
,
CCCXII, May 21, 1936, col. 1428.
3. "All the V;orld Over", Labour
,
iky 1938, V, p. 195.
4. Crompton, "Chairman's Address", L.P. Annual Report
, 1933. pp. 135-6
5. Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy
, p. 2.
prog™, of Social^ and Peace ^ ^ ^^
is that tf you want Socialism you mugtw peftce# ^ ^^^
you must have socialism." 1 If the Lebour Party could convincQ ^ eiec_
torate of this policy, it could come into po.er.
Since disarmament
.as the chief method advocated by the Labour Party
in support of its peace policy, the Labour members used almost every oppor
tunity to oppose ne. expenditures for armaments. Their first point of op-
position .as based on the idea that Britain could hot .in an armament race
if one should develop. Mr. Baker said that an increase of aircraft
.ould
only force Germany to build more. 2 Attlee pointed out further that air-
peer threatened Britain's security. Still the Government
.ould not con-
sent to the abolition of military planes at the peace conference.
3
Submar-
ines .ere another serious throat to Britain. Despite Britain's superior
fleet in European
.aters, the battleships and cruisers . re only targets
for submarines,4 Mr. Adams in the House of Commons made the same obser-
vation in 1935. He regarded as "sinister" the chance of the Germans build-
ing as many submarines as the English. Submarines had threatened British
existence more than any other single .eapon in World T/ar I. 5 England had
Just signed a naval treaty, permitting Germany to build a navy equal to
35 per cent of the tonnage of the royal navy, and even more submarines. 6
Secondly, the Labourites emphasized the expense involved even if
Britain should be able to .in the armament race. Because they were
1. Attlee, Commons, CCCXXVTII, November 1, 1937, col. 1669.
2. Noel-Baker, " • Rearmament » and Collective Security", Labour
November 1935, III, p. 63.
'
3. Attlee, Commons
.
CCCXXVTII, November 1, 1937, col. 1669.
4. Crompton, pp. cit ., pp. 135-6.
5. V. Adams, Commons
,
CCCIV, July 22, 1935, col. 1598.
6. Haines and Hoffman, op. cit
., p. 363.
expensive, money for an increase in social services *as lacking. In the
President's address before the Trades Union Congress in 1931 the statement
was made that the crushing burden of expenditures "upon argents is one
of the factors which keeps the world impoverished." 1 Attlee opposed an
increase of 4,581.000 for the military services the same year. He pointed
out that this increase came at a time when the Government was at its wit's
end to balance the budget. 2 m l951# the Labour Party made the following
motion concerning the amy estimates* "That this house is of the opinion
that the expenditure on armaments is a crushing burden on the people of
the world and a menace to the continuance of Peace, and that in the inter-
ests of mankind a speedy and substantial reduction should be made in war-
like expenditure. ,,S Even Colonel V'edgewood, who soon came to favor a
rearmament program, said that an enormous amount of money could be saved
by not building the ships which the Government wanted to build.4 The same
trend of thought existed in Attlee' s mind when he asked, "Is the burden of
defense to go on and crush us?"
6
In 1937, Mr. Greenwood stated that rear-
mament had been paid for in increased taxes, a lower standard of living,
g
and increased prices.
The Labour party members of the House of Commons stressed the point
that it would be better to cut the amount spent for arms and turn it over
to the social services. This opinion was held throughout the period under
1. "President's Address", op. cit
., p. 71.
2. L. MacNeill-T.eir, "The Rebellion of the Bright Young Things",
Labour Magazine
,
April 1933, XI, p. 567.
3. L.P. Annual Report
,
1932, p. 97.
4. Colonel J.C. Wedgewood, Commons
,
CCLXXXIII, November 27, 1936,
col. 999.
5. Attlee, Commons
,
CCCXVII , November 12, 1936. cols. 1095-6.
6. A. Greenwood, Coiiimons, CLCXXVIII , November 27, 1937, col. 92.
discussion.
.. 1, ciynes sald in m2 that the Mpeaclltureo ^
possible a high standard of health and education. 1 A couple of years iater
the appropriation, for the ar»y .
2
Morsan Jones also believed that the costs
of arms took money from the social services. He said before Colons in
1936 that if the expenditure upon anas >,ent on, Britain's social services
would be "in pavm" for a generation 3 a x., i. A month later he said that rearmament
puts up obstacles to social progress. He claimed that the House of Commons
had no right to deprive future generations of social progress because of the
confronting international relations.4
It may be well to examine Labour's reasons for advocating disarmament
and consider their validity. Is war futile? In a world w r many millions
of people are killed, and many millions more die from disease and starva-
tion which follow war. Too often, as Henderson pointed out, a defeated
nation lives only to avenge its national pride and to regain lost territory,
and another war is the result. On the other hand, victory in war for a
nation may preserve a way of living and prevent its people from living in a
condition of servitude. The history of the world would be quite different
if victories had not been won at times when a particular civilization was
threatened. The pas;: twenty-five years would unquestionably be of a dif-
ferent character if the Central Powers had been victorious in 1 orId War I
and had imposed terms similar to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on the western
allies •
1. J.R. Clynes, L.P. Annual Report
, 1932, p. 229.
2. Lawson, Commons
,
CCLXXXVII, March 15, 1934, cols. 617-8.
3. M. Jones, Commons
.
CCCXVII, November 5, 1936, col. 371.
4. M. Jones, Commons
, CCCXVTII , December 18, 1936, col. 2827
The claim that huge argents have never prevented « U not more true
than the idea that disarmament by one nation prevents war. Britain followed
a policy of disarmament hut became involved in ..orld r„ II. other nations
lacking means of defense such as /byssinia and China also found this to be
true. Unilateral disarmament does not guarantee freedom from war.
When the Labour members pointed out that arms cost money, they were
right. A large portion of any nation's debts result from spending for
armaments and the costs of war. If money spent for war and capons had
ever been spent In any nation for social services, there would undoubtedly
be a better fed, clothe*, educated, and housed people in that country than
there are today. On the other hand, a rearmament program or a war practi-
cally wipes out unemployment and raises wages for labor. This, of course,
often leads to inflation and its problems. The contention of Labour, how-
ever, that the costs of armaments are oppressive and that money is taken
away from social services for these costs is true. * full rearmament pro-
gram may leave little to be expended for social services. Since Labour
was thinking primarily in terms of the welfare of the labouring man, it is
not surprising that it opposed rearmament.
A fe Labour members even wanted Britain to undertake disarmament by
herself as an example. They hoped that this example would be followed by
the nations of the world. The majority, however, held that it would be
far better to achieve disarmament as a result of agreements with the other
nations of the world.
One important change in Britain's armament program, which Labour ad-
vocated, was the nationalization of the manufacture of arms in Britain.
During the entire period being discussed, continued agitation was carried
on for this step. It wf>s thought that nationalization would prevent profits
19.
from being m*Ue by war. and thereby on* of the causes of war *ould be re-
moved. The chance was advocated in articles in Labour Ka-^lne bv Arthur
"reenwood, C. I*li,ie !3um., Francis ftlUaw, and " red A. Smith, Oreonwood
presented the following WgmmU In our fight against war ,o Kust strive
to destroy the influence of the amumcnt manufacturers." Ho continued. "If
armaments are necessary...then they must be produced under national control,
and the industry oust be freed fron the intrigues of the Secret International
of aroaments manufacturers who, in common with capitalists are the only ones
who profit from war."1 C. Delisle Burns said that a future Labour overn-
ment would abolish the private laanuracture and trade in anas.
2
Lillians
protested in 1936 "that in the bluest rearmament program of this country*,
peacetime history thoro is to b© no real check on profiteering.*5 r .
Smith objected to the sending of armaments to nations with whom Britain
«ni cht go to war. He did not want British men killed with British bullets.
He added that potential enemies could not build up their stores of arms
4from their own resources. These examples show that Labour writers wanted
to plac- the manufacture of arms under ri t~id govo,"nment control. In addition,
1. Greemood, "The War gainst ?'er", Labour Magazine
.
Julv 1933,
XII, pp. 118-9.
2. C. Delisle Durns, "war and Labour Policy", Labour
,
September 1933,
I, p. 9.
3. Francis -illiams, "The Rational Government Backs an rms Kamp",
Labour
,
pril 1936, III, p. 194.
4. Fred A. ;,mith, "Why Should We Arm Our ^nemies". Labour. August 1937,
IV, pp. 205-6.
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son ex-
the same thing was urged in the House of Commons by Gordon MacDonald,*
Morgan Jones, 2 J. Milner, 3 and Clement Attlee. 4 Arthur Header
pressed the same opinion before the Annual Conference of the Labour Party
in 1933. Their speeches in the House of Commons show the unanimity of
British Labour in deairing the nationalization of the manuf- cture of arms. •
That government control of private manufacture of arms would aid dis-
armament was another viewpoint of Labour groups. If Britain did not add
to its military forces during discussions of disarmament, that failure, too,
would facilitate disarmament. Hall and Cripps were the persons who support-
ed this idea. In 1933, Hall said that it would be a good "gesture" to the
Disarmament Conference to "have some relaxation regarding the laying down
Q
of these cruisers." i„ i935, Cripps said that unless the government would
do its utmost to bring about a standstill agreement in armaments while the
negotiations for limitations went on, Labour would not support the proposed
increase of air forces. If an agreement was not forthcoming, then Britain
alone should hold up its own expenditures for a specified time. Such a step
would make it unnecessary to scrap the program in three months when limitations
7
would come into effect.
Labour members of Commons had other reasons for voting against the
service estimates besides a standstill agreement. From 1931 to 1936 Labour
1. Gordon MacDonald, ^ ommons
,
CCLXII, March 8, 1932, col. 1736.
2. M. Jones, C ommons
,
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7. Sir Stafford Cripps, Commons , CCCII , March 3, 1935, Col. 1460-2.
members of the Commons consistently opposed the estimates for the military
and naval forces of Britain. 0* March 8, 1931, the Labour Party put forth
a resolution asking that a "speedy and substantial reduction should be made
in warlike expenditures" because they were a "menace to peace". 1 Two years
later Morgan Jones opposed air armaments because they might cause the Disar-
2
mament Conference to fail. Hall and Attlee opposed the h 1,000,000 in-
crease for work at Singapore. 3 Hall else stated his determination to vote
against the naval estimates.4 In 1934 Attlee declared his intention to
vote against the increased air estimates because of the striking power of
an air force. He preferred to see air forces internationalized.
5
Lawson
g
opposed the army estimates in the same year. In 1935, MacLean was on
his feet in oommons to object to his country being committed to an air arms
race. He denied the /ir Minister's claim that the planes could be used for
civil purposes, because the civil airplane could easily be changed to a
7death dealing machine." Jones opposed the rearmament program because
even if the navy were a hundred time3 stronger, Britain still would not be
8
able to ca ry out its League duties any bettor. Attlee said in 1936
that the Labour Party could not support the Government's request for arma-
ments because Labour did not trust the Government with tho use of the arms
1. L.P. Annual .Report
,
1931, p. 97.
2. M. Jones, Commons
,
CCLXXXIII, March 23, 1933, col. 1007.
3. Hall, Commons
,
CCLXXXVII , March 12, 1934, col. 61.
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,
CCLXXV, March 9, 1933, col. 1383.
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5. Attlee, Commons , CCLXXXVI , March 8, 1934, cols. 2047-8.
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7. N. MacLean, Commons", CCCIV, Jul} 22, 1935, col. 1578.
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or the building up of the efficiency of the services.
1
Even in 1937, there
were still some disarmament die-hards in the Labour Party. At the Annual
Conference of that year a resolution was introduced opposing support of
the Government's rearmament policy. This resolution was supported fcj S.
Harrison, T. Kennedy, H. Harvey, and Lord Ponsonby. The wind had changed,
2however, and the resolution was defeated*
Some Labour members proclaimed that if the Labour Party won an election
and thus controlled Commons, it would make this opposition to rearmament
the official policy of Britain by passing a peace act. This peace act would
provide all necessary machinery to make disarmament successful* It would
cover all phases of disarmament and its corollaries* C* Delisle Burns dis-
cussed in Labour the action he believed was necessaryi A Labour Government
would pass an nAct through Parliament making it necessary for any British
Government to submit its international disputes to peaceful settlement,
preventing any British Government from the use of threats in a dispute, end
enabling it to take immediate action when economic, financial pressure,
or other measures" were required under the Covenant of the League, ifender-
son, in his Labour's Foreign Policy, described the provisions of the Peace
Act in considerable detail* He would pass a Peace Act for two reasons:
first, to make clear to the world Britain's position and to enlighten public
opinion upon Britain's stand in regard to non-recourse to war, arbitration,
and co-operation, with other nations to keep peace: and secondly, to show
that the value of a law depends upon the belief that it will be enforced*
Great Britain could do much to help that attitude* The Peace Act would
1. Attlee, Commons , CCCXII, July 21, 1936, col. 1428.
2. L.P. Annual Report , 1937, pp. 196-7.
3* Burns, op* cit . , p. 9*
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provide that in all oases. without exception, the SoTOrnment^^
-t its international disputes to peaceful ..^^ ^^ ^ ^ ^
would the Government mobilise its earned forces exeePt to repei actual ag-
gression, and that the ,0TOmnent should have taU powers to take ali eco-
nomic, financial and other measures retired to fulmi al! obligations
under the Covenant, the U«». Treaties, and other instrument, by which
Britain may b, bound. 1 In 1934
, the Gene^l Counoil of the Trades Union
Congress said that the next labour Government would bring before Parliament
a bill to accomplish all that Henderson had proposed. 2
Although there mm mm opposition to rearmament, and some su,port for
a Peaoe Act, there is only a little support recorded for a policy of uni-
lateral disarmament. In the President's address before the Trades Union
Annual Congress in 1931 there is a statement to the effect that a Labour
Government would set a good example in the matter of armaments. 8 The same
year Sir Ben Turner asked. "Is it feasible? I recognise that amongst a
great mass of the people themselves they have not brought themselves to
the idea that we can afford to do without war weapons, but I believe there
is a gre, t moral force behind example - and if Britain led the way. I think
it would be safer for Britain and safer for the world.
4
Turner was .peaking
in opposition to the resolution proposed at the Labour Party's Conference
by Hugh C lton and supported by Arthur Henderson. The resolution was, never-
theless, adopted by the conferences it called for adduction of armaments
by mutual agreement." 5 The idea of multilateral disarmament expressed in
1. Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy
, pp. 19-20.
2. T.U.C. Report
. 1934, p. 1S9.
3. "President's Address"
, op. cit ., p. 71.
4. Sir Ben Turner, L.P. Annual Report
. 1931, p. 186.
5. L.P. Annual Report
, 1931, p. 42.
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this resolution «as the one *hich the majority of British Labour supported.
Attlee stated clearly the Labour Party's opposition to disarmament by
Britain alone, "As a party W e do not stand for unilateral disarmament." 1
It Was disarmament of all nations by an international agreement *hich Bri-
tish Labour and the Labour Party stood for. Eventually some hoped to achieve
total disarmament
•
Such words as "drastic" and "substantial" frequently described the
extent of disarmament desired. W. Arnold-Forster made such a statement!
"•••I want immediate limitation and drastic and progressive reduction of
the armaments of all nations..." 2 Burns said that one action of a future
government would be a "drastic reduction of British armaments under inter-
national agreement..." 5 Arthur Henderson said exactly the same thing
except that the "drastic" disarmament would be accomplished by "interna-
4
tional agreement. Numerous other examples could be quoted, 'hat
Labour specifically wished to accomplish was best summed up by Morgan Jones
in his proposals which he desired to have presented at a Disarmament Con-
ference meeting at Geneva
i
"(a) the general abandonment of all air bombing
"(b) the general abolition of all weapons at present forbidden
Germany by the Treaty of Versailles
"(c) the international control of civil aviation
"(d) an immediate reduction by all nations in their expenditure
upon armaments
1. Attlee, C ommons , CCCII , May 2, 1935, col. 375.
2. Hm Arnold-Forster, "Our Case in the Disarmament Campaign",
Labour Magazine , December 1931, X, p. 350.
3 • Burns
,
op. cit
. , p • 9
•
4. Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy, pp. 21-2.
"(e) the suppression of all private manufacture and trade in armaments
"(f) international inspection and control of armaments in all countries
"(g) the creation of an international police force; and
n (h) the definition of aggression on the basis of the proposals made
by the Conference committee,"
A disarmament conference seemed to Labour in Britain the only way to
achieve these objectives. They believed that all nations should sit down
at a conference table under the auspices of the Lea-ue of Nations and reach
an agreement. Here all phases of disarmament would be discussed and settled
for the benefit of the world.
All organized groups of Labour supported the Disarmament Conference of
1932-1934. /trthur Henderson who had been Foreign Secretary in the Labour
Government expressed his support at the Labour Party's Annual Conference in
this manner: MI believe if you are ever going to get any serious measure
of disarmament, you will get it through the joint efforts put forward through
the League of Nations. The Disarmament Conference is a League of Nations
Conference and if we go to the League of Nations Conference and put up the
strong case thet can be put up by international agreement, I believe we
2
are more likely to succeed. He was urging this as the better method as
compared to unilateral disarmament. At the seine meeting a resolution was re-
ported which expressed unqualified support for the i isarmament Conference by
the Executive Committee of the Labour Party. This resolution which was adop-
ted /pril 21, 1931, said, f,The National Executive of the Labour Party records
its conviction that the General Disarmament Conference which will be held
early next year is one of the most momentous events in the history of the
1. If. Jones, Commons , CCLXXXI , November 13, 1933, col. 579.
2. Henderson, L.P. Annual Report, 1931, p. 187.
Y'orld, and especially of European civilization."
1
Hugh Dalton at the Party's Conference moved, aiaong other thi gs, that
"It ^the conference/ welcomes the opportunity afforded by the BfcrM Dis-
armament Conference to deal effectively with this question ^/disarmament/.
.
.»'
2
This resolution wkb adopted by the Labour Party's Conference. 3
It was in 1931, also, that the Trades Union Congress put its support
into a resolution which was adopted. The resolution expressed the belief
of the Congress that the future of the League of Nations would be "jeopar-
dized" unless the Disarmament Conference of the next year reached an agree-
ment upon disarmament.4 In 1934, the National Joint Council wanted the
British Government to put forward certain proposals at the Conference to
aid disarmament.*'
In the House of Commons the Labour members strongly supported the Dis-
armament Conference, /'ttlee stated that it would be a "tragedy" if the Dis-
armament Conference resulted in rearmament. Here is a good indication that
the progress of the Conference was not regarded with favor. In general many
of the Labour members of Parliament seemed to be most concerned with the con-
ference when it appeared that nothing would be accomplished. In 1S34, Cocks
7
asked for a statement on the position of the Disarmament Conference. in
1. Henderson, L.P. Annual Report
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6. Attlee, Commons, CCLXXXIV, December 21, 1933, col. 1501.
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1935 Morgan Jones asked the Government to call the Disarmament Conference
aeain-to give evidence that the idea of disarmament had not been given
up. 1 McLean, a week and a half later, also .anted a conference to dis-
cuss armament. 2 He .as followed by Lansbury with the same revest. 3
As late as 1936 Grenfell asked for information on the position of the Dis-
armament Conference.4 He probably needed no answer.
VShen the discussion of the Hoover Proposals. which consisted of the
suggestions that all existing arms be reduced by one third, took Place at
the Disarmament Conference, considerable approval was expressed. Before
Commons on June 28. 1932. Lansbury called the Hoover Proposals the "most
magnificent proposals that have yet been put forward." 5 The Labour Magazine
in an editorial said that these proposals would save from h 2,000,000.000
to I 3,000.000,000 annually. The editorial said that Hoover's proposals
were the "minimum programme" which the working classes would accept. Even
these would have to be supplemented by other measures. 6 The s^me editor-
ial said that it was the only "simple and comprehensive proposal devised to
reduce the number of soldiers on the continent of Europe."
7
That the Labour Party supported whole-heartedly these proposals can be
proved by following the progress of the Annual Conference of the Labour
1. M. Jones, Commons
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Party in 1932. The executive report to the Labour Conference contained
this, "The National Executive Committee of the Labour Party cordially *el-
cor^s President Hoover's proposals for immediate disarmament. They regard
these proposals... as a substantial first step towards total disarmament..."
The statement continued to say that the same persons "express the hope that
everything will now be done to secure the immediate adoption of President
Hoover's proposals as a minimum programme." 1 This statement was mode on
June 23, 1932. At the same conference a resolution was introduced by J.R.
Clynes. Part of this resolution was devoted to the Hoover Proposals in
these words: "The Conference is of the opinion that loyal and effective
co-operation with the United States on the basis of President Hoover's pro-
posals is in the highest interests of the world peace..." 2 This resolution
3
was carried by unanimous vote. It was only during the year of 1932 that
this active support was carried on. It is interesting, however, that Morgan
Jones as late as 1937 said that, the Hoover proposals could have been accepted.4
He meant by this statement that the Hoover proposals were workable and should
have been accepted by the Disarmament Conference of 1932-34. His statement is
an indication of the impression which the Hoover Proposals made upon the Labour
Party.
Another plan which received some support from Labour \*as that all nations
1. "Executive Keport" , L.P. Annual Report
,
1932, p. 60.
2. L.P. Annual Report
,
1932, pp. 228-9.
3. Ibid., p. 232.
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,
February 1937, IV,
p. 139.
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disarm to the level of Germany as imposed upon her by the Tr aty of Ver-
sailles. This would have limited greatly armies and navies, and abolished
some of the means of waging The treaty limi ted Germany to an army of
100.000 men.
1
Arnold-Forster, writing in the Labour Marine gain his
whole-hearted support to the Federation of the League of Nations Societies*
proposal to abolish all weapons prohibited by the Peace Treaties.
2 1 3
" In
the House of Commons Cocks said that the nations at the Disarmament Conference
should agree to "abandon every
-weapon forbidden to Germany".4 Jones and
Milner supported this view and the latter wanted Britain to take the lead
in proposing this plan. 5 These members of Parliament were evidently follow-
ing the position taken by the Labour Party at its annual conference in 1933.
/t this conference J.R. Clynes proposed that the Arty's conference take this
stand on disarmament. His proposal was accepted by the conference. 7
If all nations had agreed to accept the degree of armaments which Ger-
many possessed, there would have been equality among all nations. W« Arnold-
Forster quoted and supported the resolution of the I.F.T.U. and L.S.I, concern-
ing equality, in his article published in the Labour Ma^asine. The resolution
said
,
"
'The system of Disarmaments will only be complete and durable if it
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is based on equality of rights and duties. 11,1 The Trades Uni on Congress
Annual Report carried the sane statement.
2
Arnold-Forster still held to
this principle in 1934. 3
Not only did Labour want equality in rights and duties but also equali-
ty of armaments - in disarmament. This idea hit straight at the idea of
keeping, Germany at the bottom. Arnold-Forster openly said that he believed
in equality for Germany in aims. He continued to say that disarmed countries
should not be permitted to rearm. "Obviously, it is most desirable we should
4
equalize by leveling down,..." The Trades Union Congress agreed with the
joint resolution of I.F.T.U. and L.S.I . which Arnold-Forster discussed. 5
In 1935, Morgan Jones stated in the House of Commons that Germany should
S
have been granted equality by disarmament
•
Another phass of disarmament which Labour wished to see come about was
a scheme of international control of the manufacture of arms. Cripps, speak-
ing before Commons, proposed that both the manufacture and the sale of arms
7be placed under international control. It may be assumed that the instru-
ment of international control would be the League of Nations. Jones was of
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the same opinion, enlarging upon the suggestion to include the suppression
of all private manufacture and trade in armaments. 1 Not all the Labour
members of Commons believed that this would be accomplished with ease.
Cocks said that an international system f 0r the control and inspection of
arms would only bring about evasion. He was of the belief that no country
would divulge to international police the location of any arms or factories.
It may be assumed, however, that Cocks was in the minority because ttlee
supported this plan. Attlee criticized the Government because it opposed
the proposal of the United States to inspect the private manufacture of
3
arms. A resolution of the Labour Party Annual Conference, which was
adopted in 1933, called for the suppression of all private manufacture of
4
arms •
The magazine Labour printed erticles which included demands for inter-
national control of armaments. C. Delisle -urns said that the abolition
of the manufacture of arms under international agreements would bo one of
the first steps of a Labour Government. W* ''rnold-Forster wrote that
"...we ought to support the French in pressing for supprwssion of manufac-
ture of arms for private profit. Failing that we ought to at least support
6
the French scheme for control." In the same article Forster said that an
international agreement for disarmament must provide for the abolition of
7
the private manufacture of arms. Henderson wanted to control the sale of
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anas by a system similar to that used to control the sale of drugs by a
convention.*
Another check upon the building of anus of all types which Labour wished
to obtain nas a cut or a check on budgetary allotments of all nations for
armaments. The Labour Magazine printed the draft resolution of the National
Executive of the Labour Party Annual Conference of 1531 which expressed this
desire. This resolution urged the British Government to "put forth at that
Conference (Disarmament Conference) proposals for drastic and far-reachine
reductions, by international agreement, in the numbers and equipment of all
armed forces and in military, naval, and air expenditure."
2
The proposal
was adopted at the Labour Party's Conference. 3 v7. Arnold-Forster, as might
be expected, supported a cut in appropriations for armaments. He placed his
si'pport behind the Federation of the League of Eations Societies' proposal
to cut world spending for armaments by twenty-five per cent.
4
This twenty-
five per cent was the only definite clue as to how much Labour wanted to
reduce spending for arms.
The Trades Union Congress also favored cutting expenditures for anas.
It supported a petition, representing the British Trades Union Movement,
the Labour Party, ana the British Cooperative Union, which was sent to the
PrL-ne Minister and Arthur Henderson (who was President of the Disarmament
Conference). Included in the petition was a request for a reduction of ex-
5
penditures for war materials. In 1934, the National Joint Council, on
June 23th, called upon the British Government to submit proposals for
1. Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy, pp. 21-3.
2. "Labour Constructive Proposals - I raft Resolutions for the Scarborough
Conference" submitted by the National Executive of the Labour Party to
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, October 1931, X, p. 263.
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"immediate reductions of expenditures" for anus to the Disarmament Confer-
ence. These examples she™ clearly that the Trades Union Congress and the
groups Which it represented wished to reduce the mm* or mm»y for arms.
This trend of thought is reflected in the speeches of Labour mem-
bers in the House ofW Morgan Jones said, in discussing disarmament,
that there should bo "budgetary limitations, for that, after all, is not an
unimportant part in the problem.'*
2
Four months later he included the same
idea in his proposals which he wanted the Government to send to the Disarma-
ment Conference. 3 Sir Stafford Cri PP s also suggested that the funds avail-
able for erms be cut at the Disarmament Conference.4
Arthur Henderson supported a limitat: on upon the amount of money spent
on arms. his Labour's Foreign Policy he said that "strict limitation of
budgetary expenditure upon armaments" would be one of the things which the
next Labour Government would try to bring about* This, of course, would
have been included in a Disarmament Treaty.
There is a wealth of printed material which states Labovr f s desire to
achieve disarmament. On the other hand, there &re only a Tew men who had
definite ideas as to what they wanted to reduce or abolish. It is only
hy examining considerable material and examining the support of the various
plans that one is able to get a complete picture of lust what the Labour
groups desired in the way of disarmament.
In regard to the army. Labour had proposals which touched upon peace
time effectives, the period of service, the size of guns, tanks and of
the army.
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It was pretty well agreed that the size of an army should bo limited
or, at least, that all amies should bo reduced. The Trades Union Congress
said that tho peace time effectives must be reduced.
1
In 1932, * petition
was presented to the Prime Minister in which a request »S included for an
•immediate and substantial reduction of effectives..."
2
The National
utive of the Labour Party in 1931 submitted resolutions to the annual confer-
ence of the Party which included a proposal for "drastic and far-reaching
reduction by international agreement, in the numbers and equipment of all
3
armed forces..." This resolution was proposed to the Conference by Hugh
ualton; its acceptance was voted.
4
These are the only comments made in
Labour publications which refer directly to the size of national armies.
Labour also hoped that some agreement could be reached on the terms of
enlistment in a national army. The Trades Union Congress hoped that an
agreement could be reached at the disarmament Conference on the "period of
5
service in the conscript armies." The Hoover Proposals made no mention
of how long enlistments should be. The Treaty of Versailles fixed enlist-
ments for enlisted men at fifteen years and for officers at twenty-five
6
years.
It is difficult to know ezactly how long Labour thought enlistments
should be. They did, however, hope to modify the conscription policies of
other nations such as France. It is more than likely that Labour in Britain
would have supported the plan to reduce all armies to 100,000 men and fix
1. "Political spects of the Unemployment Crisis", T.U.C. Report
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3. "Labour Constructive Proposals", T.U.C. Keport
,
1932, p. 263.
4. L.P. Annual report
,
1931, pp. 184 and 187.
5. T.U.C. Report
,
1937, p. 133.
6. Albjerg and /.lbjerg, op. cit ., pp. 743-4.
enlistments for enlisted Men and for officers for . specified time, as in-
dicated by its support of the proposal to reduce all arms to Germany's
level
e
Labour also wished to take some action in regard to reserves. The
Trades Union Congress said that "reserves available for mobilisation" should
be reduced. 2 TC. Arnold-Forster said that disarmament at the outset would
be unequal because of conscription. He added, "Some means must bo found to
mitigate this inequality which is given to the Pavers With short service-en-
listment reserves available for rapid expansion in *artirie ."
3
It is hard
to believe that Labour wanted conscription to continue, yet the period of
service in conscript amies is mentioned. Probably the troth is that they
opposed conscription; but, as Arnold-Forster suggests, they thought it coul d
not be abolished at this time.
Although the size of an army is important. Labour also saw that en army's
equipment might ma.ke aggression possible, as well as its size. Henderson
wanted to abolish all heavy artillery and tanks. 4 Arnold-Forstor agreed
with Henderson's suggestion of action as a rieans of carrying out the provi-
sion in which the victors promised to disarm. The Hoover Propcsals also
proposed to abolish "all mobile land guns of more than six inch calibre"
6
and to prohibit tanks. Front the enthusiasm expressed for the armament
proposals of the Peace Treaties and the Hoover Proposals, it is probable
1. Albjerg and Albjerg, op. cit
., pp. 743-4.
2. "Disarmament", T.D.C. Annual Report
, 1921, pp. 241-2.
3. Arnold-Fcrster , "Our Case in the Disarmament Campaign", Labour Magazine
,
December 1831, X, pp. 350-2.
4. Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy
, pp. 21-2.
5. Arnold-Korster , "Cur Case in the Disarmament campaign", Labour i-iagazine
,
December 1931, A, pp. 350-2.
Arnolo-Fcrster , "The Crisis in Disarmament", Labour
.
May 1334, I. p. 204.
6. Mlliam Starr Meyers, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover
,
1929?1933.
. Kew York: C. Scribners Sons, 1940, p. 142.
that all Labour Eroups ^ere in accord
.ith the plan to abolish tanks and to
limit the size of heavy guns to six inches calibre or less. Arnold-Forster
thought that reductions of arms should take place to the "point of abolition
of all arms except such as may still genuinely be required to prevent, or
in the last resort to put a stop to, breaches of the public peace. 1
The navies of the nvorld Wmld also be reduced. Battleships and sub-
marines were the chief targets for abolition. The Tredes Union Congress
went on record in 1951 as favoring e reduction of all navies.
2
Sir Staf-
ford oripps believed that "naval disarmament" should be part of disarmament.
W. Arnold-Forster supported the Federation of the League of Nations Socie-
ties' proposal to proceed in negotiations on the basis that all a*T*3 vessel
be limited to the size imposed upon Germany.4 Arthur Henderson wcs of the
5
same opinion in his Labour's foreign Policy
.
From the above example it is clear that the Labour groups wished to
abolish all warships over 10,000 tons and all submarines. The Treaty of
Versailles permitted Germany to have the following navy: six battleships,
six cruisers, and twelve torpedo ships. Germany was permitted to have no
6
submarines
. This plan would have reduced many navies to token forces.
The Hoover -Proposals w re not so far-reachi> g; they were chiefly
plens to reduce existing m vies by one-third and abolish some types of
ships, loover suggested that aircraft carriers and submarines be abolished;
that Japan, Britain, and the United otates reduce cruisers, destroyers,
1. Arnold-Forster, "Our use in the Disarmament Campaign", Labour Maga-
zine
,
December 1951, X, p. 3o0.
2. "Disarmament", T.U.C. Report
, 1931, pp. 241-2.
3. Cripps, Commons
,
CCLXXVI, March 23, 1933, col. 6C7.
4. Arnold-Korster, "Our Case in the Disarmament Campaign", Labour Maga-
zine , December 1931, X, pp. 350-2.
5. Henderson, Labour r s foreign Policy
, pp. 21-2.
6. Albjerg and i.lbjerg, op. cit,, pp. 743-4.
and battleships by one-third ; and that Italy and France build no new ones.
1
If there was any one weapon which Labour groups most wanted to abolish,
it was military aircraft. All sections were united in desiring particularly
to have bombing planes outlawed. Attlee was one of those who thought that
Hitler's proposal to agree to nor-aggression pacts, to fix limits on arma-
ments and to place "restrictions" on bombing planes should be considered by
2
a Disarmament Confereuoe. I'acLean stated that he supported a plai; to
reduce the air forces of other nations to the size of England's and then to
reduce all air forces by another one-third. 3 Both of these men later made
other statements calling for the abolition of all national air forces.
In the House of Commons Attlee, ^'acLean, Lansbury, Jones, Crinps,
Milner, and Adams all w&nted to see every national air force destroyed.
Morgan Jones said he wanted "the complete abandonment of all air bomb-
ing." Sir Stafford Cripps declared that an increased air force would
not give any protection to Britain. The only sound defense would be to
"abolish aerial warfare altogether ."5 Attlee agreed, laying that although
air power theeatoned England's security, the government did not try to
6
abolish military aircraft at the Disarmament Conference. The Trades I'nion
Congress also went on record as favoring the abolition of national a5 r forces.
It supported a joint resolution o^ the I.F.T.U. and the L.S.I, calling for
7
the abolition of national air forces "without delay" in 1931. In 1934, the
1. Meyers, op. oit ., p. 142
2. Attlee, Commons , CCCII , May 22, 1935, col. 374.
3. MacLoan, C ommon3 , CCLXXV, March 14, 1933, col. 1S09.
4. M* Jones, Coimuons , CCLXXH , November 13, 1933, col. 579.
5. Cripps, Commons, CCCII, May 22, 1935, col. 471.
6. Attlee, Commons, CCCXXVTII, November 1, 1937, col. 328.
7. "Disarmamsnc" . T.U.C. Annual Kaoort. 1931. on. 241-2.
Congress said that in order to achieve international security "all national
air forces" must be abolished,*
The Labour Magazine and its successor, Labour
, carried articles by Noel-
Baker, MaoNeil, Weir, Smith, and Arnold-Forster which advocated the aboli-
tion of national air forces, Walter R. Smith wrote: n lt is of very parti-
cular importance to get rid of the air armaments which the nations now main-
tain. This statement is characteristic of others in the publication. The
Labour Party Annual Reports mentioned this phase of disarmament only once,
in 1033, when the report included a request for the abolition of military
aircraft. It is a little surprising that there were not more requests in
view of the activity of the Labour Members of Parliament on the behalf of
destroying national air forces.
One other weapon which Labour wished to abolish was poison gas. The
Trades Union Congress expressed its approval of the joint resolution of the
I.F.T.U. and L.S.I, which included a statement calling for the prohibition
4
of chemical and bacteriological munitions. Arnold-Forster seconded the Fed-
eration of League of Nations Societies' plan which included the prohibition
5
on chemical warfare. Noel-Baker also said that since there was no protec-
6
tion against gas, it should be abolished.
1. "General Council's Annual Report", T.U.C. Report , 1934, p. 159.
2. filter B • Smith, "The Way to Peace", Labour , December 1S34, II, p. 78.
3. Arnold-Forster, "The Crisis in Disarmament", Labour , May 1934, I, p. 204.
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It was hoped that the limitation of some aras and the abolition of
others xvould gradually lead to the end of all national amies and navies.
According to Arnold-Forster and others "complete" or "total" disarmament
was the final objective, Amold-Forster wanted the reductions to be "car-
ried as rapidly t.s possible to the point of abolition of all arms except
such as May genuinely be required to prevent, or in the last resort to put
a stop to, breaches of public peace. 1,1 The petition of the British Labour
Party and the British Trades Union Movement called for a reduction which
would lead "to complete, universal, and controlled disarmament at the ear-
2
liest possible moment
At the Annual Conference of the Labour Party in 1933, J.R. Clynes in-
troduced a resolution -which »£,s accepted. This resolution called for the
3
'-total disarmament o" all nations". Henderson, before the Conference of
the next year, stated that "Labour's policy is directed towards the aboli-
tion of war .. .by. • .the substitution of an international police force under
4
the League's authority for national armed forces."
In the House of Commons Afctl.. and Grenfoll expressed trie desire to
see partial disarmament £ive way to complete cisarmanent . Grenfeli said
5that he w nted complete disarmament from the Disarmament Conference. in
19313, Attlee said that the Labour Party's >olicy was to reduce and then
abolish ail armaments.
The achievement of complete disarmament would not automatically end
1. Arnold-Forstor, "Our Case ir the Disamaaient Campaign", Labour ila^azine,
Daceauer 1931, X, p. 350*
2. "International", T.U.O . Rgggrt , 1931:, p. 174.
3* L.P. Annual »**'t:orl 9 1933, pp. 192 and 194.
4# L.P. Anuual xiepart, 1934, p. 154.
5. Grenfeli, Commons , CCLXX7I , March 23, 1933, col. 525.
6. Attlee, Cations, CCCII, May 22, 1955, col. 370.
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The achievement of complete disarmament would not automatically 0rid
the possibility of international disputes. Since these disputes could not
be settled by war, some other means had to be provided. Labour, therefore,
supported arbitration under the League of Nations, economic sanctions, and
an international police force to maintain international order. Only one of
these
- the International Police 7orce - >iill be discussed here because
the others are treated in later chapters.
This international force would provide all the protection necessary.
It was to bo under the authority of the League, or, in othor words, under
the direction of all nations who were members of the League. Henderson
said that such an organization was one of the steps in Labou> »s policy to
abolish war, and emphasized the point that this force would be substituted
for national armed forces.
1
It was the opinion of most Labour leaders that
this police force should be established as a result of a disarmament confer-
ence. Jones included the proposal for a police force among several to be
2
made to the Geneva Disarmament oonference in 1933. iiander asked that the
Foreign Secretary call upon the President of the Disarmament Conference to
call it together to achieve reduction of arms and "spocifc.1 consideration as
to the possibility of establishing an international air police forco."° Dur-
ins Italy's attack on Ethiopia, V, r.darrs said that an international force
4
v/ould haTT e made it impossible for Mussolini to "flout the League 1".
In Labour's support of disarmament there is much evidence that it had
1. Henderson, L.P. /nnual Report, 1934, p. 154.
2. Jone3, Caaraons, CCLXXXI, November 13, 1933, col. 576.
3. £». Mander, CotTimons, CCCIII, July 3. 1935, col. 1841.
4. "The International Situation", L#P. Annual Report, 1936, p. 182.
the support of the British people. Interesting evidence on this point U
found in the Peace ballot of 1936 am another poll conducted in 1933. In
this latter poll, according to the Labour Party's Annual deport
. 34,000
questionaires *ere sent out to all classes of people, une-nalf of the
questionnaires were returned; 57> of those returned favored unconditional
.
probably unilateral, disarmament by Great Britain.
1
The more fanous poll
was the Peace Ballot vjhich was sorted by the x-eague of Nations Union and
carried out by a "National declaration Committee" v.-nich included the Union
and thirty-eight other organizations. The questions and rosuits were as
follc'ws s
"Are you in favor of an all around reduction in armaments by international
agreement?
Yes - 10,470,459; It - 662,775; Doubtful - 12,052
Abstentions - 213,589.
"Are you in favor of an all around abolition of national /nilltary and naval
aircraft by international agreement?
Yes - 9,533,558; It - 1,689,786; Doubtful - 16,376;
Abstentions - 318, 845.
"Should the manufacture and sale of armaments for private profit ba prohi-
bited by international agreement?
Yes - 10,417,329; No - 775,415; Doubtful - 15,076;
2
Abstentions - 361, 345."
It is not surprising, in view of the results of the ballots, that Brit-
ish Labour favored disarmament; indeed, the Peace Ballot influenced the
(Jovernuent's policy. As tho minority party, the Labour Party could not af-
ford to oppose the electorate and still hope to gain more votes. It is
1. Ma.ior Bellerly, L.P. Annual R eport
,
1933, pp. 192-3.
2. Frederick L. Sichuman, Europe on the Eve; The Crisis of Diplomacy
1933-1939. Ne*i York: Alfred >\. Knopf, 1942, p. 175.
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possible that this public opinion for disarmament may have been created,
in part, by the activity of the British Labour groups. If this is true,
then there was a circle which could only have been broken by a change of
policy by the Labour groups or by the impact of a crisis in foreign affairs.
Whatever the cause. British Labour maintained its support for disarmament
after the British Government had turned to rearmament, and public opinion is
unquestionably one factor which led Labour to continue to work for disar-
mament throughout the period, 1931-1937.
The position of the British Government i n regard to armaments in the
period 1931-1938 has been the subject of considerable comment; much of
that comment was adverse criticism. An examination of Labour's position
does not lead one to think that its policy would have been much different
or that it would have been wiser from the standpoint of British interests.
Labour's policy on armaments was directed towards achieving international
disarmament, a policy which became increasingly impossible as the years
passed. Labour's policy was probably motivated by two considerations:
first, their pacifist background, and second, their opposition to Government
policy.
There can be little doubt of Labour 1 s sincerity in its belief in dis-
armament. Too much was written and said on the behalf of disarmament over
a considerable period of time to classify Labour's aim as only politics or
chicanery. This belief is at least partly the reason why Labour was blind
to certain aspects of world conditions. Labour made many statements concern-
ing the danger of the totalitarian nations to peace, yet still worked for
disarmament. Either Labour did not feel that there was a real threat or did
not realize that arms alone could prevent aggression from succeeding. Along
with this sincerity of belief was the factor of the Labour Party being the
43
party of opposition. This factor alone would have prompted the Labour Party
to oppose the Government when it started its rearmament program. This atti-
tude could have prompted Labour to advocate rearmament before the Government
had started to press for a greater rearmament program. But at that time
the Labour groups had good evidence that the British people believed in dis-
armament. Thus. Labour could not afford to give up the policy of disarma-
ment, expect an increase of its power at the polls. This belief of the
British people may have been partly the result of Labour's continual agita-
tion for disarmament. If this is true, then Labour groups must share the
responsibility for the position in which Britain found herself in 1939.
Whatever the cause or effect Labour did not support rearmament until some
time after the British Government had taken steps to increusr. British arma-
ments •
The British Government moved towards rearmament in 1934 starting with
1
the air force. In March of 1936 the Government provided for large scale
2increases for military and naval forces. Yet, it was in 1936 in debate
on these increases that Attlee moved,". ..as the safety of this country
cannot be secured by reliance on armaments but only by the resolute pursuit
of a policy of international understanding, adherence to the Covenant of the
League of Nations, /find/ general disarmament.
. .this House cannot agree to
a policy which in fact seeks security in national armaments alone..." Not
until November 1, 1937, did Attlee say, "In the conditions which now exist
as a result of their ^the Government's^ policy we agree that any govern-
4
ment would have to provide an increase of armaments." Here is clear evidence
1. Summarised by Arnold V.'olfers, Britain and France between Two >rs,
Conflicting btrategies of -Peace Since Versai lles^ New Y0 rk: Hareourt
,
Brace and Co., 1940. p. 374, footnote 14.
2. Loc. cit .
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that Labour lagged behind the Government in supporting rearmament. Cer-
tainly there were signs which pointed clearly to the need of armaments be-
fore November of 1937. Abyssinia had fallen to Mussolini; the Rhineland
had been fortified by Hitler; and Franco was receiving military help from
both dictators. If their activites were to be halted, a threat of force
backed by real strength, or force, had to be used. Labour's policy until
1937 would have made such a step impossible.
Ideally, it is the duty of a political party to keep a nation informed
as to the nation's needs. A party should take any opportunity to point to
certain matters either domestic or foreign which need attention, and offer
a program to correct these conditions, ^abour to some extent was able to
do the former, but completely unable to do the latter in regard to armaments.
Since, in many respects, the government had failed to take that step, then
it was of the utmost importance for the opposition to provide the necessary
leadership. Labour leaders quickly saw Hitler as a menace to democracy and
peace, but failed to offer a program which would have destroyed that menace.
Certainly in the beginning of the Government's rearmament program, labour's
attitude may heve in part been responsible for the slowness with which the
rearmament program proceeded. If Labour had supported the rearmament program,
more British people would have supported the program. Britain would have
been able to present a united front to aggression.
The disarmament program put forward by British Labour and the Labour
Party was idealistic rather than practical. Throughout the greater part of
the period 1931-1938, Labour groups failed to realize that the detemination
of Japan, Germany, and Italy to expand at the expense of weaker nations
would not be prevented by adverse public opinion. It is one of the incon-
sistencies of Labour's foreign policy that on the one hand, Labour advocated
44.
collective action and at the same time would have denied the means by which
collective action could have succeeded. Labour would have weakened the
ability of Britain and other nations to make collective action effective by
disarmament* Even if all other nations had agreed to international disar-
mament, these three nations would have violated the agreement* Thus, at the
time when collective action should have been strong, there would have been
no power with which to meet the fcgj ressor nations.
The chief reason why disarmament was not achieved during this period
was the fact that the nations of the world were compelled to rearm to meet
the aggressor nations who did not believe in disarmament and certainly did
not intend to disarm no matter what other nations did about their arms.
Consequently, the peace-loving nations could not see hem they could disarm
and still have security. It was evident to many nations that disarmament
was not the way to security with sane nations outside of the League who would
not accept disarmament. On the contrary, the way to security was by rearma-
ment —force to meet force.
The point which most needed to be emphasized concerning disarmament
was the matter of security. No nation cencerned vath its own security could
cotisider disarmament by itself, without regard to the overall question of
security and defense. It is true that Labour groups recognized this to sone
degree. :3ut for the most part they took the stand that security would come
after disarmament. The skeptics insisted that security wes necessary before
disarmament could be achieved. V ith world conditions as they were, the skep-
tics showed wisdom and realism. The redeeming feature of labour's policy
towards disarmament was Labour's insistence that disarmament be universal,
and also that a world police force be established to deal with the violators
of the peace. These two conditions were certainly necessary to make disarma-
ment successful. The chief criticism is that Labour's drive .as for inter-
national disarmament primarily, and for an international police force, se-
condarily. The order should be reversed even In time, of tranquillity, and
it is imperative that it should be in times of stress. The years, 1931-
1938, constituted a period of suspicion and fears-fears which could only
have been allayed by security. The policy of the Labour Party did not offer
this remedy. Thus, it *as working for an objective which could not be
fulfilled, and Labour's efforts were fated for defeat.
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Chapter II
Manchuria
The first example of the aggression, which was to become almost common-
place in the 1930 's was the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. In the summer
of 1931, there were two conflicts between Chinese and Japanese nationals.
The first of these came at the end of June when a Japanese captain and three
assistants were murdered by Chinese soldiers in Manchuria. This action was
followed in early July by the Wanpaoshan affair, a riot caused by a dispute
between Korean and Japanese farmers in Manchuria, which led to anti-Chinese
riots in Korea in wh ch five hundred Chinese were casualties, and to an anti-
Japanese boycott by the Chinese. Although Baron Shidehara, the Japanese
Prime Minister, desired a policy of conciliation, Japanese military authori-
ties decided to use force. Following an explosion on the South Manchurian
itailroad, Japanese troops seized the barracks, arsenal, and airfield in
mukden on the night of September 18th and the following morning. Within the
next four days many strategic points along and near the railroad were in
Japanese hands. By the beginning of 1932, Japanese troops held all of South-
ern Manchuria. This aggression w^s continued until all of Manchuria was
occupied and a puppet state under Japanese control was established.*
The Chinese Government brought the matter before the League of Nations
2
on September 21, 1931, under Article XI of the Covenant.
1. W. N. i'edlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles . London:
Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1940, pp. 144-5.
2. Article XI of the Covenant reads:
1. "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any
of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a
matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall
take any action deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the
peace of nations. In case any such emergency shall arise
the Secretary-General shall on the request of the Members
of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.
2. "It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member
(Continued on next page (47) as footnote)
The next day the matter viae debated by the Council, to whom- the Japanese
delegate said that the question could best be settled by direct negotiations
of the two nations directly concerned. After some discussion, the League
council decided to try t e persuade both sides to stop fighting and return
their troops to their original positions. An appeal to this effect was sent
to both nations. A report of the meetings of the Council was sent to the
United States because it had signed the shington Pact and the Kellogg
Treaty. The United States indicated its approval of the League action, but
said that it did not wish to take part in a commission of inquiry. Although
the Council had received a note from Japan stating that troops would be
withdrawn to the railroad zone, the Japanese forces pushed forward. Further
League Council discussion produced no plan leading to the cessation of hos-
tilities. In December, on request of the Japanese delegate, a commission
(which came to be known as the Lytton coiiLiaission) was appointed to investi-
gate the facts of the case. On January 7, 1932, Secretary Stimson sent
his famous nonrecognition note to Japan.
The Stimson Doctrine stated the refusal of the United States to recog-
nize any agreement which would "impair the treaty rights of the United
States or its citizens in China including those which relate to the sover-
eignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity
of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China,
commonly known as the open-door policy, and tha~ it does not intend to recog-
nize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means
contrary to the Covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27,
(Footnote continued from page 46)
of the League to bring to the attention of the
Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever af-
fecting international relations which threatens to dis-
turb international peace or the good understanding be-
tween nations upon which peace depends."
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1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States,
are parties." Not until March 11th did the Council of the league of Na-
tions adopt a resolution, drafted by Sir John Simon, which stated that no
member of the League would recognize any new situation contrary to the
Covenant or to the Pact of Paris.
The Lytton Commission made its report to the League in October of
1932. It was recommended in this report that Manchuria be given autonomy
under £ hinese soverilgnty and new tr- aties be signed by both China and Japan
to safeguard the rights of both parties. The Council began consideration of
this report on November 21st, and on November 28th sent the report to the
Assembly. The Assembly asked the council of Nineteen to study the report
and to make recommendations to the assembly. This Council made recommenda-
tions which implicitly condemned Japan 1 s actions; it urged that Manchuria
be restored to Chinese sovereignty and that Japanese troops be withdrawn
to the railway zone, where they had the right to be. The Assembly accepted
the proposals by the vote of all members present except Japan. This was
followed by the withdrawal of the Japanese delegation from the Assembly,
and on March 27, 1933, the Japanese Government announced its intention to
2
withdraw from the League of Nations. This mere condemnation of Japanese
action by the League, without any attempt to enforce sanctions, was ineffec-
tive, and Manchuria still remained a Japanese protectorate.
The British Government's policy during this period was, generally
1. Quoted by Irving S. Friedman, British Relations with China . New York
International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, Publica-
tions Office, p. 19, footnote 1.
2. Friedman, British delations with ihina, pp. 39-42.
speaking, directed towards mediation. A few days after the Japanese attack
on Mukden, China brought the matter to the attention of the Council of the
League, which called upon both China and Japan to withdraw their troops
immediately. Viscount Cecil, the British member of the Council, approved
of the Council s action and stated that only when peace w- s assured, could
the dispute be settled. On September 28th, Cecil expressed approval of the
Chinese suggestion that a committee investigate the dispute. He also hoped
that by direct negotiations the Chinese and Japanese Governments could reach
an agreement for the evacuation of troops. On October 16, 1931, Prentiss
Gilbert, an American, attended the Council meeting at the Councils invita-
tion which was supported by the British delegate. The British delegate
assured the Japanese that Prentiss Gilbert would not sit as a member. On
October 22nd, Lord Cecil stated that the British Government had been made
uneasy by the bombing of Manchurian cities and could not see the justifica-
tion for such action. At a later meeting of the Council on November 16th,
the . ritish delegate gave his support to the resolution which provided for
sending a commission (the Lytton Co mission) to Manchurie to investigate.
On the same day Lord Cecil took note of the "difficult and exceptional"
position in Manchuria, but hoped that such a condition would not lead to
more hostilities. Thus, ritain accepted in part, the Japanese assertion
that disorder in Manchuria made military action necessary.
On January 7, 1932, Secretary Stimson sent his non- recognition note
to China and Japan, expressing the hope that Britain would take similar
action. In an official reply the British Foreign Office stated that
Britain still supported the open-door policy, but, because Japan had stated
that it intended to continue the o-en-door, such a note was unnecessary.
This was considered as a rebuff to the United States by many, and evidence
so.
that the United States and Britain would not present a united front to Ja-
panese aggression. This reply, it was explained in 1938, was not intended
to alienate the United States, but had been drafted by permanent officials
of the Foreign Office and sent to the newspapers without realization of its
implications. When Manchukuo asked for Britain's recognition, Simon told
the House of Commons that recognition would be premature. From February 28,
1933, to March 13, 1933, an embargo was placed on the shipment of arms both
to China and Japan by the British Government, the only government which did
this. On December 6, 1932, the League Assembly began its discussion of the
Lytton Report. At that time bimon called attention to the parts of the
report that mentioned disorderly conditions in China. He stated that it
was necessary to recognize "realities" and indicated that a restoration of
the status quo before the Mukden incident would not be the correct solu-
tion. He, however, did wish to uphold the principles of the League, and he
thought the League might be able to offer its good offices for conciliation
of the dispute. This speech was pro-Japanese and indicated 3ritati's ac-
quiescence in the Japanese conquest of Manchuria.*
There is evidence that British Labour would have preferred a more ag-
gressive policy. Some Labour members wanted financial and economic sanctions
levied against Japan, as well as the moral sanctions of non-recognition and
the withdrawal of ambessadors. In addition, some Labourites would have sent
arms to China. The great danger to the League of Nations, to peace, and to
other possible victims of aggression were foreseen.
In November of 1931 Lsnsbury warned Commons by saying that if Japan
succeeded in its attack upon Manchuria, other nations might commit aggression
2
by the "same method". The Labour Magazine presented a similar warning in
1. Gilbert "rnest dtibbard, British Far "astern Policy . New York: Inter-
national Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943, Chapter II,
passim.
2. Lansbury, Commons, CCLX, November 25, 1931, cols. 462-3.
editorial in February of 1932 which stated that the League of Nations and
the 3riand-Kellogg Pact would become scraps of paper if the war were ig-
nored. The writer went on to say that it was a "grave situation which
threatens the peace of the world..." 1 Attlee believed that Japan was the
second danger point after Austria. 2 In 1934, one delegate to the Trades
Union Congress said that the immediate danger of trouble was Japan, not
Germany which was incapable of waging war at this time. 3
In 1935, Attlee, with the advantage of hindsight, said that the British
Government had defaulted on all of its pledges, such as the Pact of Paris
and the Wine-Power Treaty. He quoted Secretary of State Stimson's statement
that if Japan were permitted to violate .hina*s territorial integrity, a
new naval race would be inevitable, and war was possible in the Pacific.
Attlee continued by saying that the failure of the British Government and
other governments to uphold the rule of law had killed security throughout
the world. "From that moment rearms nent became the order of the day, and
the advocates of physical force all over the world were encouraged, includ-
ing Hitler."
The conflict, moreover, placed the British people and British interests
in jeopardy. These things were quickly recognized by all section s of the
Labour movement. A statement to this effect by the National Joint Council
which represented the General Council of the Trades Union Congress, the
National 'ixecutive of the Labour Party, and the Parliamentary Labour Party,
was published in the /nnual Reports of the Labour Party's Annual Conference
1. "Editorial", Labour Magazine
,
February 1932, X, pp. 456-7.
2. Attlee, Commons
,
CCLXXXIV, December 21, 1933, col. 1503.
3 » T.U.C. Report , 1934, p. 329.
4. Attlee, Commons, CCXCIX, March 11, 1935, col. 38.
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and the meeting of the Trades Union Congress of 1932. This statement said
that the Japanese attack was unwarranted. If the nations of the world did
nothing to support the League, the League would fall; other wars would cer-
tainly follow; and if the situation became worse, there could be no hope
for disarmament. Furthermore. British lives and interests were in danger
and should be protected.
1
This statement contained suggestions for action
to stop the war which will be stated later.
The aggressor was declared to be Japan. It was admitted in some quar-
ters that Japan had seme rights, but not the right of breaking treaties and
seizure of Chinese territory. The National Joint Council feared that Japan
wanted more than Manchuria,-that
- hanghai as well was a goal of Japanese ag-
2
gression. The Council stated definitely: "It is clear that a state of
war exists between China anc Japan for which Japan is responsible."
It was admitted by inference that there was political disorder in
China. Nevertheless the National Joint Council did not consider this any
justification for attack. "Political disorder in China is no justification
for the invasion of its territory by any foreign power." The Council pointed
to the British Memoranda of 1926 as the basis for this opinion. This memor-
anda said that no nation should interfere in ~hina but rather should maintain
friendly relations with China while waiting for the establishment of a strong
4
national government. It was this policy which Japan should follow.
Cocks, Jones, and Henderson were quick to point out that the Japanese
1. "Executive Heport", L.P. annual Report
,
1932, p. 68.
T.U.C. Report
,
1032, pp. 179-80.
2. L.P. Annual Report
,
1032, p. 68.
3. T.U.C. Keport, 1932, pp. 179-80.
4. loc. cit.
attack was a violation of treaties guaranteeing the political and territor-
ial integrity of China, Cocks pointed out in Commons in March of 1932
that the invasion of Manchuria affected the Nine-Power Treaty. 1 Morgan
Jones repeated this assertion a year and a half later saying that the pre-
sent regime in Manchuria (1933) violated China's integrity, as guaranteed
by various treaties and was incompatible with peace in the Far Eest.2 in
his pamphlet, Labour's Foreign Policy. Henderson said that treaties should
not be "torn up with impunity." 3
Not only did some Labourites believe that the Nine-Power Treaty had
been violated, but also that the Covenent of the League of Nations had
been ignored, - making this conflict the conrern of the League. Therefore,
Labour leaders urged the British Government to take an active part in pro-
posing to the League such plans as a request for the cessation of hostili-
ties, withdrawal of the ministers from Japen, and the denial of recognition
to Japan's conquest by the League states.
In 1932, the Executive Report made to the Labour Party's Annual Confer-
ence stated that any war or threat of war is of concern to the entire League
a
and to every citizen of a League member. Lansbury declared, "There is an
obligation not only upon Japan to honour its word, but upon those who
„5
signed the Covenant to honour their word. A few minutes before he had
Q
said that Japan's attack was in defiance of the Covenant of the League.
1. Cocks, Commons, CCLXI1I, March 22, 1952, col. 934.
2. M. Jones, Commons , CCLXXXIII , November 27, 1933, col. 498
3. Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy , pp. 26-7.
4. "Executive Report", L.P. Annual Report , 1932, p. 68.
5. Lansbury, Commons , CCLXXV, February 27, 1933, cols. 44-5.
6. Ibid., col. 35.
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If the League were to take up its duties, uni Labourites wanted the
cooperation of the United States and Russia in any action. Wellhead, a
Labour member of the House of Commons, said in 1934 that agland, with the
backing of France and the United States and several other powers, would be
enough to deter Japau. A couple of months later V.'edgewood asked the
Foreign Secretary if he was in communication with the United states, trying
to secure concerted action in regard to China.2 Cripps made the definite
proposal that England get as close cooperation ag possible with Russia and
the United States as well as with the League in dealing with the Far-
3
Eastern situation*
The cooperation of the.se two nations would make more effective any
League action such as a request for cessation of hostilities -which some
wanted the League to make. A week after the Japanese attack on Manchuria,
Lansbury urged the roreign Secretary to press for a cessation of hostilities
ana urge that the "whole question be referred to an impartial tribunal for
4
settlement. After Tardieu announced that the "full authority of the
League 1 ' would be placed behind the proposal for an armistice and an arrange-
ment for a neutral zone for the protection of the International Settlement
at Shanghai, the Labour kla^a&ine in an editorial stated that any settlement
5
or agreement should apply to Manchuria as well.
If hostilities continued, it was suggested that all nations should
withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from Japan, It was hoped that
such expression of disapproval toward Japanese aggression would cause the
JU R.C TKallhead, Commons, CCLXXXV, February 7, 1934, col. 1169.
2. Wedgewood, Commons , CCLXXXVIII, April 23, 1934, col. 1366.
3. Cripps, Commons , CCLXXXIX, May 18, 1934, col. 2061.
4. Lansbury, Commons , CCLX, November 25, 1931, col. 464.
5. "Editorial", Labour Magazine , February 1932, X, pp. 456-7.
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Japanese to withdraw from China. This plan can be found in the Annual <e-
ports of 1932 of the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party. The Exe-
cutive Report of the Labour Party urged the Government to request the Council
of the League of Nations to consider the withdrawal of the ministers or am-
bassadors from Tokyo of the members of the League. It was hoped that this
action would not be necessary, but that this expression of public opinion
would not be "unheeded" by the Japanese Government. 1 The Anrual Peport of
the Trades Union Congress contained the same thought, word for word. 2 Throe
and one-half years later .Sir Stafford Cripps said that this should probably
be the first step to stop Japan. 1
The withdrawal of ambassadors from Tokyo might, under the Loague Cove-
nant, have been followed by sanctions, pcrticnl&rly economic and financial
measures, which would have denied to the Japanese resource to wage war. A
statement of the National Joint Council which represented the General Coun-
cil of the Trades Union Congress, the National executive of the Labour Party,
and the Parliamentary Labour Party urged the British Government to propose
"measures of financial and economic constraint". In fact it was believed
that the British Government was "obliged" to recommend such action under
its obligations to the League of Nations. These measures were to be "co-
operative and gradual" and "in association and agreement with the United
4
States and the members of the Lea rue."
The above statement was not the only reference to economic and finan-
1. "Executive Report" t L.P. Annual Report , 19 32, p. 68.
2. "International Joint statement of the Far Eastern Situation",
T.u.C. Report
,
1932, pp. 178-80.
3. Cripps, Commons , CCXCIX, March 11, 1935, col. 150.
4. "Executive Report* L.P. /nnual Report , 1932, p. 68.
"International Joint Statement of the Far Eastern situation",
T.U.C . Report
,
1932, pp. 178-80.
cial pressure which could be used against Japan, ft, Amold-Forster wrote
in 1934 that if the British Government had taken the lead in defending the
collective peace system and restraining Japan "if necessary by economic
pressure", the^challenge to British and world interests would not have been
so "menacing". Cripps, a year later said, "it was our duty" to exert econo-
2
,mic pressure. As late &s 1937 an editorial in Labour said that "universal
condemnation" was not enough to stop Japan. In addition, action had to be
taken "to convince her rulers that political and economic isolation and
3
strict accountability are the penalty for their criminal misconduct."
One of the forms of economic and financial constraint which could
have been used against Japan was the boycott. This means that all nations
would refuse to buy Japanese ^oods, thus depriving the Japanese of one source
of revenue. L. MacNeill-V;eir quoted Lansbury as saying that if the League
was not going to use sanctions and compulsion there was no use of belonging
4
to the League. Others made specific statements recommending or supporting
a boycott. A resolution of the Trades Union Congress General Council and
the National Executive of the Labour Party, dated February 22, 1933, came
out definitely in support of a boycott. The resolution recommended that if
Japan rejected the proposals of the League Committee of Nineteen, all sec-
tions of the Labour movement should pass resolutions "calling for the appli-
cation of an economic boycott in accordance with Article XVI of the Covenant
of the League of Nations."
5 In Commons Railhead said, "The only thing that
g
will bring her ^Japan^7 to her senses is a form of keen economic boycott."
1. Arnold-1' orster, "The Collective Peace System; Labour's choice".
Labour
,
February 1934, I, p. 133.
2. Cripps, Commons , CCXCIX, March 11, 1930, col. 150.
3. "All the T'orld Over", Labour , October 1937, V, p. 26.
4. MacNeill-Weir, pp. cit ., p. 567.
5. "Executive Report", L.P. Annual Report , 1933, p. 51.
6. Wallhead, Commons, CCLXXV, February 27, 1933, cols. 128-9.
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Another economic measure suggested was an embargo upon shipments
to Japan, and some persons wanted this to apply to China as well. In I933
the Executive of the Labour Party wanted an embargo of arms to both China
and Japan. The Trades Union Congress was of the same opinion.
1
Cocks, too,
was desirous of an embargo, but only on goods to Japan. He wanted to make
"arrangements between the nations, members of the League and the United
States, to place an embargo on certain goods going to Japan 0r to bring
pressure in various ways which would put her at a disadvantage." Specifi-
cally mentioned was the following: "all loans should be forbidden to Japan
and she should have no power to raise money in other countries" provided
2that agreement could be reached with other nations. Attlee and Lansbury
wanted the embargo on arms to apply only to Japan. The latter wanted "our
government to say at once, that no arms and no ammunition shall be exported
from this country to Japan." Cripps would go one step farther, - because
the League had declared Japan the aggressor, he would send arms to China.
He too wanted to persuade the other nations not to supply Japan with arms,
4but refusing arms to China, he believed, was another way of helping Japan.
By such action these Labour spokesmen believed that it would be difficult
for Japan to carry on aggression.
It has been pointed out above that British Labour wanted to settle
the Sino-Japanese question by peaceful means. It has been shown, too, that
a good share of Labour believed that economic pressure should have been used
to accomplish this aim. But, if this failed, would Labour have been willing
1. "International Department, "Executive Report", L.P. Annual Report,
1933, p. 51.
2. Cocks, Co.imons
,
CCLXXV, February 27, 1933, cols. 109-10.
3. Attlee, Commons, CCLXXVI, April 13, 1333, col. 2746.
Lansbury, Commons, CCLXXV, February 27, 1933, cols. 45-6.
4. Cripps, Commons, CCLXXV, February 27, 1933, col. 147.
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to use military force to compel the aggressor to withdraw? In the light
of statements by Labour leaders in the early years the answer must be "no" •
There is little evidence that Labour supported such action. Only a few in-
dividual 8 came out in favor of military sanctions* Just how far Labour f s
thoughts were from military sanctions may be illustrated by Attlee's atti-
tude towards strengthening Singapore in 1933 • He said, "I have never been
in favor of the base myself."* It seems that if Attlee were expecting to
use force against Japan, he would not have objected to making Singapore
strong* On the other hand, this was consistent with his policy on disarm-
ament No ^abour group supported military sanctions until 1938 when the
Labour Party did so*
It was not until 1936 that one Labourite, Sir Stafford Cripps, support-
ed military action* He said, "It was our duty, in cooperation with the other
nations* •• to take every possible step. ..by armaments if necessary* The
Rational Council of Labour called for "concerted effort" by all nations to
stop Japan in 1937. 5 This did not necessarily mean military action. In
fact, Attlee a few months later said that no one was suggesting war on
Japan.
*
The policy advocated by the Labour Party placed emphasis on the strength
of disapproval being sufficient to stop aggression. T hit disapproval com-
bined with the Labour Party's vague recommendation of economic sanctions
was the main part of its proposed policy in regard to the attack on Man-
churia. England's policy should have been to persuade the League of Nations
1. Attlee, Commons , CCLXXV, March 9, 1933, col. 1383.
2. Cripps, Commons , CCXCIX, March 11, 1935, col. 150.
3. "All the World Over", Labour , September 1937, V, p. 2.
4. Attlee, Commons , CCCXXX, December 21, 1937, col. 1798.
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to act promptly and forcefully, and to secure the cooperation of the United
States and the Soviet Union in this action. It seems reasonable to conclude
that in September 1931, the League of Nations should have clamped an embargo
on all goods to Japan immediately, blockaded Japan, and attempted to persuade
the United States and the U.S.S.K. to do the same. If the embargo had been
enforced, the blockade would have been virtually unnecessary since the nations
of the League, the United States, and the U.S.S.R* included almost all the
nations with goods to export. A blockade, moreover, would have made clear
the world's determination to prevent aggression. A blockade would have been
difficult to maintain because the United States and Great Britain did not
have naval bases from which to operate, as a result of the Washington Con-
ference. At that time they had agreed not to strengthen any base in the
Pacific. This factor would have made military and naval sanctions diffi-
cult to enforce, but a show of force might have stopped Japanese aggres-
sion. If the Japanese had decided to smash such a blockage, they probably
could have done so. In addition to taking action against Japan, China should
have been helped with loans and shipments of military supplies. In this
manner China would have been better able to defend its territory against
invasion, making aggression less attractive to the Japanese militarists.
Unfortunately much of this was impossible to accomplish. The United
States would not have taken part in a blockade of Japan. Without the aid
of the United States it is probable that the League powers would have found
it estremely difficult to enforce a blockage if Japan had decided to defy
and break the blockade. This being the case, it would have been better not
to have placed a blockade around Japan. A defeat for the League blockade
undoubtedly would have destroyed the League. It may be doubted, moreover,
that the United States would have sacrificed its trade with Japan by cooperat-
60.
ing with an embargo. If Secretary of State, Stimson, had been able to
••cure support for economic sanctions, it would have been concrete evidence
of the world's disapproval of agression, and would have been evidence of
the unity of Great Britain and the United States which Japan feared. Cer-
tainly, it would have been difficult for Japan to obtain materials with
which to wage war. One of two alternatives would have happened in this
event, either Japan would have had to give up its plans for taking Manchu-
ria, or it would have found it possible to continue its attack. If the first
had occurred, the value of sanctions would have been proved and the League
would have been strengthened. If the second had occurred, it would have
proved that economic sanctions unsupported by military force are useless.
If the latter were the out come, this action would at least have had some
positive result, because it would have destroyed the illusion of many that
economic sanctions alone were necessary to prevent agression. Sanctions
having been tried and found wanting, the persons believing in collective
security would have urged stronger measures when the next blow fell. Since
they had not been tried, these persons still continued to think for many
years that economic sanctions alone would be sufficient.
If it had been impossible to persuade the United States to place an
embargo on goods to Japan, the League was under obligation, nevertheless,
to place an embargo on goods to Japan, and to boycott goods from Japan.
The imposition of economic sanctions would have been an expression of the
League of Nations' opposition to aggression and its determination to act.
The British National Government and the Labour .Party chose to ignore
the possibility of such action. Actually, the policy put into effect by
the Government was as strong as the policy advocated by the Labour Party.
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The Labour Party seemed to be little concerned at the time of the begin-
ning of hostilities. Not until the Lytton Commission had been appointed and
made its report to the League of Nations, did the L&bour Party begin to take
an active interest. During the seme period the British Government was try-
ing to secure the withdrawal of both Japanese and Chinese troops, and for a
month did place an embargo on the shipment of arms to both nations. The
Government also supported the appointment of the Lytton Commission in
November of 1931. Not until the autumn of 1932, a full year after the in-
vasion started, did the Labour Party propose that the League nations
withdraw their ambassadors from Tokyo, and suggest "measures of economic
ant: financial constraint". The British Government's policy failed to pre-
vent Japanese aggression, and the Labour Party's proposals came when Japan-
ese success had been demonstrated by the creation of the puppet nation,
Manchukuo.
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Chapter III
Abyssinia
The Italo-Abyssinian dispute grew out of a clash of troops at Walwal
on December 5, 1934. Walwal was a watering place located in the disputed
frontier area between Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. It had been occu-
pied by the Italians in 1928, and the occupation had been uncontested until 1935
when Abyssinian troops, escorting an Anglo-Abyssinian boundary commission,
challenged the Italian garrison, Abyssinia protested to Rome, and on Decern er
9, 1935 proposed arbitration. Mussolini in return demanded an apology and
reparations. It seems to be fairly well established that for about two
years before the V.alwal incident Mussolini had been directing military pre-
parations in Italian Somaliland and Eritrea for an attack on Abyssinia.
Halle Selassie, the ruler of Abyssinia, turned to the League of Nations.
While the League discussed the matter, Italy poured arms and troops into
Eritrea end Italian Somaliland. In January, /byssinia invoked Articles XI
and XII of the Covenant of the League, and in March, Artiele XV."
1. Article XI states in part that any threat of war is "a matter of
concern to the whole League, and the Lea ue shall take any action
that it may deem, wise...."
Article XII states in part that if a dispute arises between members
of the League "likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the
matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry
by the Council, they agree in no case to resort to war until three
months after the award by the arbitration or the judicial decision
,
or the report by the Council,
"
Article XV states in part, "If there should arise between Members
of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is
not submitted to arbitration or judicial decision.*, the Members
of the League agree they will submit the matter to the Council."
"If a report by the council is unanimously agreed to by the
members thereof, other than the representetives of two or more of
the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that
they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which com-
plies with the recommendations of the report."
FollowinG the Abyssinian move, Italy agreed on March 22, 1935, to
establish an arbitral commission if direct negotiations should fail. On
September 5th, this commission absolved both nations of any responsibility
for the incident at V.'alwal. On Ootober 1, 1935, Mussolini sent his amy
into Abyssinia, and Abyssinia struggled to resist the attack.
1
Haile Selassie informed the League of the attack and asked the League
to send observers to confirm his charge. The League Council met on Octo-
ber 5, 1935, to study the report of its Committee of Thirteen
-which recom-
mended bringing the hostilities to an end. The Council then appointed a
Committee of Six to make recommendations. A note from /byssinie asked the
Council to recognize the existence of war and to apply sanctions. The Com-
mittee of Six, in its report, declared that Italy had violated the Covenant.
On October 19, 1935, the Committee of Eighteen, established by a committee
of the Assembly, recommended sanctions on Italy consisting of five parts:
"1. an arms embargo against Italy;
11 2. an embargo on all loans and credits;
M 3. an embargo on imports from Italy vdth some exceptions;
"4. an embargo on exports to Italy of transport animals,
rubber, aluminum, iron ore, scrap iron, tin, and stra-
tegic rare metals;
H5. a provision for mutual support ingthe application of
economic and financial measures
These measures were accepted by most of the nations of the League, and
the United States placed an embargo on arms to both Abyssinia and Italy.
1. The introductory section of this chapter is based largely on
Sohuman, op. cit
., Chapters V and VI.
Haines and Hoffman, op. cit
., pp. 375-30.
2. (Documents on International Affairs , John W. Y/heeler-Bennett and
Stephen Heald, editors. London: Humphrey Mi Iford-Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1935, II, pp. 192-262.)
Quoted by Schuman, op. cit ., p. 188.
64
This step was taken with British support*
In the meantime France and England were working behind the -.cones
to effect a settlement by buying Italy off with territorial and economic
concessions from Abyssinia. Out of this cr^ae the Roare-Laval plan # This
plan specified that Britain and France would recommend to Bail* Selassie
that he cede part of Abyssinia to Italy; in return, Abyssinia would re-
ceive a strip of Kritrea from Italy giving Abyssinia access to the Red
Sea. In addition, Italy would be granted exclusive economic rights in
Southern Abyssinia. This plan was abandoned, due to the upsurge of opinion
in Great britain, which forced Hoare from office.
On January 22, 1936, discussion in the League Council turned to the
practicability of placing an embargo on shipments of oil to Italy. Eden,
who replaced Iloare at the oritish Foreign Office, urged its adoption, but
the reluctance of France to take this step, followed by a ministerial
crisis in I ranee, and the death of George V in England all led to delay
until March of 1936. At that tiae, France urged the Committee of Thirteen
to make a final attempt to secure a peaceful settlement, /byssinia agreed,
and Mussolini agreed in principle. This caused more delay. In the mean-
time, Italy completed the conquest of Abyssinia, and on May 1936 with the
occupation of Addis Ababa, Haile Selassie left the country. The Council
met on May 12th to consider the new situation and postponed a final deci-
sion until June. In the intervening period the nations indicated that the
sanctions should be lifted. On July 15, 1936, sanctions against Italy
were repealed by the League of Nations.
Throughout this long crisis the policy advocated by British Labour
differed radically from that of the Government. Labour members were dis-
turbed by the violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Labour
did not want to help Italy in its agression by either passive or active
asistance. Instead it sincerely wished to prevent this attack on Abys-
sinnia from succeeding. That the League of Nations should act firmly ftnd
promptly in this crisis
-wag Labour's belief.
The following were some of the opinions expressed by Labour and the
Labour Party. The League of Nations should condemn Italy's aggression and
impose sanctions which would cripple the attack. Italy should be expelled
from the League for its crime. All League members should withdraw their
ambassadors from Home to indicate their disapproval of Italy's attack on
Abyssinia. The Hoare-Laval deal was strongly opposed because the plan
would reward, not punish, the aggressor. Any settlement must be made by
the League, so that the authority of the League would be vindicated. Labour
also desired to enlist the cooperation of France and the United States.
In the summer of 1935, before the invasion began, Labour members
urged the Government to close the Suez Canal to Italian ships carrying
supplies and men. When the danger of an Italian attack was apparent, but
before Italy's all-out attack, Attlee and Dalton proposed that in the event
of hostilities the Suez .anal be closed to Italian shipping. This would
make it almost impossible for Italy to supply its army, 2500 miles from
home. As early as October 2, 1935, Hugh Dalton, speaking before the Labour
Party's Annual Conference, said that the Suez Canal, alone, could be closed
very easily, and that such action would leave Italy helpless.* Attlee advised
warning Italy that if she intended using force, the Suez Canal would be
2
closed to Italian armies. Another type of support for Abyssinia to be
1.
2.
Hugh Dalton, L.P. Annual Report
,
1935, p. 155.
Attlee, Commons, CCCII , June 7, 1935, cols. 2193-4
undertaken by Britain alone » suggested by he presented t«o
pos 8ible courses of action to Commons, no help to Italy by any exports
whatsoever, and supply to Abyssinia of the weapons of defense. 1 He also
attacked the Government's embargo on arms to both Italy and Abyssinia. He
would send arms to Abyssinia as soon as the League declared that they were
2
needed for self-defense.
By and large the Labour groups believed that the Italo-. byssinian
dispute was a matter to be settled by the League of Nations. In September
of 1935, Labour said: "The duty of the League is clear. It is to prevent
Peace from being outraged by Mussolini." 3 The General Council's report
to tho Trades Union Congress contained a resolution, drawn up by fifty-
two representatives of Trade Union Centres and Labour Parties at Geneva
in September of 19 35, in which they appealed to the League to fulfill its
duty and to preserve peace and justice. The imminent danger of war plainly
indicated the duty of the Wgue to apply the sanctions of the Covenant.4
This resolution was sent to the President of the Council and the Secretar-
iat for distribution to the members of the Council. Adams said that the
massing of Italian troops in North Africa "constitutes a danger such as
contemplated under Article 10 of the League",5 He continued by saying that
the League was involved in the /byssinian dispute. 6
Attlee was one of those who believed that the League should act
and must succeed in this crisis to remain in existence. He said "This
incident... is a test of the reality of the League and the sanctity of the
1. V. Adams, Commons
,
CCCIY, August 1, 1935, col. 2914.
2. Ibid ., col. 2912.
3. "All the World Over", Labour
,
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,
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5. V. Adams, Commons
,
CCCII, June 7, 1935, cols. 2204-5.
6. Ibid., col. 2205.
1
Covenant of the League.* Colonel V/edgewood bluntly stated that if the
League failed to enforce peace, the League would be dead as far as Labour
2
was concerned, and later that the Ethiopian conflict was a question of
3
life and death for the League of Nations. In 1936, however. Labour con-
tinued to support the League after its failure in June. The National
Council of Labour reported, "The invasion of Abyssinia by Fascist Italy
constituted and still remains a 'threat 1 to the League of Nations." The
Council wished to continue the "measures /sanctions/' adopted against
Italy. This was after Abyssinian resistance had stopped. It illus-
trates Labour's devotion to the League of Nations. It is true, however,
that after the failure of the League to prevent Italy from taking Ethio-
pia, the League no longer had any power to act. Colonel 'iedgewood's pre-
diction had become a reality.
Because the League's authority should be vindicated, and because
Britain was a member of the League, any League decision should have been
supported by Britain. Attlee asked the Government to inform Mussolini
that it would uphold the Covenant of the League. If Italy failed to recog-
nize the authority of the League, then she would be declared an aggressor,
5
and Britain would act against an aggressor. The National Council of
Labour called upon the British Government to make immediate proposals
in the League Council in order to define the duties of both Italy and
Ethiopia. In addition, the Government was asked to "declare that /it/
will discharge its duties and obligations as a member of the League without
6
fear or favor. 11
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It is not strange, considering Labour's previously expressed senti-
ments, that it condemned the Hoare-Laval deal, for it was clearly outside
of the framework and spirit of the League of Nations. As stated before,
this plan proposed that Britain and Prance would recommend that /byssinia
cede to Italy the Tigre province and the Danskil country southeast of
Eritrea along with much of Ogaden province. In return Italy would give
Abyssinia a strip of Eritrea so that Abyssinia would have access to the
•ea at Assab. In addition, Italy would get exclusive economic rights in
the southern half of Abyssinia. Haile Selassie was not consulted, and, of
course, protested vigorously.*
The National Council of Labour correctly condemned the Hoare-Laval
plan. It called the agreement a "gross violation of the League of Nations
and a betrayal of the Abyssinian people." The resolution stated, also,
that the National Council of Labour condemned any form of settlement which
awarded territory and political and economic advantages to the aggressor
at the expense of the victim. Such a settlement would only encourage fur-
ther aggression. The Council called upon the League of Nations "to apply
effectively the policy of Sanctions. ••and refuse to recognize the invasion
and conquest of any portion of Abyssinian territory as the basis of set-
2
tlement. An editorial of Labour charged that the British government
had pledged its support to the League of nations, but within a monih of this
promise had agreed to a settlement which shocked the entire world. The
editorial concluded that no British Government had ever so "basely betrayed"
its pledges. This was Labour's answer to the Hoare-Laval deal. The
1. Schuman, op. cit
., p. 197.
2. L.P. Annual ^oport
,
1936, p. 33.
3. "All the r:0rld Over", Labour
,
January 1936, III, p. 98.
National Council of labour represented all Labour groups, and as such can
be taken to be the official s^nd of British Labour* This resolution stated
Labour's faith in sanctions, which will be discussed below. Labour's oppo-
sition to the Hoare-Laval deal is significant because it shows that Labour
did not desire to appease the dictators.
This opposition to aggression was expressed by Henderson, who de-
manded that Italy should be expelled from the League. On two occasions
in April 1936, he asked the Foreign Secretary to consider this proposal.*
Once again such action would not stop aggression, but would be an expression
of disapproval. From the standpoint of League prestige, this would have
been preferable to letting Italy walk out of the League because she had been
"insulted" • It was Henderson, too, who wanted the League States to with-
draw their ambassadors • In the spring of 1936, he said on two occasions
that there was no reason why the ambassadors should not be withdrawn from
2
Rome. He stated that such action would have the moral effect of showing
3
Italy how the other states regarded the attack upon Abyssinia*
The League action which had the enthusiastic approval of Labour
was the enforcement of sanctions* Labour's only regret was that they were
not more inclusive. By October 19, 1935, the League of Nations, through
its Committee of Eighteen, had adopted five proposals of sanctions as
stated above, and these proposals wore accepted by the overwhelming major-
ity of the League nations. On the other hand, the League did not supply
Abyssinia with war materials - in fact, Britain denied arms to Abyssinia
as well as Italy - nor was en oil embargo placed, nor the Sues Canal
1. Henderson, Commons , CCCXI, May 6, 1936, col. 1766.
Henderson, Commons , CCCXII, May 29, 1936, col. 2472.
2. Henderson, Commons , CCCXI, I pril 21, 1936, col. 1094.
Henderson, Commons , CCCXI, May 6, 1936, col. 1766.
3 # Henderson, Commons , CCCXII, Hay 29, 1936, cols. 2471-2.
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closed to Italian traffic. Also, the sanctions which were adopted were
not too strictly enforced. Almost all this to Ahyssinia were prevented
from reaching their destination. France refused to send arms to Abyssinia,
and French officials at Djibuti "blocked shipments of *rms "by rail to Ahys-
sinia* After January of 1936, no goods were permitted to pass through
French Somali land.
The application of sanctions had the whole-hearted support of Bri-
tish Labour, Most followers believed that the sanctions would succeed and
would stop Italy 1 s aggression. There was some opr>osition within the
Labour groups - namely by Lansbury. It was conceded by some persons that
sanctions might lead to war. but others believed the opposite. These
sanctions were to be a cooperative effort by members of the League. There
were certain kinds of materials which might be kept out of Italy's hands,
thereby sisJcing it impossible for her to w?»ge an aggressive war. Even after
the conquest of Abyssinia, the Labour Party did not want to stop the
sanctions, even if England had to continue them alone. Labour agreed that
the sanctions levied did not have the desired effect, hut this they blamed
on the British Government.
Attlee cast his support squarely behind sanctions in a statement
that they would be effective if applied "promtly, fully, and whole-heartedly.
Grenfell believed that the League would win if it applied sanctions "calmly
U
and firmly". * Wedgewood also was in favor of sanctions. In 1935. hefore
the Trades Union Congress the President, Mr. William Kern, said: "The npnlic*
1. Schuman, op. clt. , p. 177*
2. Attlee, Commons , CCCY, November ??, 1935. col. k? 9
3. Grenfell, Commons, CCCV. November 22, 1935, col. lUl.
*K Wedgewood, Commons, CCCV, November 82, 1935. col. 233.
tion of these economic and financial sections would, I believe, suffice
to restrain Italy's aggression."1 There were only two persons who op-
posed sanctions on Italy. Lanabury said. "...I most profoundly disagree
with the use of the sanctions of war either by the League of Nations or
unilaterally by our own Government." If economic sanctions would lead to
2
war, he would refuse to support such a war. This statement was made the
same day that Attlee, Grenfell, and Y;edgewood cast their support in favor
of sanctions. Cripps was not much in favor of sanctions, particularly
those in force. He called them ores which had no effect.5 These were
the only expressions of disfavor toward sanctions until a later date.
Although it wps contended by a few that sanctions oould lead to
war, some still indicat d their support. Mr. J. Williams, according to
Labour and gag Resistance
,
supported sanctions even if the sanctions led
4
to war. Mr. "William Kern admitted that sanctions may bring the League
powers to war, "but war is a certainty anyway unless Italy is restrained."^
There is good evidence that some ^bour groups were willing to go to war
if sanctions led to an Italian attack on a League member. Mr . V. Adams
stated in Commons that if sanctions did not stop Italy's war, he was will-
Qing to fight under the Covenant. Citrine told the Trades Union Congress
"There is only one way of dealing with a bully, and that is by the use of
force... It may mean war, but that is a thing we have to face...If we fail
1. "President's Address", T.U.C. Report
, 1935, pp. 67-8.
2. Lansbury, Commons
,
CCCV, November 22, 1935, col. 67.
3. Cripps, Commons
,
CCCVTI, November 22, 1935, col. 2067.
4. Covenanter, Labour and Tar Resistance . London i Victor Gollancz
and the New Fabian research Bureau, 1936, p. 11.
5. "President's Address", T.U.C. Zleport
, 1935, pp. 67-8.
6. V. Adams, Commons, CiCIV, August 1, 1935, col. 2915.
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now
.
war is absolutely certain. I ask you what will happen to Germany if
Italy can break her treaties..." 1 After Italy's conquest of Abyssinia
almost complete, Attlee said, "We were prepared to stand for collective
security. We asked for sanctions to be applied. We were prepared to stand
up to the aggressor should the aggressor attack the League Powers."2
Thus it is clear that at least influential elements in the Labour
movement were willing to use arms to prevent Italian victory. Such action
was not to be directed against Italy primarily, but against aggression and
in defense of the League of Nations. It is to be noted that although the
Labour party members thought that war might result, no one except Lansbury
objected to sanctions. This indicates one of two things: that Labour
did not really expect war, or that Labour wai not afraid to face a war for
the Lea,;ue of Nations.
The crucial problem in regard to sanctions was the selection of
materials to which Italy should be denied access. Nearly all Labour groups
approved of the sanctions voted by the League. They wished, however, to
add more items to the list. They desired to purchase no goods from Italy,
and did not want to supply Italy with any. They wanted no ship of the
members of the League to sail to Italy. A blockade was proposed, and an
embargo on fell was believed to be the most effective way to stop Italy's
war machine.
Colonel Wedgewood was one of those who felt that the League sanctions
x
made a good beginning, but he wanted to add oil to the list. Henderson
wanted more sanctions, although he thought that it was possible that Italy
1. Sir Walter Citrine, T.PWC Report
,
1935, p. 349.
2. Attlee, Commons
,
CCCXIII, June 23, 1936, col. 1613.
3. Wedgewood, Commons, CCCV, November 22, 1935, col. 233.
might be brought to terms if the sanctions of the League were continued. 1
This was at the time when it was almost certain that Abyssinia was fully
conquered. Henderson wanted a complete shipping embargo upon goods to
2
Italy. On April 29, 1936, he asked why Mritain could not place a ship-
ping embargo and refuse to allow ships of any members of the League to
take goods to and from Italy. Such action, he felt, would quickly bring
3Italy to her senses. Mr. V..Adams hoped that the Government would not
help the aggressor by any exports whatsoever.4 Wedgewood said that if
Mussolini were confronted with a blockade of fifty powers, there would
be no fight. This was conditioned by 1'ussolini knowing the nations would
5
do as they had promised.
Many Labour leaders wished to add oil to the list of materials to
be denied Italy. An oil embargo by the League of Nations was blocked by
Franoe. Wedgewood asked why the discussion of an oil embargo was postponed
at the League meeting. He asked the Foreign Secretary to take steps to
g
stop the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from sending oil to Italy. In February
of 1936, Lees-Smith was of the opinion that an oil embargo with the coopora-
tion of the United States would exhaust the Italian supplies in three and
one half months at the current rate of consumption. On the same day he
said that there had been a change in attitude in France which made it more
Q
possible to get an oil embargo. V;edgewood commented that oil sanctions
9
might be risky, but that every good action is risky. Attlee, less patient
1. Henderson, Commons
,
CCCXI, May 6, 1936, col. 1766.
2. Henderson, Co .onions
,
CCCXI, April 21, 1936, col. 109.
3. Henderson, Coiamons, CCCXI I, April 29, 1936, col. 2472.
4. Adams, B ommons
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CCCIV, August 1, 1935, col. 2914.
5. Wedgewood, Commons
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6. Wedgewood
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Commons, CCCVII, December 5, 1935, col. 304,
7. H.B. Lees-Smith, Commons, CCCIX, February 24, 1936, col. 67.
8. Ibid,, ool. 71.
9. Wedgewood, Commons, CCCIX, February 24, 1936, col. 127
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than his colleagues, wanted to know why it took four months to achieve
nothing in the way of oil sanctions. 1
In March of 1936. Henderson said that he was disappointed because
no further sanctions had been put on Italy. At that time he believed that
an oil embargo would not be effective until October or November, but that
an oil embargo should be levied at once before Italy had a chance to build
up stock for the period after the rainy serson. He wanted to add iron,
coal, and steel to the sanctions list.
2
By May 6, 1936, Lees-Smith charged
that the Government had made no attempt to get an oil embargo.
3
Even after the conquest of Abyssinia, the Labour members of Parlia-
ment wished to continue the sanctions. In June of 1936, when the conquest
was complete. Greenwood said that the British Government should still press
4for sanctions at Geneva. At the same time Attlee was in favor of keeping
sanctions. This might be expected since /ttlee had opposed V.'inston Church-
ill's suggestion to withdraw sanctions in March. 6 Henderson said that since
no new sanctions had been levied for seven months, the policy was not one
7
of progressive sanctions. He indicated by this that he wished to see more
sanctions placed on Italy. If the League were to withdraw the sanctions
on Italy, Henderson wanted Britain to continue its sanctions, and to refuse
to supply Italy with war commodities. He admitted that he did not believe
1. Attlee, Commons
,
CCCIX, February 24, 1936, col. 147
2. Henderson, Commons. CCCX, April 9, 1936, col. 3049.
3. Lees-Smith, Comaona
,
CCCXI, May 6, 1936, cols. 1827-8.
4. Greenwood, Commons
,
CCCXIII, June 18, 1936, cols. 1216-7.
5. Attlee, logons , CCCXIII, June 23, 1936, col. 1610.
6. Attlee, Commons
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CCCX, March 26, 1936, col. 1536.
7. Henderson, Commons, CCCXI, May 6, 1936, col. 1764.
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that this action by Britain alone would be effective, but he wanted Bri-
tain to accept and carry out its obligations by going it alone.
1
There is only one piece of evidence that any Labourite wished to
repeal the sanctions against Italy. Writing in the July i sue of Labour
in 1936, Dr. M. Follick said that there was no use continuing an arms em-
bargo against Italy because Italy no longer needed oil. The only thing which
could now be done to drive Italy from Abyssinia was to use an army of
500,000 men. This was the only action left because the government would
not use "collective collaboration" to freeze her out by sanctions.** In
other words the Government had let the situation reach the point where
sanctions no longer had any force. This lone statement, however, cannot
be taken to mean that Labour^ followers wished to see sanctions repealed.
'"hat action could the League have taken after the seizure of Abys-
sinia had become a fact? One possibility was to deny recognition to Italy's
conquest. In 1936, the National Council of Labour called "upon the League
of Nations... to refuse to recognize the invasion and conquest of any por-
tion of Abyssinia 1 s territory as the basis of settlement . In July of
the same year Lansbury declared that it would be a "calamity" if the Bri-
4
tish Government recognized wde jure" annexation of /byssinia by Italy*
In 1937, Ernest Bevin, as the President of the Trades Union Congress, said,
"VTo shall protest with all our force against any recognition by the League
of Italy's v*ar and plunder in violation of the Covenant and all her treaty's
obligations."^
Such action had been supported during the Manchurian incident.
1. Henderson, Commons, CCCXI , April 21, 1936, cols. 109-10.
2. Dr. M. Follick, "Has Mussolini Really ?Jon", Labour, July 1936, III.
pp. 282-83.
3. L.P. Annual Report, 1936, p. 33.
4. Lansbury, Commons
,
oCCXV, July 31, 1936, col. 1906.
5. "President's Report", T.U.C. Report , 1937, p. 76.
IHence, this was but a continuation of i-abour's policy in regard to aggres-
1
r
sion* Such a policy would not stop aggression, but it would definitely
}
express disapproval of such methods. In contrast, the Government reoog-
1
nized the cqnquest on April 16, 1938.
» LBesides working with the League of Nations, Labour wanted Britain
to cooperate with at least two other nations during this crisis; namely,
France and the United State s* Both Henderson and Yedgewood "believed that
the cooperation of France should he enlisted* During the crisis Franco
showed little inclination of sincerely desiring to prevent Italy's conquest
of Abyssinia* Pierre Laval, French Foreign Minister during 1335 and the
early part of 1936, was more concerned with obtaining Italian aid against
Germany, and, therefore, did not want to alienate Italy. Laval w&3 instru-
mental in postponing an oil embargo by the League. M. Fl&ndin, Laval's
successor to the Foreign Offioe, did not change the French policy, and con-
sequently, cooperation of France with Britain was not forthcoming, ^edge-
wood believed that France *s cooperation could be secured by pointing out
that if the effort to stop the w r failed, the Lacarno treaty would be
1
gone, and France would lose its prized security. Henderson said substan-
tially the same thing. This prediction was to come true. France did
lose the protection of Locarno and of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
It was recognized by the Labour groups of Britain that if the co-
operation of the United States could be secured during the Abyssinian af-
fair, cooperate action would have a better chance of success* Wedgev^ood
said that he was very pleased by the Foreign Secretary's statement that
1 # Wedgewood, Commons , CCCIV, August 1, 1935, col. 2938.
2. Henderson, Commons, CCCXI , April 21, 1936, col. 111.
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he had been in touch with the United States on this question. The Colonel
"believed that it was within the hands of Britain and the United States
with the help of Trance to "preserve 1* the pe«ce of the world. 1 In connec-
tion with the proposed oil embargo, Lees-Smith commented that there was
hope and a chance of getting the United States to help. If Britain wavered,
o
the United States would be less ant to help. As stated above he believed
that an oil embargo, nnd an agreement from the United States not to in-
crease exports of oil, would exhaust Italy's oil supply in three and one-
half months. 3
The efforts of the British Government, though having the same gen-
eral aim, seemingly, as those of Labour, never were as energetic as Labour
would have liked. Throughout the Abyssinian-Italo crisis, the British
Government worked to bring the dispute to a neaceful end before hostilities
began, and after *rmed conflict came, to bring it to a speedy end. While
in Rome on June ?Hth and 25th, 1935# 5den t«gge*4eA a settlement, giving
Italy the portion of O^aden around Walwal, compensating Abyssinia with a
corridor through British Somaliland to the port of Zeila. This suggestion
was refused by Mussolini. The next move made by Britain came at the con-
ference of Great Britain, Italy, and France, held in Au< t of 1935 to dis-
cuss the affair. Here the British and French delegates suggested that
Great Britain, France and Italy lend their aid to Abyssinia. Abyssinian
sovereignty was not to be impaired, but Italy's special interests were to
be recognized. Once again |taly disapproved. In the meantime, Britain
H Wedgewood, Commons , CCCIV, August 1, 193^, col. 2939*
2. Lees-Smith, Commons , CCCIX, February ?M> 193^ cols. 68-9-
3. Ibid, , col. 67.
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had brought its fleet and naval bases up to full strength in the Medit-
erranean.
On September 10th, Hoare and Laval decided that if sanctions were
imposed by the League, they would make sure that the sanctions were limited
to financial and economic measures only. Britain agreed to the sanctions
adopted by the League Assembly in October, but the o sanctions proved to
be ineffective. On January 22, 1936, Eden urged the League to adopt an oil
embargo* France urged delay, and because of other added difficulties, the
oil embargo was not adopted. After the May 12th meeting of the Council,
by which time Addis /baba was occupied by Italian troops, Britain decided
that the sanctions had failed of their purpose and decided to urge their
repeal. The League nations agreed, and on July 15th, the sanctions against
Italy were officially ended*
In contrast to the Government's policy, Labour spokesmen urged
strong league action. Such action was necessary to maintain the League
of Nations and collective security. Thus. British Labour condemned the
Uoare-Laval deal as contrary to the ideals of the League. Rather than re-
cognize Italy's aggression, it would be better to prevent that aggression.
To make it difficult for Italy to supply its military forces in Africa,
some Labourites urged the Government to close the Suez Canal to Italian
shipping. Along the same line, Labour gave complete support to the League
sanctions, regretting only that the sanctions were not more stringent. Many
indicated that they were in favor of sanctions even if sanctions led to war
between Britain and Italy. When the British Government decided that sanc-
tions no longer served a useful purpose, and helped to bring about
their
repeal, many objected and specifically requested their continuance.
They also requested that Italy's annexation of Abyssinia should
not
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bo recognized. British Labour and the British Labour Party thus showed
more devotion to the League of Nations as an instrument of collective
security than did tho British Government.
If one starts with the assumption that it was to the advantage of
Britain and other nations to prevent aggression, and maintain the League
of Nations as a bulwark against aggression, then the policy of the British
Labour group was logical. It was sensible to close the Suez Canal and to
snnd military supplies to Abyssinia. It naturally followed that Italy should
have been denied the resources to wage the war of conquest. The same rea-
soning dictated the use of a naval blockade arid military forces to end
Italy's dream of an enlarged empire as quickly as possible - if peace were
to be maintained. This latter phase British labour generally neglected,
except to|nake statements to the effect that Labour supported sanctions even
if i.iussolini did attack any League Power (i.e. Britain) because of this.
Perhaps a blockade was unnecessary, but there is some evidence that leads
one to believe that if the sanctions hfid been more comprehensive, Italy's
attack would have ground to a halt. Italy is a nation with limited natural
resourvos, lacking coal, iron, and oil - ail essentials in constructing
weapons and waging a successful war. The sanctions imposed wore those which
Italy did not need for a short war. An oil embargo might have resulted in
a longer war, or even defeat for kussolini ' s army. Certainly the air force
would have been grounded.
In some ways it is surprising that the British Government did not
adopt a more forceful policy in the crisis. A considerable portion of the
British people seem to have been in favor of such a policy. The Peaoe
Ballot, sponsored by the League of Nations bnion showed this to be true.
One of the questions in the Peace -.allot was, "Do you consider that,
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if ft nation insists on attacking another, the other nations should combine
to compel it to stop by: (a) economic and non-military measures, and (b)
if necessary, military measurer,?" The voting on the question was as follows:
Yes No Doubtful Abstentions
a. 10,027,608 635,074 27 ,255 855 107 1b. 6,784,368 2,351.981 40,893 tJ»Mtt
This indicates that most of the people of Britain supported economic sanc-
tions, but indicates that only a little more than half of the population
favored military action. Thus it would seem that the British Government
could have counted on support for any economic sanctions it desired to place
on Italy, but would have received a questionable amount of support for mili-
tary sanctions. Helen Hiett, in discussing British opinion in Public Opinion
in the Italo-Ethlopian Dispute
, states that the result of the Peace Bal-
lot was "a definite instruction to the government". She also states that
the Ballot was the chief reason for Hoare's statement in September of 1935:
"The recent response of public opinion shows how completely the nations sup-
ports the government in full acceptance of the obligations of league Mem-
bership." In a footnote she comments that a breakdown by weeks of the vote
from November of 1934 to May 1935 showed a steady increase in the number
of votes registered in favor of military sanctions, and a corresponding de-
crease in the number of voter, cast for the abolition of military and naval
2
aircraft. This expression of opinion is one reason why all major political
parties supported the collective peace sj^stem in the general election held
in November of 1935. Therefore, it seems a safe conclusion to state that
1. Quoted by Schuman, op. cit .
, p. 175, fro..: 'mold J. Toynbee and
others, Survey of International Affairs. London: Humphrey Gilford'
Oxford University Press, 1935, II, p. 51.
2. Helen Hiett, .Public Opinion in the I talo-Ethiopian Dispute . Geneva
Geneva Special Studies , Geneva Research Center, VII, February 1936,
No. 1, pp. 19-21.
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the British public would hare supported any economic measures which the
British Government and the League of Nations undertook.
In spite of public support. Labour's policy might have been difficult
to put into practice. Prance under Laval, was not in favor of plying
stringent sanctions on Italy, Laval wanted Icaly' su^ort to checkmate
Germany, and, therefore, did not wish to alienate Italy by supporting the
application of sanctions too vigorously. Therefore, Trance's support at
this time was of doubtful quality. As stated before, it was Laval who suc-
cessfully prevented, the addition of oil to the embargo list. A second
difficulty standing in the way was the attitude of the United States. The
United States had banned the sale of arms and munitions to both Italy and
Abyssinia. But would the United States also refused to send other
goods to Italy such as oil? The American government did support a moral
embargo on oil to Italy. In addition, the Neutrality Proclamation of the
United States stated that the Government would not give protection to any
American cltiaen who traded with Italy. Some have contended that this was
a clear indication that the United States would not oppose a blockade of
Italy.
1
The denialof arms to both sides and the refusal to protect its
citizens who were trading with Italy was certainly a departure from the
traditional American policy of insisting upon the freedom of the seas
for neutral trade. Pranklln Koosevelt, moreover, was not friendly to
aggression. It seems probable that the United States would not have made
any move which would weakened collective action.
Another question concerned the tenor of British opinion if sanctions
had provoked Mussolini into attacking a League raenber. The Peac^ Ballot
shows divided support for military sanctions, giving some indication
1. Henry Bamford Parkes, Recent America, A History of the United States
Since 1900. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 19^1, p. 590.
that if a conflict had come as a result of sanctions, British opinion might
have turned against sanctions. It is the author^ opinion that the British
people placed so much faith in the pnwer of economic sanctions that thev
expected that no other means would be necessary to stop Italy. Thev com-
pletely discounted the possibility of war arising from the enforcement of
sanctions. If war had resulted, the Peace Ballot indicated that only half-
hearted support would have been forth«oifting from the British people*
10,027,608 persons supported economic sanctions, but only 6,784,368 persons
voted in favor of iailitary taeasures. On the basis of this evidence, only
slightly mor than half of the British would have given support to mili-
tary sanctions in order to uphold collective action* There was solid sup-
port, ?iowever, for collective security, ikrt did that support reach the
point of really supporting military sanctions? All of these difficulties
combined, made effective collective action a doubtful matter.
In spite of the possible obstacles which might have made effective
military sanctions a questionable policy, Britain and the League of Nations
could have made the conquest of Abyssinia a difficult undertaking. The
British Labour Party urged the Eiritish Government to take suchjft stand.
Even before the outbreak of hostilities the Labour Party suggested the clos-
ing of the Suez Canal to Italian shipping; this step the Government did not
consider. The Labour Party favored the application of sanctions by the
League nations during the crisis, while the Government seemingly agreed.
The British Government did support the sanctions levied by the League and
did propose the adding of oil to the embargo list, but was persuaded by
France to drop an oil embargo. In the meantime, in contrast to the Govern-
ment's avowed aims, the lioare-Laval plan was evolved which met essentially
all of Italy's demands. This *ep brought a strong protest from the L-bour
Party which believed that aggresion should not be rewirded. Tftien the
British Government indicated early in 1936, that it would urge the Wgue
to repeal the sanctions, Labour again objected, and instead requested the
British Government to continue the sanctions, even if lifted by the Lepgue
of Rati ons« Throughout "the entire affair the Labour Party maintained com-
plete loyalty to the principle of collective action. It 'jiTi reasonable
to assume that if that principle hed been sincerely accepted and applied,
internation&l law could have been upheld.
Chapter IV
Rhineland
By the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Articles and 1*3,
Germany was forbidden to "maintain or construct any fortification either
on the left hank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line
drawn 50 kilometers to the last of the Rhine." Germany was also forbidden
to send or keep armed forces in the same area. Article hk specified that
any violation of the above provisions would be a "hostile act" and "cal-
culated to disturb the peace of the world". 1 This restriction did not
satisfy France, which wanted an additional guarantee of aid from other
nations if an infraction of the provisions occurred. 2 These guarantees
Prance thought she had secured by the Locarno Treaty of 1925, Article 2
of the Treaty contained the pledge of Germany and Belgium and also Germany
and France not to attack each other; this agreement did not hold if either
Article ^2 0r of the Treaty of Versailles were violated. Article U
read as follows:
"(1) If one of the high contracting parties alleges that a
violation of Article 2 of the present treaty or a
breach of articles ^2 or ^3 of the Treaty of Versailles
has been or is being committed, it shall bring the
question at once before the Council of the League of
Nations.
(2) As soon as the Council of the League of Hations is
satisfied that such a violation or breach has been
committed, it will notify its findings without delay
to the Powers signatory to the present treaty, who
severally agree that in such case they will each of
them come to the assistance of the power against
whom the act complained of is directed.
(3) In case of flagrant violation of article 2 of the pre-
sent treaty or of a flagrant breach of articles ^2
and U3 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the high
1. Wolfers, op. cit., p.
2. Ibid ., p. U3
.
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contracting parties, each of the other contracting
parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the
help of the party against whom such a violation or
breach has been directed as soon as said Power has
been able to satisfy itself that this violation
constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that
by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or
of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of
armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate
action is necessary. Nevertheless, the Council of
the League of Nations, which will be seized of the
question in accordance with the first paragraph of
this article, will issue its findings, and the high
contracting parties undertake to act in accordance
with recommendations of the Council provided they
are concurred in by all the members other than the
representatives of the parties which have engaged in
hostilities. sl
Representatives of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, and Great Britain
signed the Locarno Treaty.
In violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaty,
Hitler sent German troops into the demilitarized Rhineland March 7, 1936.
Hitler's move fortified his western border so that he could not be so
readily attacked during his contemplated advance into Central Ihirope.
The excuse given by Hitler was that France had broken the Locarno Fact
by the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact which had been signed on
May 2, 1935.
Thus, according to Hitler, the action of France released Germany
from its obligations under Locarno. Even while troops moved into the
Rhineland, Hitler, speaking to the Reichstag, held out ueace offers with
regard to Western Europe, but no approach t*as made to nations to the
south and east of Germany. Both France and England hesitated to take
any action. According to some interpretations of the Locarno Pact, they
were entitled to use military force against Germany. The question before
1. Wolfers, op. cit., pp. ^5-6, footnote 25
France England was whether or not this deed was a^ viola.
tion" of the Locarno Treaty. If tt was
, then France could use force
immediately to drive German troops fro, the Rhineland. The French c»b-
inet met and decided to act in accordance with Article U. section 1 0 f
the locarno Pact; that is, to put the matter before the League Council.
The Council handed down the opinion that Germany had broken the Treaty
of Versailles and the Locarno Treaty, but did not record any action to
compel Gerry's withdrawal from her new positions. Thus. Hitler turned
his attention to Austria, Czechoslovakia, and eventually Poland and the
Ukraine with confidence that his eastern frontier was well protected. 1
The re-occupation of the Rhineland did not greatly alarm British
Labour, although, since Hitler had come to power in Germany they had
opposed his acts and distrusted his promises. Many members recognised,
however, that a new danger had been created by this step, and that Ger-
many
• s action might lead to war. They suggested that the matter be
referred to the League, which it was. In this case. Labour members ex-
pressed opposition to British acquiescence in any further aggression, or
to any nation acquiring a dominant position. At the same time Labour
members piously hoped that France would remain convinced that in the event
of a German attack upon France, Locarno would still be in effect. The
magazine, Labour
,
pointed out that "Germany's action in reoccupying
with her armed forces the demilitarized Rhineland has created a most
dangerous situation. It makes a contempt for public law that.
. .cannot
be condoned; ...
*
2 Hugh Dalton noted the "limited character" and "the
absence of certain states" from Hitler's plan to keep the peace.
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Characteristically, Labour members held that this newly created
danger to peace should be dealt with by the League of Hations. On March
26, 1936. two Labour members of the House of Commons referred to the League
of Nations. Dalton wished to see a "League of Nations approach" instead
of just an approach to the problem from the French and British Tiewpoint. 1
Attlee criticised the Government proposals because they were based upon
Locarno instead of the League of Hations* He sensed the threat of German
expansion to the east and urged that any agreement should apply everywhere
and not in Western Europe alone, Hugh Dalton was not opposed to accept-
ing Hitler 1 8 proposal for the discussion of ways of maintaining peace in
Europe, but he did say that the talks should be blunt. * Dalton wanted to
make clear to Hitler the idea that Britain would not stand idly by while
other nations were attacked,** A few days later he expressed this idea
in a different form, "Let us say to the German people in all friendship
and in all frankness. .We wish you no ill. We recognize your title to
equality, equality in political status, and equality in economic opportun-
ity. ..but we do not recognize the right of any nation... to an overbear-
5ing and brutal predominance in the world. n Greenwood agreed with Dalton
and added that all nations should be asked to take part in a general
conference. In fact. Greenwood would ttsei«e H the opportunity.
1 # Dalton, Commons , CCCX, March 26, I936, col. 1^52.
2. Attlee, Commons , CCCX, March 26, 1936, col. 1533.
3. Dalton, Commons , CCCIX, March 9, 1936, col. I926.
I. Ibid . , col. 1927.
5. Dalton, Commons , CCCX, March 26, 1936, col. IU55.
6. Greenwood, Commons, CCCIX, March 10, 1936, col. 1976.
Dalton added to the previous statement, "I hope we may be able to
pursuade the French Government
.... that the Locarno Treaty still stands so
far as our relations with them are concerned in the event of an aggressive
attack upon them."'''
Thus Labour members were willing to consider revision of exist-
ing Agreements with Germany through international fiction. But they
opposed military action in the immediate Hhineland crisis. Henderson
commented that Britain should disarm if she expected Germany to respect
the Treaty of Versailles. The most revealing statement of Labour's
attitude toward the re-occupation of the Hhineland was made by Hugh
Dalton. wIt is only right to say bluntly and frankly.
. .the Labour Party
would not support, the taking of military sanctions or even economic
sanctions against Germany at this time, in order to put German troops
out of the German Rhineland. " In comparison Hitler has stayed within
German borders while Mussolini has not.^
In summing up Labour's policy toward Germany's re-occupation of
the Hhineland, it may well be said that the policy was a negative one.
While it was admitted that the danger of war was increased, no plan was
offered to lessen that danger. Although it is dangerous to assume that
one n*n speaks for a i*roup, it seems safe to do so in this case because
no one on Labour's side disagreed with Hugh Dalton 1 s declaration that
the Labour Party would not support sanctions. Dalton' s position teal
no aggression had been committed must have been accepted by the Labour
Party.
1. Dalton, Commons , CCCIX, March 9, 19 36, col. 19?7-
2. Henderson, Co-nmons , CCCIX, March 9, 1936, col. IS77.
3. Dalton, Commons , CCOX, March 26, 1936, col.
In taking this stand, Dslton and other Labour people failed to
realize fully the significance and the possible results of Germany's
action. In the first place, as Seton-W»tson wrote. Germany gained con-
siderably. "Indeed. froffl the purely gtrategic standpointf 8ucc8 ,gfal
re-occupation meant for Germany the double gain of "making herself im-
pregnable in the west and of pchieving her maximum offensive power in
the Vest also'."
1
This German action was an indication, as well, of
the aggression to take place in Central Europe. The failure to under-
stand tnis and the failure to propose effective action to prevent the
realization of German ambitions appears in retrospect to have been a ser-
ious weakness in the Labour Party 1 a nosMon on foreign policy.
The lack of understanding can be illustrated by studying Labour's
attitude toward disarmament and rearmament. The doctrine of disarmament
was still predominant. The re-occupation of the Rhineland did not bring
any sudden demand for more British arms, but there was increased interest
in British military strength, most of which came some time after March
7. 1936. There was criticism by Attlee of the Government's rearmament
program because there was no co-ordination between the various branches
2
of the military. Lees-Smith was critical too, but because no defenses
had been prepared against air attacks. ^ The Labour Party Conference
took note of the strength of the dictators when it accepted a resolution
proposed by Hugh Dalton. The resolution was as follows:
"That in view of the threatening attitude of the Dictator-
ships.... the armed strength of the countries loyal to the
League of Nations must be conditioned by the »rmed strength
1. Seton-Watson, op. clt.
, p. 2^9-
2. Attlee, Commons
,
CCCIX, March 9, I936, col. 18^9.
3. Lees-Smith, Commons, CCCXV, July 20, 1936, cols. 8^-5
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of the potential aggressors.
"The Conference, therefore, reaffirms the policy to maintain
such defense forces as are consistent with our country's re-
sponsibilities as a Member of the League of Nations, the preser-
vation of people's rights and liberties, the continuance of
democratic institutions, and the observance of International
Law.
"Realizing the relationship between foreign policy and arma-
ments, and... the deplorable record of the Government, the
Labour Party declines to accept responsibility for a purely
competitive BJUMttfc policy. It reserves full liberty to
criticize the rearmament program of the present Government
, ...
H
This resolution is significant because it shows definitely the
change of the Labour Party's attitude toward rearmament. Since the Con-
ference did not meet until October 5, 1936, it cannot be said positively
that it came as a result of the Rhineland seizure. Probably it came
as the result of the conflicts in Manchuria, Abyssinia, and Spain. The
importance of this resolution is that the Labour Party favored basing
the amount of arms needed on Britain 1 s obligations as a League member.
This would influence the Labour Party to oppose greatly increased
appropriations for arms because it could point to the strength of other
League members and claim that the combined strength of the League made
a larger increase of military forces by Britain unnecessary. Taking this
into consideration along with the number of Labourites who earnestly de-
sired disarmament, it cannot be said that British Labour at this point
wanted to embark upon a strenuous rearmament program, but it cajft be
said that British Labour had come to the turning point in its disarma-
ment campaign, and was starting on the path leading to British rearma^
merit.
While British Labour failed to recognize the most important aspect
of the situation. Labour did condemn the action of Germany in sending
I, "Resolution by Hugh Halton n , L.P. Annual Heport , 1936, p. 18?.
carried, p. :-?Q7*
troops into the Hhineland as the clear case of treaty violation, which
it was. The articles of the Treaty of Versailles were violated hy this
move as well as Article fc, Section 1, of the Locarno Treaty. In view of
Labour's belief in the sanctity of treaties, it is not surprising thst
Labour condemned the German move. let, it is doubtful whether, if talks
had taken place concerning the right of Germany to occupy the Rhineland,
Labour leaders would have been opposed to German re-occupation. Some
Labour leaders had been in favor of granting Germany equality by dis-
armament. Would this not have given Germany eoua'lity with other nations
if she could fortify any part of her territory? As previously mentioned
in this chapter Henderson stated that Germany had some justification be-
cause Britain had not disarmed. Dalton* s statement that Labour would
not support the application of any type of sanctions against Germany also
bears out this contention. Yet, it does seem inconsistent for Labour
to condemn Hitler's move as a violation of the treaties, and still
oppose any step to prevent the infraction from "becoming an accompli shed
fact. Such an attitude is not the way to uphold international law,
which Labour leaders believed should guide all the activities of nations.
It has been contended that France and Britain did not have the
legal right to take military action against Germany in 1936, hut if
the purpose of these two nations was to prevent aggression, then this
was the time to act. The legal basis for military action was stated in
the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaty. 3ome have contended
that this right did not exist when Germany occupied the Rhineland with
troops in 1936. This opinion is "based on the wording of the Locarno
Treaty which states that immediate military action could be taken only
in case of "flagrant violation*. According to some persons, the occupy
tion did not meet this definition because it was not a prelimary step to
an attack on Jraace. Therefore, Britain was not bound to come to France 1 •
aid. Nevertheless, the issue wns referred to the League Council under
clause 1 of Article IV. Action Against Germany would have been perfectly
legitimate when the Council condemned German action as a violation of
both the leeaiae Mi Versailles Treaties, as it did on March 19, 1936.
The decision by the Locarno Powers against action to checkmate Germany
was due largely to the
-oolicy of the British Government, which brought
pressure on yrence for a policy of conciliation and appeasement. In the
end it was decided to take no action whatever. 1
Military action by Prance alone, or "by France and Great Britain,
woulrt almost certainly have forced the German troops to withdraw, left
Germany unfortified in the west, and made it impossible for Germany to
turn to the South and "East to absorb Austria and Czechoslovakia, and to
attack Poland vithout being threatened with immediate attack by the
French army in the West. From the standpoint of preventing aggression,
this is exactly what should have taicen place in March of 1936. The real
problem, more apparent now than then, facing Britain and other nations
in 1936 was to find a way to prevent future aggression. Hitler's
troops in the Rhineland, and the subsequent building of fortifications
in the area mode Hitler's western frontier secure from attack; thus he
could safely turn his attention to the South and Bast. It sealed the
fate of Austria and Czechoslovakia. British Labour and the Labour
Party made the same error as the British and Jrench Governments. They
1. Haines and Hofftaan, op. cit., xrp. 39>96*
condemned the step M a treaty violation, hut neither comprehended the
danger |« the sovereignty of the nations in Central TSurope nor the
danger to world pe«ce. Having failed to make the correct analysis of the
situation, British Labour groups also failed to offer the proper oourse
of action, which was to urge France to use its army in the Thineland, and
to promise full British cooperation, even to the extent of sending troops
across the English Channel to Prance.
er-
Chapter V
Spain
In the summer of I936 the world was confronted with new lnt
national complications growing out of the civil war in Spain. On July
17. 1936. Spanish army units revolted against the Spanish government.
The leader of the army revolt was Francisco Franco. The plan was to
seize the government of Spain by a coup d'etat. The coup failed, and
a civil war which was to last for three years "began. Italy and Germany
sent troops, planes, and munitions to help Franco win the civil war.
Volunteers came to the aid of the Spanish government, including both
men and materials from Russia. The civil war took on the characteris-
tics of an international war. Franco won the war in 1939 with the aid
of Mussolini and Hitler.
1
The civil war in Spain brought new complications for Britain.
A victory for Franco supported by Hitler and Mussolini meant that these
potential enemies could neutralize the British position at Gibraltar.
Other positions in Spain could be fortified which would make it impossi-
ble for Britain to use the western outlet of the Mediterranean Sea.
This would lengthen British communications with India and the Near iMt
by several thousand miles if a European war broke out. Fascist victory
would also weaken the ability of France to wage war. Control of the
Balearic Islands could make it difficult for France to call upon her
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reserve manpower in Africa, if the Fascist powers used the islands as
bases against French shipping. Victory in Spain would also give Prance
another frontier to defend in war. Even if Spain did not enter a
European war, the possibility of Spain doing so would necessitate the
stationing of military forces along the Spanish frontier *nd at Gibraltar,
thus weakening the ability of the Allies to concentrate their forces
against Germany.
Jfrance and j&xgland choae to ignore these potential dangers, and
decided to follow a policy of neutrality in a futile attempt to localize
the Civil War. On July 25, 1936, Prance forbade all arms shipments to
Spain. This was labeled Son-Intervention. Britain followed France's
lead three weeks later. Italy, Russia, Germany, and Portugal agreed to
this so-called Non-Int ervention. As events developed, both France and
Britain adhered to their agreements, but Germany, Italy and Russia and
Portugal ignored Non-Intervention. The result was that Madrid received
little help, while Franco received a large amount from Italy and Germany.
A Non-Int erventions Committee was set up in London to supervise
the application of the pledges. Ho methods of punishing violations were
proposed. The British Government accepted this plan and maintained
strict neutrality in the conflict. The only time thr.t Britain adopted
a tough attitude was after shipping in the Mediterranean Sea had been
attacked mysteriously by submarines and planes. A conference, called
for September 10, 1937» resulted in joint naval action against the
"pirates*1 * The sinkings ceased at once. Other than this, the British
Government remained aloof from the Spanish Civil War.
This lack of action did not meet the approval of British Labour
96,
circles. Labour definitely sympathized with the Spanish government and
left no doubt in anyone's mind as to their opposition to Franco. The
policy of Uon-Int ervention was criticized with vigor, and its abandonment
was sought. Labour wished to prevent the Rebels from receiving aid from
the outside, but it had no objection to the Loyalists receiving all possible
aid. Such a course, they felt, would crush the rebellion and save Spain
for democracy. This attitude was justified by the contention that the
Loyalist government had the support of a majority of the Spanish people,
and that it was entitled to treatment as the legal government. The
Spanish Civil War was looked upon as a danger to the peace of the world;
thus this matter should be dealt with by the League of Sations. In this
case there was no fttfetffci for sanctions. When British shipping was
attacked, a few Labour leaders demanded protection for this ship-ring. A
few reco*-nized the struggle in Sv-ain as ft threat to the balance of power
in relation to fascism vermin democracy, and a threat to the British
life-line through the Mediterranean Sea.
The Labour groups of Briton strewed the point that the Spanish
government was the legitimate regime, against -vhich conservative
fascist-minded groups had started a rebellion. Wedgewood inquired in
Coimnons what it aattered if the Spanish government had been elected by
a minority of the people. It was the established government , against
which the army rose in rebellion.
1 On the same day Cocks stated that
the Spanish government was supported by a majority of the people. ft
month Uter Jones said that the Spanish government was the embodiment
1. Wedgewood, Commons , COCXVI, October 29, 1936. col. 79-
2. Cocks, Colons. CCCXTI, October 29, col. 105.
of the popular will".
1
Grenfell said that the government was the legal
government of Spain because it had an overwhelming parliamentary majority;
he offered as proof the support of the government bv the people in the
2
war.
There can he no doubt that the Spanish government was the legal
government of Spain. It represented the will of the people as expressed
at the polls. The army, led fey conserv- tive officers, wes In rebellion,
but the government retained wide porul? support, particularly in urban
areas. As Grenfell pointed out, the proof of this popular support lay in
the defense of the republic, which held cff the Rebels even though a large
part of the army had gone over to them. Therefore, Labour's support and
desire to help the Spanish Government ooul^ be justified on both jnoral
and legal bases.
Thus Labour supported Alvarez del Vayo^ when he charged that the
Rebels wore being supplied with arms. The National Council of Labour
telegraphed Uden, who was in Geneva, on 3<_ptember 30, I936, to this
effect: "...in view of the fact that the French Government initiated
the policy with the whole-hearted support of the British Government,
the Hational Council of Labour regards It as the imperative duty of
these Governments to tajce the initiative immediately to have these
U
serious charges investigated and the findings published without delay."
The Labour Pnrty Conference upheld this view and added its insistence
1. M. Jones, Commons , CCCX7II, November 5, I936, col. 376.
?. Grenfell, Commons , CCCXIX, January 1, 1937. cols. 151-2
3. The Toreign Minister of the Loyalist Government,
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on investigation and publication of the facts. A year later the Trades
Union Congress asked for the same procedure. 2 These statements refer to
the violation of the Hon-Intervention Agreements. As Rebels, Franco's
armies had no legal right to receive arms shipments from any nation, and
also the Ion-Intervention Agreements had provided that no arms he shipped
to either side in the Spanish Civil War. If the Rebels were receiving
anas from foreign nations, this should he proved, and the facts published.
It was hoped that these methods would cause the nations helping Franco to
•top this aid.
This hostility to Franco is also illustrated in Hoel-Baker's six
point proposal of 1938. Hoel-Baker included within this plan an embargo
on trade with parts of Spain controlled by Franco. * This was consistent
with the attitude that the Spanish Rebels should receive no outside aid
against the legal government of Spain. The Non-intervention Plan pro-
vided for this, but it was being broken daily by Germany and Italy. The
least the Government could do, Hoel-Baker contended, was to keep Its
side of the bargain to the letter. le alee proposed to impound any of
Franco's funds to recompense ship owners whose ships had bean sunk by the
Hebels. Ibis was also an attempt to prevent Franco from receiving any
h
supplies.
The hostility to Franco was again illustrated by labour's wish to
prevent supplies of arms from reaching the Hebels. From the very begin-
ning of the Spanish Civil War, Labour heard rumors of Germany and Italy
1. L. P. Annual Report , 1936, p. 37-
2. "General Council's Report", T.U.O. Report , 1937. p. 173.
3. Hoel-Baker. Commons , CCCXXX7II, June 21, 1938, cols.
932-^.
U. Hoel-Baker, Commons, CCCXXXTII, June 21, 1938. cols. 932-^.
sending supplies and men to help Franco. As time went on, evidence
accumulated that the rumor had all too much "basis in fact.
Shortly after the revolt of the Spanish troops began, Morgan Jones
asked if the rumors that Italy and Germany were sending supplies to Spain
were true. If they were true, the situation was very serious for all
Europe. 1 In October of I936, Cocks told the House of Commons that there
were several sources of information which proved that the Dictators were
sending help to Franco's armies. 2 Some time later Grenfell asserted,
"This influx of trained men from Germany and Italy into Spain must "be
stopped, but it cannot be right to stop volunteers from one side only.
That would mean stopping volunteers from France and elsewhere while the
Germans are sending their trained divisions to win victory over the
Spanish people. H ^
There were many comments along the same lines which indicated
the Labour dislike of fascist troops in Spain. This was continued
throughout the Civil War. Henderson proposed to end all discussion as
to whether fascist troops were or were not in Spain; he called for a
committee of Investigation to go to Spain in order to find out if there
were Italian troops present. His proposal had no chance as long as the
Conservative Government was in power. It was, however, the logical thing
to do to settle the controversy. If anyone were to find definite proof,
he should go to the scene of action. On the other hand, Mussolini had
admitted the presence of Italian troops in Spain and had even sent con-
U
gratulations to victorious troops. What more could anyone want?
1. K. Jones, Commons, CCCXV, July 27, I936, col. 1116.
2. Cocks, Commons , CCCX7I, October 29, 19 36, col. 101.
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Attlee charged that Bilbao had fallen under the impact of foreign
artillery and foreign aircraft, yet the British Government continued to
support Eon-Intervention. Eenderson said that there was considerable
evidence that Hon-Int ervention was a "farce*3
, that foreign troops had
constantly aided the Rebels, and that German planes had "bombed Guernica. 1
Williams asked the British Government to "guarantee to the house that
they will in no way deviate from the terms submitted to the Non-interven-
tion Coasaittee, and that in no circumstances would belligerent rights be
accorded the Franco Regime before the withdrawal of foreign troops."2
As the fares of Hon-Intervention continued, Attlee charged that
Franco got supplies through Italian and German violation of international
law, while the Spanish government got none because the land frontiers
were closed. ^ Cocks said that he did not believe a word of the Dictators'
promises to withdraw troops from Spain. Re pointed to Mussolini's speech
of July 1, 1937 in which II Buce said, "Volunteers will not be withdrawn.
The last word will be spoken by guns."** Grenfell inquired whether the
Government should not demand the prompt withdrawal of foreign troops from
Spain.
5
Speaking before the Trades Union Congress In 1937t Sir Walter
Citrine said that the policy of the Labour Party "was to restrain by
force If necessary", the Hebels from being supplied with arms from Italy
and Germany. 6 2hle was the only reference to the use of force in this
1. Henderson, Commons , CSCXXY, June 6, 1937. col. 1571.
2. F. Williams, Ooramons , CCCOTI, July 26, 1937. col- ^3^.
3. Attlee, Commons , CCCXXVI , July 30. 1937. cols. 3532-3*
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5. Grenfell, Commons , CCCXXXFII, June 21, 1938, col. IO3O.
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connection. It seems probable that a strong, fina stand by the British
Government would have been sufficient to prevent foreign troops from going
into Spain. The Dictators were not ready to fight at that point. The
above statements dearly indicate Labour»e opposition to the presence of
Italian and German troops in Spain, and the desire for the Government to
sake every attempt to secure their withdrawal. Seedless to say, the
Government Ignored these protests.
It is significant that at the outset Labour did give Son-Interven-
tion its support, and continued to do so until the plan was oroved to be
unsuccessful. It is also true that many statements indicating support
for the plan were qualified, by "if it is carried out". Morgan Jones,
in discussing the mediation movement, said that he did not want this
latest move to slow down Son-Intervention. Be wanted it to be fulfilled. 1
Grenfell said that he was for Son-Intervention if it would be fully
carried out, but it had not been. There was no need, he said, for carry-
ing the Mfarce" further. Attlee was moved to comment that Son-Inter-
vention could be Justified only by success. ^ Later, however, he said
that there should be an attempt to make a reality of Son-Intervention.
h
To do all this volunteers had to be withdrawn. Henderson had criticised
Son-Intervention to the extent that he was forced to deny that he wanted
Son- Intervention abolished.^ Grenfell said that there could not be any
1. N. Jones, Commons, 3CCXTIX, December 18, 1936, cols. 2S25-6.
2. Grenfell, Commons , CCGXXX, January 19, 1937. col. 59.
3. Attlee, Commons , CCCXX?, June 25, 1937. cols. 1550-1.
k. Attlee, Commons , OCCXXTX, July 15. 1937. cols. 1588-9.
5, Henderson, Commons , GCCX3T, June 25, 1937. col. 15<>9.
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peace in Surope until there was real Jfea-Intervention. This was in June
of 193S. 1 Wnen Attlee stated in Commons that Labour accepted Hon-Inter-
vention until it was proved to be one-sided. Chamberlain was moved to
interrupt with the comment th?t it was for a short ueriod. 2
In 1936, one of the conditions for Labour 1 s support of T?on-Inter-
vention was that it be fully carried out, that no aid from any source
should reach either side in the Spanish war. This, Labour hoped, would
be to the advantage of the Spanish government. Ernest Bevin urged the
Trades Union Congress to adopt a resolution which included the warning
that the utmost care should be taken to prevent Ron-Intervention from
hurting the Spanish government. 3 *ttlee's resolution, submitted to the
Labour Party's Conference of I936 and accepted, said, "...we demand
that our own Government and other Governments who have nut their hands
to this International Agreement should see that it is being fully
carried out.
"
The Trades Union Congress published the criticism made in July
1937 of tn« Government's policy by the Labour Party, that no effective
plans had been worked out for the com-olete cessation of foreign help
for franco's armies. 5 This indicated approval of the Party's statement. ,
2arly in 1937» Attlee accused the Government of permitting intervention
by the Axis to continue although It was the Cabinet which had played
1. Grenfell, Commons , CCCTJOCril, June 21, 1938. col. 102^.
2. Attlee and Chamberlain, Commons , CCCXXJtm, June 23, 1938, col. 1352.
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a leading mrt in support of Non-Intervention. Nov, he charged, a shift
had teen made to support intervention. In the same speech he said th^t
he wanted a plan of control which would work. He would place a definite
time limit to test the effectiveness of control. If this plan were not
accepted, then Hon-Interventlon should he done away with. 1 Grenfell said
that he had been la favor of Hon-Intervention until it was proved to he a
failure. Cocks defended Labour's position hy saying that the "main couv-
plaint" which the Labour Fsrty had against Non-intervention was that it
had been decided M to atop munitions, hut they stop then for the Govern-
ment and not for franco. They decide to stop volunteers, hut they stop
them for the Government and not for Franco.*^
If Non-Intervention had "been successful in stop-olng the flow of
supplies to the combatants, it seems likely that Labour would have
supported Hon-Intervention more strongly. There were many who hoped
that such a plan would localize the conflict. They quickly saw thpt Non-
Intervention was being put into force by the democracies and being 1 jnored
by the Dictator nations. This condition was harmful to the side which
Labour wanted to see victorious.
The expression of good will for the Spanish ^ovarnmant i3 shown
by one of Bb el-Baker's six proposals in his plan to be followed in S^ain.
He asked that anti-aircraft guns be taken off the non-intervention lists.
This would have given the Spanish government & chance to obtain a means
of defense against 0-erman and Italian planes in the service of Franco.
The government had practically no air force to protect its remaining
1. Attlee, Coupons, CCGXXX, January 19, 1937. cols. 11>U.
2. Orenfell, Commons , CCCXIX, January 19, 1937. col. V59*
3. Cocks, Commons, CCOXXXII, March 9, 1938, col. 1972.
k. Hoel-Baker, Commons, CCCXXXVII, June 21, 193*. o<> ls » 93^-
cities. Anti-aircraft guns voul* have provided some defense against the
bombs which were dropped on Loyalist Spain. Wedgewood objected to "British
pressure which led francs to close its frontiers.* He had the some our-
pose as Bo el-Baker, - to let the Spanish government get supplies.
In view of the almost universal conviction in Labour circles the
Spanish government should win its fight against the Rebels and fascism,
and th*t Bon-Intervention hindered the Loyalists, it is not surorising
that there are many statements which expressed opposition to Bon-Inter-
vention, and asked that it be abandoned. The first instance of opposi-
tion to the Hon-Intervention Agreements came on September 10, 1936 at the
Trades Union Congress. On this date Sir Walter Citrine asked the Govern-
mont to lift it 3 embargo in order to help the government of Spain. Then
in October of the same year at the Labour Party 1 s conference, Christopher
Addison said thrt the Labour Pr rty would *>MMtt a profound mistake if
it by inference support ed the Bon-Intervention planO Both of these
groups, however, gave qualified support to Bon-Intervention. Late in
the same year, the Labour members of the House of Colons began to
criticize Bon-Intervention as it was operating. Cocks in October asked
that the Spanish government be permitted to buy arms.
5
In January 19JS, Grenfell sM-d that there was no need for carry-
ing on a "farce". In June Attlee commented th-t Bon-Intervention had
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not been fairly applied. He also gald that Hon-Intervention had done
nothing to relieve international tension, or to shorten the conflict.
Therefore, he demanded the end of Fon-Intervention. 1 In this he was sup-
ported by Henderson. 2 In July 1957, Attlee said that additional proposals
would not make the plan work hut bring more unpleasant incidents. He said
that the fascists supported Hon-Intervention because it made a convenient
screen behind which to help Franco. I Criticism "by other mexcberc con-
tinued along the saoe lines. Cocks, Greenwood, Orenfell, and Attlee all
i § 6urged the abandonment of Hon-Intervention. * * Greenwood said, "non-
intervention Agreement now. ...is a rotting corpse. "7 Grenfell summed
up the situation with the assertion that aggression was a fact and Hon-
Intervention had "become a "farce".
The Trades TTnion Congress end the Labour Party's Conference
produced more evidence of the <*aae attitude. Mr. W.J. 8, Squance moved
that the Congress press for the removal of the ban on the sale of arms
to Spain. * Sir Charles Trevelyan proposed the following resolution which
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received unanimous consent of the Labour Party' s Conference. That this
Conference "...instruct the Hational Ixecutive Committee to launch forth-
with a nation-wide campaign to compel the Government to
J
(1) Abandon the so-called Son- Intervention
Agreement
. .
.
(2) Restore to the ...Spanish Government its
rights under International Law to pur-
chase arms and maintain its authority and
establish law and order in its territory.
The Hational Council of Labour had already passed such a resolution. 2
Here is additional evidence of Labour partisanship.
As it had done in the Ethiopian Crisis, the Labour Party asked
the Government to present the case of Spain to the League on the basis
that such a crisis, since it endangered the peace, was the concern of
the League. Attlee and others of the Labour Party requested this inter-
vention of the League. Such requests, however, were not as frequent,
nor as persistent as in the case of Abyssinia. This is well illustrated
by the fact that the outbreak of the rebellion was not immediately
followed by demands that the League act.
It was not until after the speech from the Throne, almost six
months after the civil war started, that Attlee criticised the Govern-
ment because its policy had not been and would not be to co-operate with
the League of Batlons.^ On June 5th of the next year the Labour Party,
according to the Trades Union Congress, "demanded that the League act
under the Covenant and take up its responsibilities. " At the same
time the Congress considered Sir Walter Citrine's resolution calling for
1. L.P. Annual Report , 1937, P- 212. Carried, p. 215.
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Trades Union Congress I solidarity" with the Spanish Government's Appeal
to the League of Rations. It concluded that it was the duty of the
League to propose measures including the withdrawal of foreign troops. 1
In June and July of 1937 this appeal for League action was the
strongest. Attlee, Henderson, Wedgewood, and Grenfell all said that the
time had come for the League to act. Attlee said the Spanish question
must be dealt with by the League of lations "where it can he dealt with
more fully and with greater hope of peace."2 Henderson's comment was
that the Government was guilty of "hypocrisy" unless Britain was "pre-
pared to face up to our obligations under the Covenant whatever the
consequences, "3 Wedgewood asked what the League was going to do.
1
* In
June, Henderson again said that the League should take some action.
The Government should ask for an immediate meeting of the Council of the
League. On the same day Attlee demanded that the League act.**
The number of demands for League action vcried inversely to the
number of plans concerning what the League might do in this case, lot
a s ingle request is recorded for sanctions by the League. It would seem
that if the Labour leaders had expected the League to act, they would
have proposed steps which the League could have taken. The answer may
be that Labour had little hope of League action.
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One test of the sincerity of a foreign policy could well be the
extent to which It would he backed by the determination to use force.
This was true In the oase of I5thiopla, v/here sanctions required the back-
ing of force. If Labour sincerely desired to prevent the Rebels from
winning, it would hare suggested the use of a fleet to enforoe a blockade.
This was suggested at one time, but one suggestion cannot be construed
to represent the organized policy of a group unless supported by the vote
of its followers. Certainly the opinion of one man does not rep resent
the opinion of 10,000,000.
Cooks probably expressed the opinion of Labour as a whole when
he said that no one was suggesting the sending of the arnqr and navy to
take part in this oonflict. All that Labour wanted was to peimit the
Spanish government to buy arms where it could. * Attlee denied thnt he
I
wanted Britain to go into Spain. The opinion of Wedgewood was similar.
He suggested the possibility of sending British troops to Spain to stop
the war, but in the next breath admitted that it was "impossible and
impractical". He said that the Spanish would resent such a move, but
that they might welcome a League army. He, too, would not Bend troops
to Spain.
^
The sinking of British ships was another matter. Henderson
•aid thnt ships sailing to the port of Bilbao were carrying on legal
U
operations, and thus should have the protection of the British Havy.
Wedgewood followed by praising the British Navy for providing the
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"Gebel yerjon* with eacorta, and recommended that it bo continued. 1
Grenfell waa of the opinion that if Britain protected British ahipa in
Spaniah terbora, neither 'franco nor Muaaolinl would declare war. 2 Attlee
alao believed that Britiah ahips should he protected. He said, "fake the
question of Majorca; it is quite possible to blockade Majorca. Why
should any other power intervene, if Majorca belongs to General franco?^
It ia clear from the examples cited that Labour waa not ready to
go to war to force the defeat of franco , but that it would protect
British ahlpping on lawful buainesa. This is not to be construed as
meaning that British Labour wished to fight in Spain; there is not
enough evidence to aupnort such a conclueion. It was a minority opinion,
not the official opposition volley.
There ia little evidence that Labour thought primarily in terms
of balanoe of power. The central theme of their speeches was that the
government of Spain was the legal government, and thus had very definite
rights under international law. If the -government could win it a fight
for existence, it would be a victory for democracy. There are, however,
hints that the idea of balance of power did enter into the thoughts of
Labour. A victory by Franco would upset the balance already tinned in
favor of the dictators. Therefore, the Hebels should be prevented from
getting rirras from any nation, and the government should not be pieced
on the same footing. Thus, Labour saw the struggle as a threat to
democracy, a n^rt of the balance of power. Then, too, a Rebel victory
1.
2.
3.
Iwould be dangerous to British shipping and to the life-line of the
pire. How was the time for the democracies to stand up to the dictators.
In support of the belief that a victory by franco would upset the
balance between the dictators and the democracies, the General Council*
Annual Report" of the Trades Union Congress w= rned that the presence of
foreign armies was a "challenge" to democracy. 1 Attlee said that if
democracy is to survive, it oust be prepared to stand up to the dictators. 2
Grenfell warned that a Franco victory would put Spain in the "pocket of
Herr Hitler who would rule over Spain and have full control and command
of all the strategic points of advantage which the Spanish peninsula
affords. "' The Rational Council of Labour said that the attempt of the
Fascist powers to change the "strategic balance of power in the Western
Mediterranean, and thus imperil the vital interests of Britain and
Trance" was a danger of war. This was the lone reference that was
made directly to the balance of power.
levertheless here is evidence that labour was beginning to think
less in terms of collective security and more in terms of Britain. It
feared a victory for France '<:culd put Fascism in a position to threaten
the trade of the empire. This was undesirable since it threatened
Britain herself. If a democratic government remained in Spain, it would
be no threat to this vital life-line.
In the Spanish question there were three important Issues at
stake for Britain, all of which had some relation to Britain's future
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security. In S^aln the Civil War m$ a struggle between two opposing
groups who were ©t variance over the form of government desired for
Spain. The Rebels, led hy Ihranco, wished to establish a Fascist govern-
ment; the loyalists wished to maintain a democratic form of government.
The former wished to limit persons! freedom, and protect certain groups.
The latter wanted to grant pergonal freedom jfflflmlr* reforms designed
to "benefit the majority. If the fascist revolt succeeded, n ~<vorr^ent
would he established \*hich was not only hostile to democracy in Spain,
hut also in Britain. The second i^.sue r^s the maintenance of inter-
national 3.aw. The aid £?iven to Franco during the Spanish Civil War was
an illustration of the lack of respect for international lav or p^re^-
meats held by Italy and Germany. At this time these two nations did
not hesitate to violate international lav any more than they had "before
or were to again. To Britain, the maintenance of international law
wag important because Britain needed to know that certain "procedures
would be followed eo th*t the could plan for the future on that basis.
The third issu^ highly important as far as Britain was concerned, was
the threat to her coitwunications as pointed out in the introduction to
this chapter.
Because of this threat to Britain 1 © security, Britain should
have taken firm and decisive steos. This would have eliminated taking
the problem to the League of Vations, M suggested by Labour leaders,
because by the outbreak of the Civil War, the League had been proven
incapable of action by its failure to prevent Italian selsure of
Abyssinia. It is true that this was the result of non-supr>ort by the
major powers, but it is doubtful whether the League nations would
haT© had any confidence in the ability of the League to meet problems
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as serious as the Spanish Civil War even if the major powers had sought
to activate the league.
It is possible th*t HornIntervention was the correct policy to
follow at the outbreak of the Civil War. There is some justification
for such a policy on the basis that the Spanish people had the right to
adopt any form of government by any means they desired. Also, the wish
to localize the conflict in an attempt to prevent the spread of the
war to the rest of Europe is understandable. If Britain had taken steps
to prevent outside aid from flowing into Spain, then the conflict might
have been limited to the Spanish peninsula. Such a step might have
made it possible, as well, for the Spanish .government to put down the
rebellion. It became impossible to restrict the hostilities to Danish
forces because Germany ?nd Italy sent military forces to help the Hebel
amy in complete disregard of the Fon-Intervention Agreements. It was
at this point that Britain should have insisted upon the carrying out
of the Non-intervention Agreements by all nrtioas. If this could not
be done, then Britain should have bloclcaded the Spanish Rebel coast to
prevent Franco from receiving aid. Furthermore, Britain should hatl
sent to the government forces, munitions, supplies, and possibly mili-
tary advisors. The British Government, in addition, should have cooper-
ated with Hussia which was already helping the Loyalists with men and
supplies. The stakes were too high to permit a £ebel victory. As soon
as Eon- Intervention proved to be to the advantage of Franco, Hon-
Intervention should have been abandoned for Intervention - aid to the
Spanish government. Only in this way could Britain have been positive
that her position at Gibraltar would not have been rendered valueless,
and the Mediterranean would have remained open to her shipping, —
British security would have been maintained.
In contrast to the British Government, which certainly did not
recognize publicly the threat to British interests of a faacist victory
in Spain, the Labour Party recognized that a victory for Franco might
be detrimental to Britain. During the Civil War the Labour P^rty was
more outspoken in its hostility to Tranco and the ideas he represented.
The Party gave idealistic reasons for their attitude, euch as the
menace to democracy and opposition to aggression, as well as practical
reasons Buch as the danger to the British life-line and possible up-
setting of the balance of power in Europe, for its support of the
Spanish government. The British Government adopted the policy of non-
intervention and maintained that policy to the end of the Civil "'ar.
For a few months the Labour Party also gave its support to Hon-Inter-
vention, but hen it became obvious that Gerraany and Italy were aid-
ing Franco v.lth men and arms, the Labour Party refused to support the
Government. Because, as applied, Hon-Intervention worked to the dis-
advantage of the Spanish government, the Labour Party urged that non-
intervention be done away with. Instead., the Labour Party adopted the
principle that as the legal government, the Spanish /government should be
permitted to buy arms and munitions in sufficient quantities to sup-
press the rebellion. This proposal demonstrated the Labour Farty's
partisanship, Neither the Labour Party nor the British Government was
prepared to intervene actively in Spain to insure victory for the
Spanisn government. Perhaps thi6 was the proper course; if this be
true, both the British Government and the Labour Party failed to take
tide stand.
Chapter VI
Austria
While there is extensive evidence to show how British Labour
regarded the ouestions of Spain and Abyssinia, there is considerably
less in the case of Austria. There is so little evidence that it U
difficult to determine exactly where Labour stood on the latest threat
to the iXiropean security system. The only certainty is that the Labour
farty wa 8 against the annexation of Austria by tiermany.
The gravity of the situation dia not justify this lack of con-
cern, hitler had written in Heln Kampf that Austria oust be joined to
the German ileich. One unauccesai'ul attempt had oeen made in I93U by
tne murder of Ohancellor Dollfuss to sot up a Nazi govesaml in Austria.
This attest went astray and tne attested coup failed, many of the
leaders ueiag executed.. But tuis was not to be the last attempt, for
in 193b tae annexation of Austria took plaoe.
Dollfuss was succeeded by Dr. JichuBChnigg who struggled to koep
Austria free. Hitler pushed his campaign to annex Austria in spite of
an agreement in 1936 to observe the independence of Austria. Schusohnigg
wa8 invited to Berchtesgaden to discuss Austro-tterman rel- tions on Feb-
ruary l? t 193g - Hitler accused the Chancellor of persecution of the
Austrians and announced that unless certain Nasi proposals were accented,
Oerm.-ny would invade Austria. 3chuschni,<g agreed to include two Marts'
in his cabinet and to grant full political freeaom for the Austrian
Nazis nnd amnesty for all imprisoned Nazis. In return Hitler agreed to
respect Austrian independence.
Seyse-Inqvr rt, Nazi, was appointed to tne cabinet post of
rces.
Interior and Public Security which had control of th. police to
After
» nm by Seyse-Inq^rt to Hitler, Berlin hinted at
, customs
union m military eo-ordin,ticn. When Hitler'* s.eech 0 f February *)th
fall.* to mention Austria independence, SchuschnW tolled before the
Austrian P.rli-ment saying that his « cement with Hitler would be kept,
hut no more. On M,rch 9th Schuschnlg. announced that a plebiscite would
he held, on Ri rch 1 3 , l9 *S. at which the Austrian oeoole would c * their
hrllots for or gainst »n independent Austria. This announcement brought
fresh iwKauU from Hitler, including Sohuschni^s resignation and the
vithdr.,, 1 of the plebiscite. To these demands Schuschni^ could only
submit. 3eyss-Inpur,rt became Chancellor *nd reouested German troops to
maintain order. German troops moTed into Austria on Whrch l?th, and
Austria became rert of the Greater German *elch.
IHiring this crisis, the British Government made no move to stop
the Invasion. Bo threats - ere made; no op-osition registered. The
official British Government policy was surprized by the Prime Minister
In the House of Go mi ons on Mrrch lU, iq3g. He protested against the
German
-ction; he denied Mm* the British Government had given its en-
couragement or assent to the absorption of Austria into the Reich; he
stated th t Britain had held consultations villi France anrt Italy as pro-
vided for in the Stress* conference of April 19"55. The hard fact was,
he admitted "th^t nothing could have arrested tnis action by Germany
unless we and others had been prepared to uae force to prevent it". 1
1. Medlicott, on. clt., pp. ??V7
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In the light of the development* In Austria the Government decided to
increase its rerrmrment effort.
The Brltleh labour M| had Ion- recognized the Gernwn desire to
eel2e Austria, and the danger* which might result. These Labour Views
were stated as enrly rs IfJJ. After the T>l«n for the customs union of
Germany nnd Austria had been vetoed by the Great Powers, the Labour
Magwslne warned that the ouestlon would arise a^nin. 1 Attlee, who warned
th*t Austria was one of the danger points of ffiurope, wasted British in-
fluence used agninst flict^torshin, and for democracy Gainst a~
-ration
from any quarter. Hitler's gestures promoted Cocks to predict in I935
thfit if ifaseolini went into Abyssinia, Hitler to Into Vienna before
the end of the ye»r.^ Since the Labour member ft of Commons '/ere voicing
thoughts such as these, it is not sumrisin^ that the Labour Party's
Annunl Conference called uoon the British Oovernroemt to "take all the
measures v;ithin their power to restrain foreign a^re^sion a^Mn^t
Austria; rnrl thus *vort the new menace to r>eace which "fascism tB Central
k
Surope now involves".
Although some Labour m^nbers of Commons could see danger in the
Austrian situation, those who discussed the loan made to Austria in
August of 19"^ were opposed to this form of help to the Austrians.
1. "Mitel1!*!9 * Labour Magazine , June 19^1. tvo. f5*(«
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Bevan, Jones and Wedgewood found grounds on which to oppose the
loan.
This confusion was still evident in 1938 when Hitler achieved
the Anschluss. Labour Parliamentary members exoressed concern it the
threat to Austrian independence, hut uut forth no suggestions for pre-
venting the threat from heing carried out. Arthur Henderson rsked
Chanberlain to endorse Delbos 1 (the French Foreign Minister) statement
that the independence of Austria is "an essential element in *5urot>ean
peace". Such a statement by Britain, Henderson said, would encourage the
people of Austria and bring hope to other sma.ll nations of UuropeJ1 He
also asked the Government to reserve the right to bring the matter "before
the League Council. 5 Two days after the German troops crossed the border
of Austria, Attlee warned th~t if nothing were done this time, other
c
aggressions would follow. A little later in the day he suggested that
the League be c- lied upon to formulate clans and to stop aggression, al-
though he did not mention Austria's case specifically.^
Both Attlee and Henderson were disturbed by the method which
Germany had followed in acquiring Austria. Attlee said, "whatever my
be one's views... with regard to whether Austria and Germany should be
one state, there can be but one opinion in deploring the manner in which
it has been brought about. There has been a display of n^ked force at
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a Government which was preparing to consult the people. Had it been
certain t**t that consultation was going to favour the union of Austria
and Germany, it would have been allowed to proceed in neace. feat force
has been taken, in Wf opinion, against the will of the Austriana. »X
Henderson said that no member of the Labour party would object to self-
determination, but that there had been no self-determination expressed
by the Austrian people. It was Henderson who had expressed the houe
that the British Government would urge the completion of the
-olebacite
without external oressure.^ Attlee summed up with: "We have first of
all to see the passing, or what looks like the passing of a great his-
k
toric State, Austria.
"
In spite of Mr. Attlee' s regrets because Germany annexed Austria,
British Labour hart only expressed disapproval; no plan to prevent this
event had been put forth. Labour leaders were avart of the consequences
of German success in Austria, but could only condemn the method by which
annexation haA taken place; they could not offer a plan to prevent Qennan
victory. The nearest approach to a plan was Hendersons suggestion th*t
Britain reserve the right to bring the question to the attention of the
League, and Attlee 1 s desire that the League be convened to consider
ways to stop future aggression - both futile gestures. Thus, Labour 1 s
spokemen were able to voice a warning and opposition, but unable to offer
any sensible program by which G-erman aggrandizement could be prevented
at Austrian expense,
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If Britain sought to maintain the ideals of the League of Notions
to maintain p balance of power in BuroT>e or to protect British interests,
Gewan expansion had to be prevented. One way of preventing this expansion
would have been to guarantee Austrian independence, - by military aid if
necessary. It is true that it would have been difficult to send direct
military aid to Austria. Military aid could have been accomplished only
by an attack on Oermai^s western border and this necessitated the co-
operation of Prance. It is possible that Britain did not have sufficient
military power to make this guarantee in March of 1938. If a strong posi-
tion in ^position to German desires were to have been taken, the early
months of 193*5 would have been the time to take that position. A guaran-
tee of Austrian independence might not have saved Austria from attack tttyp
more then Poland was saved when a definite stand was finally taken. There
is one inrDortant difference; Austria and Czechoslovakia had fallen into
German hands without Britain and Trance giving any assurance of aid, or
making any real attejnpt to prevent their conquest. 3y 1939 Hitler probably
felt that Britain and France would nnce more permit a conquest. In 19^8
the precedent had not been established. It is possible that a direct
guarantee to Austria would have carried more weight, and might have pre-
vented, or At least postponed, Hitler 1 e move. Also in 1938 there were
nore possible allies including Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Russia, and
if war had resulted, there was a good chance that Germany would have been
defeated.
Attlee's suggestion that the prohlem of aggression he discussed
by the League of Nations wss of no value at the time. The League,
after its failure to halt the Italian conquest of lithiopia had no
power to act because no nation believed that it could act. A mutual
guarantee by the nations of 8urope to oome to e*eh others* aid in case
of attack was far more practical. As stated above, such a guarantee, if
backed by force, could hare prevented German aggression; no other means
would suffice.
It is interesting to note the influence of the Austrian episode
on disarmament and rearmament. The desire for disarmament did not
dison-oear, but demands for disarmament were few. M. Jonos still wanted
to abolish air bombing, 1 and Labour still believed that the money for
arras could have been seved if the Government had followed a different
foreign policy. The volume of printed and spoken words concerning dis-
armament was a mere trickle compared to that of 1935-36. One of the re-
sults of the international events of the years before, as well as of
1938, was that Labour's agitation for disarmament was greatly diminished.
Writing in the February issue of Labour, J. 3. Middleton said
that Labour had been forced bjr circumstance to accept rearmament. Still
be did not believe that British arms could help achieve peace, but rather
that Ju^.t treaties would bring peace. * The February issue of Labour
carried an editorial to the effect that while the Trades Unions recog-
nlzed the need for arms, they were not willing to give up any of their
U
rights such irking conditions and hours because of this need.
The Commons Debates of May, 1938, show that the Labour Perty
was seriously concerned with the condition and strength of the British
1. M. Jones, Commons , CCCXXXX, February P, 1938, col. 3O5.
2. "All the World Over", Labour , Kay, 1938, p. 195.
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air force. Attlee stated that not only did Britain lack equality with
the German air force, hut in fact wn« falling hehind in the attempt to
reach equality. 1 He suggested ae a remdy that fewer types of planes he
constructed nnd greater standardization he hrou^t ahout in their manu-
facture. Vedgewood, too, was concerned with the smnll numhers of
British war planes and wanted standardization of planes.' Of the danger,
Wedgewood was fully aware: "Labour is only too v/llling to defend itself,
to defend democracy, and to defend England at the present time." "lre*j<-
thing — Army, Havy, Civil Service, even civil rights — must give w»y
to the safety of the country, and I think to the m*n production of
U
aeroplanes." Crippt charged that there was inefficiency In the air
ministry,^ and said there was a need for "immediate and drastic action"
to increase the production of airplanes and holster the nation's defenses
against air attacks.^
The author does not state, nor does he wish to suggest, that this
interest in air strength was the result of the anschluss alone. These
examples serve simply to illustrate that British Lahour had "become aware
of Germany* s strength in the air, and of the threat of air -power to
Britain. If this strength was not equaled, Britain, too, might join
the list of German conquests.
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Chapter 711
Czecho solovakia
In October of 1938, Hitler acquired, as a result of the Munich
Conference, the C %echo slovakian Sudetenland. The acceptance of Germany 1 g
demands at Munich by Great Britain and France represented the dim** of
the appeasement policy as pursued by the British Government. After Munich,
the British Government redoubled its rearmament effort. The establishment
of a German protectorate over the remains of Czechoslovakia and the
seizure of Kernel led the British Government in Mrrch to pledge its sup-
port to Poland if any event threatened her independence. The end of
appeasement had come. It was the guarantee to Poland which led to
Britain's declaration of war on Germany, after the attack on Poland.
In the Sudeten area, desired b,r Hitler, lived many Germans who
were discontented and many who wished to be a part of Germany, It was
clear in the early months of 19 3* that Germany wished to secury autonomy
for these Germans or to annex the Sudetenland. This threat should have
brought certain treaties, which Czechoslovakia had signed with other
countries, into operation. She had signed a treaty of alliance with
Russia in May of 1935 which stated th^t if one -Marty to the treaty were
attacked, the other would not aid the attacker. If France came to the
aid of the victim, the other would also £ive military aid. Thus, in this
case, if France gave military sup-port to Czechoslovakia, Russia would be
bound to aid Czechoslovakia. France had signed a Mutual Assistance Pact
with Czechoslovakia in 19?5. provided that if either were
attacked, the other would come to her assistance. The only direct com-
mitment made by Britain to Czechoslovakia was that of * member of the
League, as provided for by Article X of the Covenant, louring the crisis
Britain ignored that obligation; nor was the British Government v/illing
to give a new guarantee as to Czechoslovak!an independence. 5hgland, how-
ever, did have an alliance with France. If France fulfilled its obliga-
tions to Czechoslovakia, there was little doubt thrt Britain would be drawn
into the war. Aside from Britain's obligations to France, she could not
afford to gamble on the outcome of a war between Germany and France.
On March lU, 1938, M. Paul-Boncour, the French Foreign Minister,
assured M. Osusky, the Czechoslovak Minister, that France would carry out
the provisions of the treaties signed with Czechoslovakia in 19?U- and
1955. The Russians, too, said their commitment.; still held. The British
Government's attitude was expressed by Prime Minister Chamberlain on
March ?Hth when he spld that Britain wished to see peace maintained, and
that certain treaty obligations such as Locarno would be fulfilled by
force if necessary. There were other instances in which Britain would
resort to arms if necessary. He admitted that Britain would not guaran-
tee Czechoslovakian independence, yet he did indicate th"t if war re-
sulted, Britain might be drawn in. On May lHth he expressed his belief
that Czechoslovakia should grant the German demands If "reasonable".
Throughout the summer of 1938 the Government expressed opposition to
any settlement of the Sudeten problem made as a result of force.
The German propaganda campaign opened with a manifesto issued
by Herr Henlein and the 3udeten-deutsche Parte! on March l6th. This
1, Parts of the following have been used as a basis for the intro-
duction to this chapter:
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waa followed on April ?Uth by the Karlsbad programme which demanded the
"determination, legal recognition, and fall self-government of the German
areas, removal of injustices inflicted since 1.0 lg, m i f^n liberty to
profess German nationality and political philosophy". The Czech govern-
ment continued to seek agreement and tried to «void a complete "break.
On May 7, 1938 the British and French Ministers informed M. Krofta that
they exoected Czechoslovakia to grant ell possible concessions; the
Prague Government indicated its willingness to do so promptly. This was
followed by an intensive German propaganda campaign, end there were re-
ports of German mobilization of several divisions, in consequence of
which the Czechs moved large numbers of troops into the Suieten erea.
A draft of the nationalities Statute which granted considerable local
autonomy to the Sudetans, was given to the Sudet en-dent sche Part el
which indicated the Statute to be unacceptable. A deadlock seemed to
be Inevitable.
At the end of July a further British attempt was made to 3olve
the problem. An announcement was made that Lord Bundman had accepted
the Czechoslovak! an Invitation to act as a mediator betveen the Czech
Government and its minorities. During August, Bunciman kept the two
parties in contact, but all Czech offers were refused by the Sudeten
Germans. On four occasions between July ?6th and September 1st,
Seville Henderson told the German Foreign Office that German military
preparations might cause the Runciman mission to fail, and threaten
the peace of Europe. German propaganda told of plundering and beating
of Sudeten Germans. The Germans 1 military preparations on September
12th on both the French and Czech frontiers represented force behind
Hitler* s demand on the fifteenth for the union of the Sudetenland with
1?5.
Sernumy. This led to a revolt of the Sudeten* which was easily put down
by Czech troops.
The final stage of British mediation "began with Chamberlain 1 1
visit to Berchtesgaden on September lSth. Hitler told Chaabsrlain that
an invasion of Czechoslovakia wns imminent and could only be avoided if
& guarantee were siven by Britain that it would accept the principle of
self-determination. On his return to London he consulted the cabinet
and held conferences with S^ladier ?md Bonnet. These conferences re-
sulted in the Anglo-French proposals sent to the Gsech Government on
September 19th including these points:
(1) that the keeping of the Sudeten Deutsch
within Czechoslovakia endangered both
Czechoslovakia and SSuropemi peace;
(?) that areas in which rnora than fifty
percent of the population were German
would have to be ceded;
(3) that w soma international body" should
arrange for the adjustment of the fron-
tiers and exchange of -nopulrtlon;
(U) that th& British Government would guaran-
tee the new boundaries of Osecbo Slovakia,
fhese proposals were accented by Pra^ic. Again in (V>de*ber*r Chamberlain
met Hitler who demanded the cession of certain areas by October 1st with-
out a plebncite. *Fhese demands were went without comment to the Czechs
who refused to accept them. Hitler attacked verbally again, this time
in a speech attacking Benes. Der Fuehrer countered the mobilisation of
the British fleet and the Trench army by an invitation asking Chamberlain,
Waaler, and Mussolini to come to Monica. The agreement reached here
provided for the occupation of territory in five stage* between October
1st and 10th; the holding of plebiscite* within those areas; and the
assurance that German guarantees would be given, after the settlement of
the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities. The latter two pro-
visions were not fulfilled. *nd in March 1939 the remaining fragments
of Czechoslovakia were absorbed by Germany.
The British Labour Party was critical of the Government • s policy.
Labour believed that Czechoslovakia should not be asked or forced to
give up any part of her territory to Germany. Instead, L-tbour nr?ed
the Government to give a definite guarantee that "Britain would protect
Czechoslovakia* s integrity. Thi* step the Government refused to take.
Some believed that the League of Bations was ^till capable of consider-
ing the problem. When tbe Hxuieiman mission left for Czechoslovakia,
only conditional approval was expressed. After proposals for tbe divid-
ing of Czechoslovakia had been supported b^ the Government, opposition
was quickly expressed. The result of Munich was to prove to the Labour
Party that Hitler* s word was of no value and that democracy had suffered
a severe diplomatic defeat. In spite of criticism of the Munich agree-
ment, the Labour Party did give assent to Chamberlpin* s trip to Munich,
indicating that the Labour P^rty, as well as the Ilovornment, was will-
-
ing to support almost any effort to avoid war.
There were several dangers which some of Labour* 8 proponents
could see in the approaching crisis in Czechoslovakia. The danger to
the country itself was apparent. As early as January of 19?7t *M
article in Labour pointed out that the international tension might
lead to a rupture. If this came, it might be that Czechoslovakia t/culd
be Hitler*
a
first victim, since that nation was located alone the German
route to the Ukraine. 1 In March of 193^. Greenwood said, "I can conceive
a possible situation in which Germany's jack-boot will he lifted and east
•
shadow over Czechoslovakia.' 2 In July Morgan Jones added his warning
that Czechoslovakia w«s being "daily menaced". 3 Wedgewood warned the
Government that every time the "tyrants" are presented an ally, war be-
comes more inevitable. 1* Dr. Gerhard Schacher warned th-t if Czechoslo-
vakia fell, the way would be clear for Hitler, not only to the »*lack
Sea, but also to a push towards the coast of the Mediterranean, and ad-
vance to Poland and the Baltic, and finally the way to Russia". ' A
month after Munich, Wedgewood spw one of the first results of Munich was
in the fact that the nations of Eastern Surope are being "chained to
c
the chariot wheel of Germany".
Because of the dangers involved in this conflict, a few Labourites
wanted the League of Nations convened to discuss the problem. Henderson
said, "....I suggest that now is the time for the League. ..to call xxoon
the nations of Central Flurope to meet and see whether or not it is not
possible to hammer out some sort of settlement".^ This was in March of
I93S. In July, Morgan Jones said that in his judgment "we have to build
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upon the basis of the League. Upon that rock the temple of peace must
be founded. If it is 90 founded, no matter what rains of criticism may
descend upon it, nor what winds of adversity may whistle upon it. the
etructure will stand, for it will he founded upon the rock". 1 After
Munich, Clement Attlee criticised the Government because no attempt had
been made to bring the question before the League of Nations. 2
Labour, commenting upon the sending of Lord Runciman to Czech-
oslovakia, said, "Lord Tlunciman»s mission to Czechoslovakia must be re-
ceived with conditional approval, If he has been sent merely as an ad-
visor and conciliator in order to smooth the path of negotiation, it is
a welcome sign that the Government is at last aware of its responsibili-
ties to the cause of international appeasement". The editorial expressed
disappointment, however, because Chambrlain had neglected to state th-t
pressure would not be exerted upon the Czechoalovakian Government to make
greater concessions to the Sudeten Germans, "As Mr. Jones urged, the
C zecho slovaklan Government must be allowed to determine for themselves
at what point unity, indeoendence and integrity of their st"te demand
that they ehall put a limit" to their concessions.
3
Months before Lord Runciman went to Czechoslovakia, Labourites
urged the British Government to take a stand on the question, maintain
that position, and seek joint action with France and Russia. In Febru-
ary of 1938, Wedgewood asked the Foreign Minister whether any "approach
had been made to the government of the Soviet Union of Socialist
1. M. Jones, Commons
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Hepublies concerning the possibility of Joint or parallel action in
connection with Czechoslovakia or whether any such steps are being taken
via Prance or the league?- When Sir John Simon said, "Ho.\ Wedgewood
continued with. "In view of the increased danger of the situation to
Czechoslovakia, would it not be advisable even now to make approaches
to Hussla and France with regard to concerted action x,hen next this sort
of thing takes place." 1 Arthur Henderson advocated that Britain give to
Czechoslovakia a definite com: itment. He justified such ft move by re-
ferring to the statements of those who claimed that the First World War
would have been avoided if Britain had made a similar commitment in
2
19 lU. Wedgewood said he hoped th»t at some time the Government would
stand firm because it was the best way to avoid war. *
On September 8, 1938, the National Council of Labour stated:
"The British Government must leave no doubt in the
aind of the German Government that they will unite
with the French and Soviet Governments to resist any
attack upon Czechoslovakia.
Peaceful change can come only through friendly
negotiations. Labour can not acquiesce In the des«
truction of the rule of law by savage aggression."
The Trades Union Congress took ft similar stand, adding, "The Labour
Movement urges the British Government to give this lead, confident such
a policy would have the solid support of the British people."-* In
October the editors of Labour wrote: "From the beginning the Labour
1. Wedgewood and Simon, CoTmons , CCCXXXII, February 21, 1938, cols.
17-8.
2. Henderson, Commons , CCCXXXIII, March lH, 1938, col. 71.
3. Wedgewood, Commons , CCCXXXVIII, July 26, 1938, col. ?995-
k. "National Council of Labour Beport", L.F. Annual Heport , 1939. p. i*.
5. "The International Situation", T.U.C. Report. 193*. p. 1*75.
130.
Party he. urged upou the Sovernaent the necessity for makin, » flra stend
against aggression. 1,1
The taking of a firm stand. Labour believed, included a guarantee of
Chechoslovakia* 8 independence, and the prevention of dividing Czechoslovakia.
Mis. Wilkinson and Arthur Henderson both wished to give the Chechoslovakians
a definite guarantee of independence. Miss Wilkinson asked if the Govern-
ment had given or intended to give any guarantee to Czechoslovakia so that
her independence would be respected in case of any action taken against
her similar to that against Austria. 2 Henderson said. H suggest that in
the event of France fulfilling her League and Treaty obligations, as a
result of aggression against Czechoslovakia, and this being followed by
invasion or an attack upon French territory this country will be involved.,
whether we wish it or not. The Prime Minister prides himself upon his
ability to face up to realities; I hope he will face up to that, and make
it plain where the 3ritish Government stands. It is no use allowing the
German Government to imagine that if they attack Czechoslovakia, all that
the British Government will do will be the same as they have done in the
lest few days over Austria. "3 <£eJk flay8 iat er he said, 1 we are already
pledged to Czechoslovakia as we are to every other country belonging to
the League. All that would happen in the event of a pledge being given
to Czechoslovakia is that it would constitute a specific pledge and would
impose no greater obligations on this country than are imposed by our
U
general pledge under the League Covenant." Labour felt that such guaran-
tees would stop any threat of war. The editorial said that British Labour
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supported the British Government
• a stand over the oriels in Czechoslovakia
and helieved that some relief had come as a temporary result. "The Moral
is clear. On the only two occasions when the peaceful states have united
to resist fascist terrorism - the first at Kyon - that resistance has
"been completely successful.
Morgan Jones spoke in July: " hy all means let the Czecho-
slovakia Government strive with all its might to arrive at an agreeable
settlement with the representatives of the Germans in the Sudeten Lands
hut they must he allowed to determine for themselves at what point."2
The National Council of Labour issued the following resolution on Septem-
her 20, I938: "The National Council of Labour views with dismay the
reported proposals of the British and French Governments for the dis-
memberment of Czechoslovakia under the brutal threat of armed force "by
lazi Germany and without prior consultation with the Czechoslovakiaa
Government."^ The Trades Union Congress expressed the same view in these
words: "Kvery consideration of democracy likewise forhids the dlsmember-
ment of the Ceeehoslovaklau State by the subjection of the Sudeten German
regions to Nazi Government control. British Labour emphatically repudi-
ates the right of the British or any government to use diplomatic or
other pressure to compel acceptance of humiliation."**
Hot only did some wish to prevent the dismemberment of Czecho-
slovakia, "but Labour was opposed to seeing Germany profit at the expense
1. "All the World Over", Labour, June, 193*3, V. p. 218.
2. K. Jones, Commons , CCCXOTIII, July 2d, 1938, col. 2969.
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of Czechoslovakia. 1 Henderson and Wedgewood claimed that the German
minority of the Sudetenland never were part of Germany. 2 Wedgewood asked
about the other minorities living in the Sudetenland. Should they be
given to Germany along with the Germanst'
After Munich, labour leaders pointed out the danger of taking
Hitler* b word at face value in the future. Wedgewood said, "Frankly I..,
distrust the German Chancellor. We do not trust him, and we are
anxious for the future of our country far more than are those who nut
their faith in him. Having that anxiety for the future, we are determined
to keep our powder dry and tighten our belts, and to have the fighting
_ U
aeroplanes by the next crisis." Hhe magazine, Labour
, was sarcastic.
"The JOLLY of relying on the promises is shown only too clearly by the
violation of the many pledges to Czechoslovakia by Germany at the time
of the seizure of Austria. Morrison said that Britain had only the
word of the dictators that they would keep the peace. ^ The implication
was that the pledge meant little.
When Chamberlain announced that he was going to Munich, Attlee
sale! that he welcomed the "fresh opportunity" of further discussions
1. "All the World Over", Labour, August, 193S, Y, p. 266.
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which may lead to prevention of war. "I am sure that every member of
this House is desirous of neglecting no chance of preserving peace with-
out sacrificing principles."1 After Chamberlain had brought hack from
Munich "peace in our time", Attlee was not so charitable. He said that it
was not peace but an anaistice. "We have felt humiliation. This has not
been & victory for reason and humanity. It has been a victory for brute
2
force." He continued to say that th- Labour Party could not accept the
map because it was the "equivalent to the destruction of a state." The
failure to tell the Czechoslovakia^ that Britain would not stand by was
a "betrayal".^ "...this is the time for a new peace conference and an
all-in peace conference. Let us call in the good offices of the United
States of America, and let us not exclude the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. I pleaded many months ago in this House that we wanted a
peace conference before the next war, but then I did not assume that the
next war would be complete defeat, and that is why the Munich Conference
was not a real peace conference. It was only the delivery of an arais-
h
tice." Attlee, however, offered no plan to put before such a confer-
ence.
Lansbury expressed the minority and pacifist opinion. He could
only express relief at the outcome of the Conference because war had
been avoided. "Let us remember what price would have been paid if there
had been war. It is all very well to talk of the nrice that is being
1. Attlee, Ooiiii-ons, COOXXXIX, September 2S, 1938, col. ?6
?, Attlee, Commons, CCCXXXIX, October 3, 193&\ col. 51.
3. Ibid. , col. 60.
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paid today in what Is called humiliation and degradation and power poli-
tics, but I would remind the House that, according to figures presented
in various parts of the world, from diseases, from war itself end from
other causes, over 100,000,000 persons lost taeir lives in the last war." 1
He expressed approval of Chamberlain* I method of achieving a settlement:
"Unless you are willing to meet men face to face - and that is why I
appreciate so much what the Prime Minister did in going to see Herr
Hitler
- how do you expect to get any sort of discussion or any agree-
taent with them?" Irfinsbury had supported any policy which would avoid
war throughout this period. Since he was an extreme pacifist, no price
was too high to pay for peace. That viewpoint colored all his thinking
in regard to agression. The serious diplomatic defeat at Munich did
not cause him to abandon his life-time beliefs.
Few in Labours ranks could accept Lansbury* s view. Morrison
followed the Attlee line of reasoning. He said, "...we have an element
of dishonour in this business, and we know it. I think it is the case
that we did betray the Czechs or if you like, that we had to.... Are we
saved from an early war? Are we given a reasonable time in xvhich -people
can live in peace and comfort without being subject to the fear of war
all the timet Th-t is the kind of peace our people want. The answer is
that we are not saved from war. We have only the word of one or two
dictators that they will keep the peace. But evidence is on record - I
need not recite it now - of case after case where Eerr Hitler has made
either diplomatic or military of "endive, and said, 'This is the last
1. Lansbury, Commons , CCGXXXIX, November % 193&. col. 89
2. Ibid.
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word, the last spot of bother you are going to have, the la 3t surprise;
it is the last hit of territory I want,' and he has consistently broken
his word." Grenfell proposed the return of British Foreign Policy to
the League of Kations. ? He taso said, "The fact is that democracy has
suffered a cruel defeat."-'
'i'he attitude of British Labour and the British Labour £arty dur-
ing the Chechoslovakian affair indicated a considerable change of policy
froiii that recommended during the Manchurian crisis. The policy supported
during this critical period, however, was not greatly different from that
of the British Government. In the first place, the League of Nations no
longer occupied the dominant position in Labours policy. There was only
infrequent reference to the League in 1933; this indicates that Labour
had recognized the League's inability to act. Any reference to League
action was futile, as shewn in the case of Austria. The British Govern-
ment, of course, made no attempt to work through the League of Stations.
While contending that Britain was pledged by the Covenant of the League
to maintain Czechoslovakia's independence, Labour pressed for a specific
commitment to maintain the independence of Czechoslovakia. The Oovern-
ment under Chamberlain refused to give such a cocanitment, although
Chamberlain did admit that if war resulted, Britain might be drawn in.
Labour still wished to prevent aggression, and now wished to work within
the framework of the treaties signed by Cz echo Slovakia, JTrance, and Russia,
supported by Britain. This did not rule out discussion with Hitler, but
1.
2.
3-
136.
Labour, although approving beforehand of the Munich meeting a a an opportun-
ity to preserve peace "without sacrificing principles" 1
, condemned the
outcome of Munich as surrender.
Even though Labour urged giving a definite commitment to Checho-
slovakia,
- did Labour believe that this alone would prevent Hitler from
pressing his demands against Czechoslovakia, - 0 r was Labour genuinely
willing to back up that pledge by force if necessary? It is difficult to
determine. Wedgewood said that he hoped Britain would take a definite
stand, that was the best way to avoid war. The National Council of Labour
said that the British Government should ttunite H with Prance and Russia to
resist aggression. The Trades Union Congress took the same position.
Henderson said that such a stand would prevent war. He wished to make
clear to Germany the fact that the Government would not be guilty of the
same policy as it had been in regard to Austria. 2 All of these statements,
while they sound unyielding, were no guarantee that Labour was willing to
go to war over Czechoslovakia. Henderson's statement that a strong stand
would prevent war is the key to the answer. Labour probably was not will-
ing to fight a war over Czechoslovakia, and had the naive idea that words
alone would prevent aggression.
As far as the Labour Party's -olan went, it was essentially correct.
Britain should have given a specific -pledge to use her military forces to
maintain the independence of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the
British Government should have communicated with the French and Russian
Governments and pledged its cooperation if they fulfilled the provisions
1. Attlee, Commons
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of the alliance with Cache Slovakia. These pledge* should have been
•0 definite that there would have been no doubt left in Hitler's mind
about England's willingness to go to war for Czechoslovakia. Many have
contended that this step would have forced Hitler to back down. However,
there is some evidence that no such pledge would have stouped *itler from
marching into Czechoslovakia. The Huremburg Trials brought out testimony
that Hitler had deployed troops at strategic joints along the frontier of
Czechoslovakia on September 23, 193*5. By the next day the troops were
ready to advance across the frontier. The Hew York Times reported that
according to records kept by an adjutant of Hitler, named Schmurdt, "This
aggressive move was taken only after careful preparations. The German
army had spent the summer orecticing to overwhelm the Czech defenses,
and Konrad Henrioh, Czech Hazi leader, had been put in charge of the
Freikorps to provide the necessary incidents for war." At the same time
Hitler had so much contempt for the lack of strength in England and
France (feat he sent only five divisions tc his western frontier to rein-
force the border troops and labor battalions. They alone, he thought,
would be enough to hold off any attack there. In addition, he was con-
vinced that France would not act and that England would do nothing with-
out France. Hitler did think that Russia mi^ht oome to the aid of
Czechoslovakia, but that this aid xvould be only in the form of planes.
Events proved that Hitler's sun-oosition was entirely correct. The question
of whether Hitler would have marched into Czechoslovakia in the face of
a France and England >repared to defend that country, remains unanswered.
It is now known that he was prepared to do so, but he had confidence
that he moved with impunity.*
1. "Germans Poised for Attack at Munich Talk, Court Hears", Hew York
Time*, XCV, Hovember 27, 19^5, Section I, pp. 1 and 12.
A more important question was whether England and France were
strong enough in 1938 to act. Th*t question remains unanswered alao
.
It does seem, however, that military «ction was justified for two reasons:
first, Czechoslovakia, a democracy, was the victim of aggression; and,
secondly, some action was necessary to prevent the aggrandizement of
Germany before she hecame so powerful that no coalition of powers could
prevent German expansion. It seems probable that the combined strength
of Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland would have offset any weakness of
Sngland and France. If all these nations had moved their military forces
against Germany, she would have been forced to fight on three fronts
simultaneously, greatly coisplic-ting Hitler's problem of defense. This
factor might have brought about the defeat of Germany in less time than
required when war did come. A preventive war in 193g might have been,
in the long run, a better altern tive than appeasement at Munich.
The British Government chose the policy of mediation and appease-
ment rather than the alternative of war. Lord Runciman went to Czecho-
slovakia in the hope thpt an agreement could be worked out between the
Sudeten Germans and Czechoslovakia. His mission failed because, as it
is now known, Germany was not sincerely supporting the Sudeten Germans
to correct injustices but as an excuse to an.; ex the Sudetenland and
eventually all of Czechoslovakia. After the failure of the Runciman
mission, Chamberlain entered into direct negotiations with Hitler, end-
ing in the Munich Accord and German victory. The Labour Party was
opposed to giving Germany the Sudetenland, and urged as a preventive
a specific guarantee of support to Czechoslovakia. This guarantee,
the Labour Party believed, would both deter German dem? nds and prevent
war. Kowhere was the request for the pledge of support bolstered by
the demand to use force, if Germany insisted on annexing the Sudeten-
***** The LeW Party,s ««t the strength of words versus the
power of » mechanized, military force. There could he only one outcome
in such ft contest; victory for Hitler.
Conclusion
An examination of the attitude of the "British Labour Party and
British labour towards foreign policy during the years, 1931-19^8, shows
that the Labour Party often disagreed with the policy pn* into effect by
the British Government. At the same time, there were occasions when the
Labour Party actually g-ve its supr>ort to the Government's policy while
claiming to be opposed to it. Both the Labour Party and the British
Government sincerely wished to prevent the outbreak of war in "Gurope,
but frequently disagreed as to the way in which the objective cnuld be
effectively accomplished. Both groups wanted disarmament, but the
Government, under the pressure of events, came much sooner to the con-
clusion that it was necessary for Britain to rearm. The Labour Party,
also, had greater faith in collective security as an effective means of
preventing aggression by the fascist diet tors. The Labour Party con-
demned the policy of appeasement as short-sighted, and was more out-
spoken in its hostility to the fascist ideology. In spite of the fact
the Labour Party criticized the British Government's foreign policy, it
is doubtful whether the policy advocated by the Labour Party would have
changed the course of events during the period, 1931-1938.
During the major part of this period, the British Labour Party
pursued the illusive goal of multilateral disarmament. At home the
Labour Party opposed the appropriations for British armaments until
November of 1937, <>n the grounds that Britain's prmed strength was suf-
ficient to protect Britain. The Labour Party snd the Government both
desired disarmament; the latter wished to balance the budget, and the
former hoped money not appropriated for arms coulo be used for social
services. Both al 80 believed, for a time, (the Government until I93H,
the Labour P*rty until 1937) that increased armaments were unnecessary
for Britain's security. The Government's T>lan of 193U to increase the
efficiency of the air force became a full-fledged rearmament program in
M*rch of I936. The Labour Party believed th-t increased armaments were
not necessary aft th*t time because the combined strength of the n tions
of the League was sufficient to provide security, and th-t a sensible
foreign policy would make a Virge rearmament program unnecessary. It
was not until Hovember of I937, with Abyssinia conquered, the Tfoinelsnd
re-occupied, and the Spanish Government f^ced with defeat that the Labour
"^rty g-^ve its su^oort to the Government's rearmament program. Then, it
inconsistently criticized the -arograja because the British air force could
not meet the threat of the German air force.
As indicated above, the Labour Party's sup ort for British re-
armament was party conditioned by faith in the collective <^eurity ideal
si*
which the Labour P^rty thought the League 9$ Nations eoul 1 mvide. The
British frovernment did not place nearly ps much faith as the Labour Pnrty
did in the League of Hations as SB instrument of peace m$ security, The
policy followed by the Government and th*t ^dvoc^ted by the Labour pprty
during the Japanese invasion of Manchurir m& l he Italian invasion of
Abyssinia in 1935 illustrate the difference of opinion. In the case of
Manchuria the British Government sought to achieve its ends by h-ving the
league of Nations act as a mediator. It also urged the direct settle-
ment of the undeclared Vftf between China *>n^ Jsp»n. The Government gave
its support to the anointment of the I^ytton Commission to investigate
conditions in Manchurir, and accented the League's decision not to
recognise conquest by force, ^en the fceague trembly considered the
lhp,
report of the Lytton commission. Sir John Simon in a pro-Japanese speech
before the Assembly called attention to the *arts of the reoort tending
to cast discredit on China, such as anti-foreign propaganda and the boy-
cott. It was his belief that direct negotiations would be best and that
the League might be able to assist these talks. The Labour Party felt
that strong disapproval should be expressed by the League of Nations, -
the disapproval to take the form of the withdrawal of ministers from
Tokyo by the member states of the League. The Labour Party also urged
the member states of the League to adopt measures of "economic and finan-
cial constraint". It is problematical whether these steps would have
brought about the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria. The
difference between the attitudes of the Government and the Labour Party
was not one that opposed League of Hations activity in 19^1-19"^, while
the other opposed League of Nations activity. The basic difference was
that while the Government was reluctant to antagonize Japan by urging
League to take any steps of a concrete nature, the Labour Party proposed
*to T>ut it 8 disapproval into a specific plan of action to be undertaken
by the League of Nations.
In the case of Abyssinia, the question of collective action came
to the fore again. The Conservative Government, after much ecmi vocation,
gave surmort to the sanctions adopted by the League of Nations, and did
indicate its support of an oil embargo. The Labour Party strongly sup-
ported League sanctions against Italy, and urged the adoption of still
more stringent measures, including an oil embargo. The adoption of
effective sanctions, the Labour Party argued, would make it impossible
for Italy to conquer Abyssinia. This would not bring on war, but, on the
contrary, prevent one; Italy would not dare to attack the combined strength
of League of Hatlons. The Government evidently did not share this view
because fear* worked out a plan with Laval which *ould h-ve given Italy
territory along vith economic concessions, thus making it possible for
Italy to achieve Its aims without war. The failure of the attenmt to
coerce Italy by the League sanctions was evident by the early part of
1936. in July the league lifted its sanctions. The Abyssinian crisis
was the high point of the collective .action policy of both tha Govern-
ment and the Labour Prrty. After 1936, the Government -.aid little
attention to the Leagu* of Hations as 1 me^ns of praventir^ agression.
The Labour Party, however, still urged the Qove^nment to bring inteiw
national problems, such as the Civil War in Sxain, and the annexation of
Austria and the Sudetanl^nd of Czechoslovakia by Germany to the attention
of the League of ITations. It is to be noted th"t recuests in the«e
cases .ere not as frequent nor as urgant as before 193^, inserting
thpt faith had changed to hope.
The yhole of British foreign policy since I919 can be described
as a
;
.y easement, but the p~rticulrr phase of rppe^se^nt associated vith
Ji'cvi lie Chamberlain may be tald to have bogun on January 1937* vh«i|
the CJentlenien 1 s agreement was signed in Borne. The policy mMi the one
followed during aicst of the Civil War in Spain, and the annexation of
Austria tn<\ the Sudetenl?nd. Chamberlain 1 s policy van dedicate*"* to
achieving an agreement between the democracies and the fascist states.
The agreement was to come as a result of discussions, but the urogram
involved concessions to the Axis aa well as willingness to accent a
fait accoiiioli. It is concession that came to be most closely associated
I II *
with the policy of appeasement although apnea.sement vras often nerely
the acceptance of the fait accoKrpli . The latter was true in regard to
both the Civil War in Spain and the anschluss of Austria. At Munich the
policy of appeasement reached its climax; Hitler received all that he
demanded*
In the meantime the Labour Party urged the abandonment of non-
intervention in Spain, for a policy which would aid the Spanish govern-
ment. As regards Austria, the Labour Party mildly suggested th?t the
matter be brought before the League of Batten*, and there its policy
stopped. Perhaps the Labour Party felt that there could be no objection
to Germany incorporating Austria because the Austrians were Germans. It
did, however, object to the way in which the union was brought about.
When the threat to Czechoslovakia developed the Party again suggested
that the Leagae of fictions consider the problem. It also urged the
British Government to pledge its aid to Czechoslovakia if any attempt
was made to impair its sovereignty. This step would keep Czechoslovakia
intact and prevent the outbreak of war. By such a suggestion the Labour
Party indicated its definite opposition to the policy of appeasement.
Yet the Labour Party did not take the out-right position that Britain
should use force to protect Czechoslovakia. A guarantee they considered,
was all thnt was necessary. Vftien Chamberlain made the dramatic announce-
ment that Hitler had invited him to Munich, Attlee expressed his approval
of Chamberlain's acceptance of the invitation. It seems Impossible that
Attlee could not have known the probable outcome. After the Munich Agree-
ment was announced the Labour Party, except the pacifist wing led by
Lansbury, condemned it as betrayal, an act unworthy of Britain. The
Labour Party, however, had not offered a real alternative to appease-
ment at Munich. Perhaps the reason for that failure was that the League
&5.
of Nations uoon which the Labour Party ba,ed Ul foroign policy^
was no longer even potentially able to handle a crisis a
. serious as the
one in September of If*. Throughout the Csecho Slovakia* crisis, the
Government had taken the lead in urging concessions hy Cs echo Slovakia to
Germany, while the labour P*rty had opposed appeasement and urged that
Chechoslovakia alone he permitted to decide what concessions she would
she would grant to Germany.
It has been charged by some persons, Frederick L. Schumann for
example, that some Conservative P.rty members and leaders of the Govern-
ment were sympathetic to fascist ideology. The reason for the attitude
was the fear of communism, SOme even looking to the fascist dictators
for a check on the growth and spread of communism. The labour P-rty did
not share this distrust of communism, probably because the labour F- rty
believed in evolutionary socialism. To the Labour Farty communism was
the lesser of the two evils. In Spain, the fascist and communist
ideologies came into open conflict. Gercany and Italy gave *id to the
Pabels while Bussie helped the Spanish government. It is not surprising,
since many conservatives were sympathetic to fuse Ism, that the Government
adopted the oolicy of Non-intervention. To the Labour P*rty a fascist
victory seemed the more threatening of the two as far as Britain and
particularly British Labour was concerned. For that reason, the Labour
Party after first sun-porting Non-intervention, changed its viewpoint and
urged that the Spanish government be permitted to purchase /nat-ever was
necessary to defeat Franco and his followers. This difference was evident
in other instances also. The Labour Party urged the Gov nment to seek the
co-oper-tion of Russia, to be better able to meet the threat of aggression,
while the Government shied away from any outright co-operation with
Russia. It seems reasonably eUa* that hostility to or sympathy for
fascism or communism influenced the foreign policy of both the Governrentfs
rnd the British Labour Party's attitude, but with different results.
The Labour Party's attitude towards foreign policy was based
primarily «$#ft two major principles, international disarmament and col-
lective security. The former would make agression impossible, and the
latter vould crush exy aggression. These two ideals remained the key-
stones of the- labour Party's foreign policy during much of 1931-1938.
Even rt the time of Munich the Labour Party found it impossible to com-
pletely forget its hopes of accomplishing peace end security guarded- by
the League of Rations. For this reason the Labour P?rty seldom urged
the Governmert to tr^ke unilateral action, the one exception being the
proposed f&ar**t«« of Czechoslovakia's integrity. After the League had
failed to halt aggression by th<* fascist states, the Labour P*rty seemed
unable to bring forth any alternative to what it called ft "League of
Rations Policy*. The Government fittM much sooner to the conclusion that
the twin ideals of disarmament nnd collective security could not be
realized, but the Labour Party from the beginning to the m& of the period,
1931-1938, disliked the policy of appeasement, and vas desirous of pre-
venting the spread of fe?cism; indeed, the Lfbour Perty coveted the end
of fascism.
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